st="on">Alabama. Scott M. Nichelson and Darren D. Medlin. April 1999. 62pp.
Recent presidential speeches have highlighted the threat posed by chemical and biological terrorism. But what about the first leg of the NBC triad? This paper examines the potential threat to U.S. interests from radiological weapons of terror, including both nuclear weapons and radiological dispersion devices (RDDs), devices that intentionally use radiation to harm. There are four main factors that increase the risk of nuclear and radiological terrorism to U.S. vital interests. First, technical knowledge is more readily available due to the Internet. Second, there has been a marked increase in source availability with the economic collapse of Russia. Third, security procedures are extremely lax, employing demoralized workers and utilizing grossly inadequate procedures. Finally, despite a decrease in the overall number of terrorist incidents, these attacks are becoming more lethal. These four factors taken together strongly suggest that it is only a matter of time before a nuclear or a radiological terrorist attack is levied against a vital U.S. interest. Consequences of a radiological and nuclear terrorist attack are also contemplated. Finally, countermeasures are discussed, including both preventive and consequence management actions. The paper concludes that a radiological terrorist attack will probably occur in the future and offers some recommendations for dealing with this eventuality.
0737 Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: U.S. Policy and Practice in the Late 1990’s
Air Command and Staff College, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Alan C. Bridges. April 1999. 59pp.
This paper analyzes U.S. policy on WMD proliferation, concentrating on the recent actions in pursuit of that policy. In 1998, it became apparent the U.S. nonproliferation strategy had broken down and possibly harmed its national security, namely in Chinese relations and over the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests. Also in 1998, the United States conducted two counterproliferation attacks: the August cruise missile attacks against the Sudan and Afghanistan and the December air strikes against Iraq. This paper’s thesis is that realism, rather than its stated idealist policies, drives U.S. nonproliferation and counterproliferation strategy. It analyzes these four cases to determine whether the United States’ nonproliferation actions and its counterproliferation attacks were consistent with its stated policy, and it also looks at other explanations for U.S. actions. It then discusses the implications of those actions, offering a solution for how to justify U.S. counterproliferation actions in the future. This analysis sides with Bradd Hayes, who offered a suggestion for a “Doctrine of Constraint” that places U.S. counterproliferation efforts on firmer legal ground. It recommends the United States push to change international law, offering an internationally recognized justification for its counterproliferation policy.
0796 The National Guard’s Role in a WMD Incident.
U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Robert L. Finn. April 5, 1999. 42pp.
In the aftermath of the cold war, the United States may well be facing its most formidable enemy. The enemy is a faceless individual or group, which has determined the only way the United States will understand their viewpoint is through the calculated and indiscriminate use of violent acts. Unfortunately, these acts now include the potential to use a WMD device. The defining domestic attack that caused the United States to review its laws and policies concerning terrorism occurred on April 19, 1995, in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. The National Guard initially established a RAID Element in each of the ten FEMA regions to assist first responders in a WMD incident. This strategic research paper identifies shortfalls in the existing National Guard policy and provides a more cost-effective RAID Element manning model to best support the first responders’ needs and retain the National Guard’s inherent responsibility to be the nation’s first military.
0838 Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Policy in Search of Direction.
U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Neil C. Lanzendorf. April 19, 1999. 50pp.
The list of countries possessing or building WMD programs is growing, indicating that the traditional nonproliferation regimes of the cold war era may have slowed but could not prevent the proliferation of WMD. The worldwide diffusion of information, globalization, advances in science and technology, and changes in the distribution of world power are creating powerful inducements and opportunities for states to proliferate and devaluing traditional nonproliferation measures. Nuclear testing by India and Pakistan in May 1998 was not simply a nonproliferation policy failure. Rather, it was the predictable outcome of complex world change and porous nonproliferation regimes. Future nonproliferation efforts must target “demand,” the inducements and political will to proliferate, more so than “supply,” and must focus at the regional level. This paper notes that in a world of continuing proliferation, greater resources should be applied toward counterproliferation.
0888 A Profile of WMD Proliferants: Are There Commonalities?
Air Command and Staff College, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Brian Anderson. May 1999. 41pp.
The JCS commissioned a study through the DIA to investigate both the background and personality characteristics of those individuals who proliferate WMD. The DIA is hopeful that some particular background traits will stand out and allow them advance warning that the potential for proliferation exists in a suspect. This study investigates three individuals: Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, who specializes in the proliferation of nuclear weapons; General Anatoly Kuntsevich, who specializes in the proliferation of chemical weapons; and Dr. Rihab Taha, who specializes in the proliferation of biological weapons. The study will provide extensive information regarding the history, education, political affiliation, and writings of each individual. The hypothesis of “WMD proliferants have common background traits” is tested via a traditional research methodology. The personality characteristics of these individuals will be analyzed in another study.
0929 Cooperative Approaches to Halt Russian Nuclear Proliferation and Improve the Openness of Nuclear Disarmament.
Congressional Budget Office, Washington, D.C. May 1999. 26pp.
In response to a request from the Senate Democratic leader, the Congressional Budget Office is analyzing a broad range of cooperative measures between the United States and Russia that could improve nuclear security. This memorandum responds to Senator Tom Daschle’s request for findings as they become available. (Earlier publications responding to the same request included two letters: one dated September 3, 1998, on improving Russia’s access to early-warning information, and another dated March 18, 1998, on the estimated budgetary effects of alternative levels of strategic forces.) The options included in this memorandum fall into two broad categories: (1) preventing the spread of nuclear materials and technical knowledge from Russia, and (2) improving openness, or transparency, in dismantling warheads and accounting for fissile materials.
0955 WMD and U.S. NBC Defense Readiness: Has America Provided the Attacker Asymmetric Advantage.
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Scott D. Kimmell. May 27, 1999. 67pp.
This monograph begins by examining the published definitions of asymmetry and asymmetric warfare as they exist in contemporary literature and official documents. In addition, NBC defense readiness is analyzed to determine the level of readiness that creates asymmetry in relation to WMD. From this review and analysis a definition of asymmetric warfare is developed. The definition and its components serve as the evaluation criteria to judge whether WMD use against the United States would be truly asymmetric. Case studies serve as the test environments or experiments (Operation Desert Storm and the 1996 Summer Olympic Games in Atlanta, Georgia). A review of current federal, state, and local actions to mitigate these deficiencies concludes the monograph.
1022 National Guard Homeland Defense Division Filling the Gap in WMD Defense. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Melvin G. Spiese. May 27, 1999. 56pp.
WMD pose a new and significant threat to American security. This paper contends the DoD response does little more than add small technical units to the current disaster relief structure. It argues that the National Guard can, if properly structured, provide genuine WMD homeland defense.