Nuclear Weapons, Arms Control, and the Threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction
1996–2001
Reel 5
1997 cont.
0001 Assessment of the Fiscal Year 1997 Department of Defense Budget and Program Activities for Domestic Defense against Weapons of Mass Destruction.
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Glenn R. Guenther. December 1997. 134pp.
This thesis examines DoD involvement in U.S. preparedness to manage the consequences of a nuclear, radiological, biological, or chemical terrorist attack against its cities. It analyzes the establishment and implementation of the Defense Against WMD Act of 1996, which directed DoD to assist in the training of state and local emergency response agencies involved in consequence management activities. The historical analysis focuses on the proliferation of WMD since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, major terrorist incidents since 1993, international standards, and legislative and executive efforts undertaken to combat terrorism up to 1996. The $150 million Nunn- Lugar-Domenici amendment to the fiscal year 1997 National Defense Authorization Bill is examined in detail from its introduction on the Senate floor to its eventual passage and enactment. Problems and policy issues associated with resourcing and implementing the resulting DPP are treated. Although DoD was given responsibility for implementing city training, an interagency effort ensued involving the Public Health Service, EPA, FBI, FEMA, DOE, and others. Potential weaknesses may materialize due to several characteristics of the DPP, including its novelty and uniqueness, the unorthodox legislative process by which it was established, and its complex organizational structure and temporary nature.
0135 Defense Against Toxin Weapons.
U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, Fort Detrick, Maryland. David R. Franz. 1997. 60pp.
This manual provides basic information on biological toxins to military leaders and health care providers at all levels to help them make informed decisions on protecting their troops from toxins. Much of the information contained herein is also of interest to individuals charged with countering domestic and international terrorism. Although understanding toxin poisoning is less useful in a toxin attack than knowledge of cold injury on an Arctic battlefield, information on any threat reduces its potential to harm. This primer puts toxins in context, attempts to remove the elements of mystery and fear that surround them, and provides general information that ultimately helps leaders make rational decisions, protect their soldiers, and win battles.
0195 Report of Proliferation-Related Acquisition in 1997.
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Langley, Virginia. [1998]. 8pp.
The director of central Intelligence (DCI) submitted this report in response to a congressionally directed action in Section 721 of the FY 1997 Intelligence Authorization Act. The act requires that not later than six months after the date of enactment, and every six months thereafter, the DCI shall submit to Congress a report on the acquisition by foreign countries during the preceding 6 months of dual-use and other technology useful for the development or production of WMD and advanced conventional munitions, and trends in the acquisition of such technology by such countries. The U.S. intelligence community continues to devote significant resources to combating the proliferation of WMD. These weapons pose a grave threat to U.S. and global security. Although the proliferation of WMD is extremely difficult to assess and to contain, progress has been made in improving collection and analyses and in making both the acquisition and development of WMD more difficult and costly for such countries. Nevertheless, the intelligence community is continuing to look for new ways to ensure that it is addressing proliferation in all of its facets, with particular focus on the areas of combating chemical and biological weapons and the acquisition of such technologies by rogue states or terrorist organizations.
0203 Counterproliferation Program Review Committee (CPRC) Annual Report to Congress.
Counterproliferation Program Review Committee, Washington, D.C. 1997. 162pp.
Congress directed, in the 1994 NDAA, that the CPRC be established to review activities and programs related to countering proliferation within OSD, DOE, U.S. intelligence, and the JCS. The high level national commitment to counter proliferation threats is reflected in the CPRC’s membership. It is chaired by the secretary of defense and composed of the secretary of energy (as vice chairman), the DCI, and the chairman of the JCS. The CPRC is chartered to make and implement recommendations regarding interdepartmental activities and programs to address shortfalls in existing and programmed capabilities to counter the proliferation of NBC WMD and their means of delivery. In the 1997 NDAA, Congress broadened the CPRC’s responsibilities and specified that the CPRC also review activities and programs of the CPRC–represented organizations related to countering paramilitary and terrorist NBC threats. The findings and recommendations of the CPRC’s annual review for 1997 are presented in this, its fourth annual report to Congress.
