Nuclear Weapons, Arms Control, and the Threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction
1996–2001
Reel 1
1996
0001 Nuclear Proliferation: The Diplomatic Role of Non-Weaponized Programs.
USAF Institute for National Security Studies, U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, Colorado. Rosalind R. Reynolds. January 1996. 20pp.
The end of the cold war has not seen the end of reliance on nuclear weapons for deterrence or diplomacy purposes. The use of nuclear weapons for such purposes is as evident in the threshold states as in the nuclear powers. The nuclear weapon states used their nuclear weapons for deterrence, bargaining, and blackmail, even during the early years of the cold war when the U.S. was essentially nonweaponized. In the nuclear nonweaponized states in Asia a nonweaponized deterrent relationship is developing between India and Pakistan, and North Korea has used its nuclear program to restore diplomatic relations with the international community. The role of nuclear weapons in the post–cold war world is determined by the role of nonweaponized programs in proliferating states. This paper describes examples in South Asia and the Korean peninsula and shows that while an increased reliance on nuclear weapons programs may be a threat to the current nonproliferation regime, the focus on nonweaponized programs rather than on weapons themselves actually improves international security by reducing the threat of nuclear war.
0021 Five Minutes Past Midnight: The Clear and Present Danger of Nuclear Weapons Grade Fissile Materials.
USAF Institute for National Security Studies, U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, Colorado. Guy B. Roberts. February 1996. 80pp.
While weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have been recognized as a “major threat to our security,” with nuclear weapons being the most potentially devastating, it is less understood that growing stockpiles of nuclear weapons grade fissile materials (plutonium and highly enriched uranium) are also a “clear and present danger” to international security. Much of this material is uncontrolled and unsecured in the former Soviet Union (FSU). Fissile materials are the essential elements for nuclear bomb making. Access to these materials is the primary technical barrier to a nuclear weapons capability since the technological know-how for bomb making is available in the world scientific community. A determined proliferator will be capable of making a nuclear weapon irrespective of financial and political costs, as has been demonstrated in South Africa, Iraq, and North Korea. Strategies to convince proliferators to give up their nuclear ambitions are problematic since, for the most part, those ambitions are a part of larger regional security concerns.
0101 Nuclear Nonproliferation. Concerns with the U.S. International Nuclear Materials.
U.S. General Accounting Office, Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division, Washington, D.C. Victor S. Rezendes. February 28, 1996. 12pp.
A proposed agreement between the United States and the European Atomic Energy Community would impose controls on the export of some nuclear materials, nuclear reactors, and their major components between the United States and fifteen Western European nations. Keeping track of the growing volume of nuclear material is especially important because of the breakup of the Soviet Union and increases in both domestic and international terrorism. GAO testified that DOE’s nuclear materials tracking system, which serves as the primary source of information for the United States to track U.S. nuclear materials transported to foreign countries, has significant limitations. Moreover, recent information suggests that DOE’s replacement tracking system faces a high probability of failure because it has not been completely developed and tested.
0113 Nuclear Nonproliferation. Status of U.S. Efforts to Improve Nuclear Controls.
U.S. General Accounting Office, National Security and International Affairs Division, Washington, D.C. Harold J. Johnson. March 1996. 47pp.
Over the years, the Soviet Union produced about 1,200 metric tons of highly enriched uranium and plutonium. U.S. efforts to help the newly independent states of the FSU better protect their stocks of this deadly material—which are vulnerable to theft and diversion because of antiquated security systems—got off to a slow start but are now gaining momentum. Many independent states lack modern equipment to detect unauthorized removal of highly enriched uranium and plutonium from nuclear facilities. Seizures of nuclear material in Russia and Europe have heightened concerns about a possible black market for this material. The DoD has obligated $59 million and spent about $4 million during fiscal years 1991–95 for security improvements in Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. Initially the program moved slowly because Russian officials had refused access to their facilities, and DoD projects at facilities in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus were just getting underway. The program gained momentum in January 1995 when U.S. and Russian officials agreed to upgrade nuclear materials controls at five high-priority facilities. DOE plans to request $400 million over seven years to improve controls at nuclear facilities in the newly independent states. The expanded program faces uncertainties, however, involving its overall costs and U.S. ability to verify that the assistance is being used as intended. GAO summarized this report in testimony before Congress; see Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Help Newly Independent States Improve Their Nuclear Materials Controls, by Harold J. Johnson, associate director for international relations and trade issues, before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Senate Committee on Government Affairs.
0160 Nuclear Nonproliferation. U.S. Efforts to Help Newly Independent States.
U.S. General Accounting Office, National Security and International Affairs Division, Washington, D.C. Harold J. Johnson. March 13, 1996. 5pp.
Over the years, the Soviet Union produced about 1,200 metric tons of highly enriched uranium and plutonium. U.S. efforts to help the newly independent states of the FSU better protect their stocks of this deadly material—which are vulnerable to theft and diversion because of antiquated security systems—got off to a slow start but are now gaining momentum. Many independent states lack modern equipment to detect unauthorized removal of highly enriched uranium and plutonium from nuclear facilities. Seizures of nuclear material in Russia and Europe have heightened concerns about a possible black market for this material. DoD has obligated $59 million and spent about $4 million during fiscal years 1991–95 for security improvements in Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. Initially, the program moved slowly because Russian officials had refused access to their facilities, and DoD projects at facilities in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus were just getting underway. The program gained momentum in January 1995 when U.S. and Russian officials agreed to upgrade nuclear materials controls at five high-priority facilities. DOE plans to request $400 million over seven years to improve controls at nuclear facilities in the newly independent states. The expanded program faces uncertainties, however, involving its overall costs and U.S. ability to verify that the assistance is being used as intended.
0165 Nuclear Weapons. Status of DOE’s Nuclear Stockpile.
U.S. General Accounting Office, Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division, Washington, D.C. Victor S. Rezendes. March 13, 1996. 7pp.
DOE’s nuclear stockpile surveillance program uses various tests to detect problems in the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile, including defects and failures in nuclear weapons systems and components. This program is increasingly critical as weapons in the stockpile age beyond their originally planned lifespan. DOE has not done all the tests that it believes are necessary to ensure the reliability of the nuclear weapons in the stockpile, however. For some types of weapons, the tests are far behind schedule and DOE’s confidence in the reliability of these weapons is diminished. DOE has not done the scheduled tests for various reasons, including equipment problems, lack of space on missiles for testing, the absence of a required safety study, and delays in testing while testing operations were being transferred to new locations. Although DOE plans to get some tests back on schedule within a few years, other tests may not be back on schedule for the foreseeable future.
0172 Nonproliferation and International Security, 1996.
Los Alamos National Laboratory, New Mexico. Paul W. Henriksen, ed. April 1996. 23pp.
The proliferation of WMD and the means to deliver them remain major national security issues despite the end of the cold war. In the fall of 1993 the Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) Program Office and Division were established at Los Alamos National Laboratory to respond to the proliferation threat. The NIS mission is to develop and apply preeminent science and technology to deter, detect, and respond to proliferation and to ensure United States and global security. NIS works with many researchers in universities and other laboratories in the United States and around the world and with colleagues at Sandia and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories.
0195 Proliferation: Threat and Response.
U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C. April 1996. 84pp.
This document reports on the military threat posed by the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons—WMD—and their delivery systems. The report focuses on the WMD and missile threat in three areas: the technology that supports these systems, the current state of proliferation, and the DoD response to this threat. It also addresses the related problems of advanced conventional capabilities and generic problems of dual-use exports, covert purchasing networks, and concealment and mobility of WMD.