Nuclear Weapons, Arms Control, and the Threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction
1996–2001
Reel 9
1999 cont.
0001 Nuclear Weapons: DOE Needs to Improve Oversight of the $5 Billion Strategic Computing Initiative.
U.S. General Accounting Office, Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division, Washington, D.C. June 28, 1999. 74pp.
Historically, the United States has detonated nuclear weapons to determine their safety and reliability. Since 1992, however, there has been a moratorium on testing. As a substitute for actual testing, DOE developed the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program in 1995. The program uses various methods, including computer modeling, to ensure weapon safety and reliability. The strategic computing initiative seeks to develop advanced computer models that will simulate nuclear explosions in three dimensions with higher resolution than previous models and with a more complete treatment of the underlying basic physics. The initiative is also developing the world’s largest and fastest computers. GAO found that weak management and information processes have hampered oversight of this $5 billion initiative.
0075 Theater Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense: Guarding the Back Door.
School for Advanced Airpower Studies, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Igor J. P. Gardner. June 1999. 139pp.
This study examines the question: “Is the United States adequately preparing to counter the theater land attack cruise missile threat?” The overwhelming conventional war fighting capabilities of the United States, demonstrated during the Gulf War and more recent conflicts, have led potential adversaries to examine asymmetric means to defeat U.S. strategy. Of particular concern are WMD and the means to deliver them. This study examines the history of cruise missiles and theater missile defense. The treatment includes two case studies: Operation Crossbow, the Allied effort to counter German V-1 land attack cruise missiles and V-2 ballistic missiles, and the Desert Storm “Scud hunt.” The study next examines joint and service doctrine to determine whether the lessons from past theater missile defense efforts were incorporated, and how joint and service doctrine advocate countering the potential land attack cruise missile threat. Technological efforts to counter the threat are also examined, with the objective of determining to what extent the doctrine and technology mesh. The thesis concludes by exploring implications of identified deficiencies and then recommending ways to alleviate them.
0214 The U.S. Army and Doctrine for Weapons of Mass Destruction: Consequence Management Operations.
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Sean M. Jenkins. June 4, 1999. 79pp.
As the nuclear threat between the United States and the Soviet Union has diminished, new threats now face the nation. The end of the cold war world brought with it the unleashing of rogue states and terrorist organizations that no longer feel constrained by the superpowers. Coupled with the release of technology worldwide, no nation is riskfree from attack on its own soil. While the threat of terrorism in and of itself is not new, the threat of the use of WMD on American soil creates a new risk to national security. Tasked by Congress, DoD developed programs and capabilities to deal with consequences of a WMD attack on U.S. soil. This study conducts an analysis of the U.S. Army’s current WMD consequence management operations doctrine. The analysis is based on a model developed by Colonel Dennis M. Drew, a former air force officer who wrote numerous books and articles concerning military doctrine and strategy. The results of the analysis point to many shortcomings in current army doctrine. Recommendations are provided to better prepare the army to fulfill its role in consequence management operations.
0293 China as Peer Competitor? Trends in Nuclear Weapons, Space, and Information Warfare.
Air War College, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Kathryn L. Gauthier. July 1999. 43pp.
This paper analyzes the potential for China to emerge as a peer competitor of the United States in the coming decades. First, the author examines two traditional pillars of national strength—China’s status as a nuclear weapons state and as a space power. She then explores China’s growing focus on information warfare as a means to wage asymmetric warfare against a technologically advanced adversary. Third, the author carefully examines the status of the three programs, highlights areas of concern and potential conflict with the United States, and analyzes the implications of these issues for the United States.
0336 Combating Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Report of the Commission to Assess the Organization of the Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.
U.S. Congress, Commission to Assess the Organization of the Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Washington D.C. July 14, 1999. 278pp.
John M. Deutch and Arlen Specter chaired this commission. The report to the U.S. Senate assesses the state of weapons proliferation in places the United States sees as potential national security threats, from insecure Russian stockpiles of nuclear weapons to Saddam Hussein’s reputed supplies of anthrax. The report includes scenarios and recommendations and is a good source for information concerning the intelligence community’s assessment of the proliferation of WMD around the globe.
0614 Nuclear Blindness: An Overview of the Biological Weapons Programs of the Former Soviet Union and Iraq.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Emerging Infectious Diseases, Special Issue, Atlanta, Georgia. Christopher J. Davis. August 1999. 4pp.
The demise of the biological weapons capability of the United States in 1969 and the advent of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in 1972 caused governments in the West to go to sleep to the possibility of biological weapons development throughout the rest of the world, as technically knowledgeable workers were transferred and retired, intelligence desks were closed down, and budgets were cut. Throughout this period, both the FSU and Iraq conceived, albeit in different ways, their new biological weapons programs. It took until 1989–1991 for government technical experts in the West to persuade the world and their own governments that these programs were real and of enormous potential importance to the security of the West, if not the whole world. Too many times in the past we have failed to anticipate future developments—refused to think the unthinkable and expect the unexpected. This paper argues that the United States must learn to think like its potential adversaries if it is to avoid conflict or blunt an attack, because only superior thinking and planning (not just better technology) will enable it to survive biological warfare.
0618 National Security Report Communiqués and Treaties are Poor Shields: Implications of the U.S.–Russian Joint Statement on the ABM and START III Treaties.
House of Representatives, Armed Services Committee, Washington, D.C. Floyd D. Spence. August 1999. 4pp.
This critique of the Clinton administration strategic arms policies was issued in response to the adoption of the Joint Statement on the ABM Treaty and START III. Chairman Spence argues that the ABM Treaty is a relic of a bygone era.
0622 Nuclear Weapons: Year 2000 Status of the Nation’s Nuclear Weapons Stockpile.
U.S. General Accounting Office, Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division, Washington, D.C. August 20, 1999. 8pp.
GAO reviewed the actions that DOE and its contractors have taken to determine if any year 2000 problems exist with the nation’s nuclear weapons or supporting ancillary equipment. Based on GAO’s review of documents and the discussions GAO held with weapon design engineers, GAO determined that the nuclear weapons in the nation’s enduring stockpile would not be affected by the year 2000. GAO did identify process and documentation weaknesses: specifically, the process for designing, assessing, and certifying nuclear weapons is highly structured in order to ensure that the weapons remain safe and reliable; this process includes extensive documentation and peer review; however, DOE and Sandia National Laboratories management did not require this same level of rigor for the nuclear weapons year 2000 assessment and, consequently, the reviews performed were often unstructured, did not always include thorough documentation, and were subjected to minimal peer review.
0630 Nuclear Nonproliferation: Status of Transparency Measures for U.S. Purchase of Russian Highly Enriched Uranium.
U.S. General Accounting Office, Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division, Washington, D.C. September 24, 1999. 26pp.
After the breakup of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, there was concern that weapons-grade material from retired Russian nuclear weapons, such as highly enriched uranium and plutonium, could be stolen or reused in nuclear weapons if not disposed of or properly protected. In 1993, the United States agreed to buy five hundred metric tons of highly enriched uranium that had been extracted from dismantled Russian nuclear weapons during the last twenty years. From 1995 through 1998, 1,487 metric tons of low enriched uranium was delivered to the United States. The United States and Russia negotiated a series of access and monitoring