0365 Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare.
Borden Institute, Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Office of the Surgeon General, U.S. Army, Washington, D.C, and Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences, Bethesda, Maryland. Frederick R. Sidell, Ernest T. Takafuji, and David R. Franz. 1997. 736pp. This textbook focuses on the management of casualties. Its publication may be even timelier than expected, considering the increased threat of terrorism—both foreign and domestic. Terrorist attacks at home and abroad have heightened the interest of civilian health care providers and first responders and of other governmental agencies such as FEMA and the Public Health Service that are required to respond in case of an attack on American soil.
Reel 6
1998
0001 DOD Plan for Integrating National Guard and Reserve Component Support for Response to Attacks Using Weapons of Mass Destruction.
U.S. Department of Defense Tiger Team, Washington, D.C. January 1998. 78pp.
This plan was developed by direction of the deputy secretary of defense. Its aim is to improve the military capabilities required to effectively support local, state, and federal agency consequence management response to terrorist attacks. These attacks may include the use of nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical weapons—WMD. The plan is based on the premise that disaster relief is primarily a state mission. Given the unique nature of a WMD attack, DoD anticipates requests for federal assets much earlier than during typical disasters. Accordingly, DoD focused on the most likely tasks that it would be asked to support as the Federal Response Plan is implemented in support of a WMD event. With integration of the Reserve Component as its cornerstone, this work focused on the vulnerabilities from a U.S. state, territory, and possession perspective.
0079 The Proliferation Primer: A Majority Report of the Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services.
U.S. Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs, Washington, D.C. January 1998. 117pp. This Proliferation Primer discusses proliferation by the major suppliers of WMD technology, missile delivery systems, and key enabling technologies by examining cases in the public record. It includes evidence that implicates Russia, China, and North Korea, and it questions the current responses of the Clinton administration to the realities of proliferation as well as the administration’s assurance of the protection of America’s interests. The Proliferation Primer compares the Wassenaar Arrangement to its predecessor export control regime, Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), assessing whether the elimination of COCOM has given rogue nations and their suppliers increased access to the technology of the West. It also considers the consequences of the Clinton administration’s new policies that limit the controls over the export of dual-use technology, such as supercomputers. The Primer examines the increasing availability of missile hardware and expertise and discusses the difficulties of predicting when and how technological advances occur.
0196 Nuclear Nonproliferation and Safety. Uncertainties about the Implementation of US–Russian Plutonium Disposition Efforts
U.S. General Accounting Office, Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division, Washington, D.C. January 14, 1998. 37pp.
The United States and Russia have accumulated huge stockpiles of plutonium, a key ingredient in the production of nuclear weapons. Disposing of excess plutonium from both countries’ stockpiles, thereby precluding its reuse in nuclear weapons, is a major policy initiative of the Clinton administration. DOE’s disposition program seeks to decrease the risk of nuclear proliferation by reducing U.S. plutonium stockpiles by half— to about fifty metric tons over the next twenty-five years—and by influencing Russia to take reciprocal actions. Russia has yet to formally commit, along with the United States, to a program to reduce its plutonium stockpile, however. Moreover, it is unclear whether Russia agrees with the U.S. objective of reducing both countries’ stockpiles to equivalent levels or whether Russia is willing to make the financial commitment to such a disposition program—which could cost up to $2 billion over the next twenty-five years. Because it is uncertain when such an agreement will be signed, Congress may wish to link DOE’s future requests for program funding to assurances that Russia will take binding reciprocal actions.
0233 Consequence Modeling for Nuclear Weapons Probabilistic Cost/Benefit Analyses of Safety Retrofits. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, California. Ted F. Harvey, Lin Peters, Franklin J. D. Serduke, Charles Hall, and Douglas R. Stephens. January 1998. 45pp.
The consequence models used in former studies of costs and benefits of enhanced safety retrofits