NUCLEAR WEAPONS, ARMS CONTROL, AND THE THREAT OF THERMONUCLEAR WAR: SPECIAL STUDIES
1993-1995
Reel 6
1993 cont.
0001 Proceedings of the Defense Nuclear Agency Conference on Arms Control and Verification Technology (ACT), June 1-4,1992.
Kaman Sciences Corporation,
The first Defense Nuclear Agency Conference on Arms Control and Verification Technology provided an international forum for over two hundred individuals from the arms control verification technology and national security communities for discussion on the future of arms control verification and technology developments. Papers were presented in the following sessions: Future Arms Control Initiatives, Interface between Intelligence and Arms Control, Lessons Learned, Proliferation in a Changing World, Verification Technologies: Roles and Applications, and Economics of Arms Control. Plenary sessions were held for general presentations on the future role of verification technology and on negotiating and implementing verification measures.
0454 From Conflict to Cooperation: The On-Site Inspection Agency as a Model for International Arms Control Organizations.
Naval
An international system is necessary in a multipolar world. The problem for today is learning how to develop cooperation, not just assume it. Most striking was the level of cooperation involved in the area of nuclear weapons. The
The search for a new strategy in the post-cold war era shows that reality is more complicated in a multipolar environment. The simpler assumptions that explained the antagonistic situation no longer apply. An attempt must be made to find and develop those structures that may foster overall cooperation. Nations can learn to work together in an area vital to national security, arms control, by working together. Nations can learn by doing if the structure of the organization does not hinder the process. Sustained cooperation, therefore, can be a product and precondition of the organization through the structure of a given treaty.
0548 The Chemical Weapons Convention Verification Regime: A Model for a New NPT?
Naval
In January 1993, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) was signed, completing the first step toward eliminating all chemical weapons. This treaty is the most comprehensive multilateral arms control treaty ever signed. The teeth of the CWC is a modern verification regime that includes traditional scheduled inspections as well as an innovative challenge inspection system: a party to the treaty may initiate a challenge inspection of another party if it believes there has been a treaty violation. The CWC has been called a model for future arms control treaties. The Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has been in force for twenty five years and has its fifth and final review conference in 1995. While the NPT has been both lauded and criticized over its lifetime, most authorities agree that it needs revision to meet the demands of the next century. One of the areas of the treaty requiring extensive review is the NPT verification process. This thesis examines the verification procedures delineated in the CWC and discusses the possibility of creating a similar verification regime for the NPT. It addresses the reasons why the CWC inspection might work for the NPT. It also addresses security questions that must be considered by a technologically advanced state, like the
0548 The Chemical Weapons Convention Verification Regime: A Model for a New NPT?
Naval
In January 1993, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) was signed, completing the first step toward eliminating all chemical weapons. This treaty is the most comprehensive multilateral arms control treaty ever signed. The teeth of the CWC is a modern verification regime that includes traditional scheduled inspections as well as an innovative challenge inspection system: a party to the treaty may initiate a challenge inspection of another party if it believes there has been a treaty violation. The CWC has been called a model for future arms control treaties. The Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has been in force for twentyfive years and has its fifth and final review conference in 1995. While the NPT has been both lauded and criticized over its lifetime, most authorities agree that it needs revision to meet the demands of the next century. One of the areas of the treaty requiring extensive review is the NPT verification process. This thesis examines the verification procedures delineated in the CWC and discusses the possibility of creating a similar verification regime for the NPT. It addresses the reasons why the CWC inspection might work for the NPT. It also addresses security questions that must be considered by a technologically advanced state, like the
1994
0627 Defense Against Toxin Weapons.
Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, Fort Detrick,
The purpose of this manual is to provide basic information on biological toxins to military leaders and health care providers at all levels to help them make informed decisions on protecting their troops from toxins. Much of the information contained herein will also be of interest to individuals charged with countering domestic and international terrorism. We typically fear what we do not understand.
Science Applications International Corporation,
This document is a compilation of the comprehensive test ban proposals, negotiations, and debates that took place between July 1945 and October 1993.
0728 Director's Series on Proliferation.
This abstract series on proliferation is an occasional publication of essays on the topics of nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile proliferation. Topics addressed in this issue are Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Do They Have a Role in the U.S. Military Strategy; Sanctions as a Nonproliferation Tool: Examining Costs and Benefits in the Iraqi case; Is the Traditional Regime Enough? The
0792 Weapons and Commercial Plutonium Ultimate Disposition Choices—Destroy "Completely" or Store "Forever."
Los Alamos National Laboratory,
All of the options under consideration for weapons and commercial plutonium disposition ultimately boil down to the choices of either "complete" destruction or storage "forever." None of the reactor-based plutonium burning systems demonstrated over the past fifty years of reactor development consume this material completely. Ultimately considerable unburned Plutonium must be stored "forever" from those systems. Plutonium is considered to be dangerous both as a weapons material and as a health hazard. While properly stored plutonium might never make its way back by natural phenomena into the environment as a health hazard, stored plutonium is always accessible to recovery for malevolent purposes. It must be guarded wherever in the world it is stored for as long as it continues to exist. Complete destruction of the plutonium eliminates this material as a concern of future generations. Los Alamos National Laboratory accelerator-driven technology promises to allow safe and complete destruction of this material. Furthermore it appears that in the process of destruction the neutron-rich features of the weapons plutonium provide benefits to society that place a value on weapons plutonium exceeding that of highly enriched uranium. A realistic time scale for development and deployment of burial technology either with or without partial burning in reactors is expected to be comparable with or to exceed the time for development and deployment of the accelerator-driven destruction method under study at
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1994cont.
0001 Ballistic Missile Defense Organization: FY 1995 Budget Estimates.
Ballistic Missile Defense Organization,
This president's budget submission reflects the fiscal requirements needed to accomplish the plan for Ballistic Missile Defense established in the Bottom Up Review (BUR). It is believed that the administration and the Congress have largely agreed on missile defense goals—to defend forward- deployed and expeditionary elements of
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