measures, known as transparency measures, at several nuclear materials processing facilities that are located in closed Russian nuclear cities. GAO concludes that although most of the transparency measures have gradually been implemented at four Russian processing facilities, several key measures have not yet been put into place. In addition, the
U.S. officials do not have access to Russian nuclear weapons dismantlement facilities and to the weapons dismantlement process. In a July 1999 classified report, GAO included information on whether the transparency measures ensure that the arms control objectives of the agreement are being met.
0656 Nuclear Nonproliferation: Status of Heavy Fuel Oil Delivered to North Korea under the Agreed Framework.
U.S. General Accounting Office, Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division, Washington, D.C. September 30, 1999. 30pp.
During the 1990s, North Korea’s nuclear program was suspected of producing nuclear material capable of being fashioned into nuclear weapons. To address this threat, the United States and North Korea signed the Agreed Framework in October 1994. In exchange, the United States pledged to help North Korea acquire two light-water nuclear reactors for electricity generation. The United States also pledged to arrange for deliveries of 500,000 metric tons of heavy fuel oil annually until the first reactor was completed. The agreement stipulates that the fuel oil is to be used for heating and electricity generation. Reports have alleged that North Korea has diverted some of the heavy oil for purposes not specified in the Agreed Framework, including resale abroad. This is GAO’s fourth report on issues related to the implementation of the Agreed Framework.
0686 Responding to the Challenge of Proliferation.
U.S. Information Agency, U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda, Washington, D.C. September 1999. 40pp.
This issue of U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda examines the U.S. response to the challenge posed by the proliferation of WMD and their missile delivery systems. Key U.S. officials, including Samuel R. Berger, John D. Holum, Eric David Newsom, Donald K. Steinberg, and Craig Gordon Dunkerley, outline U.S. initiatives for addressing and preventing proliferation; explore the threats posed by nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons; and review U.S. policy on conventional arms issues including landmines, small arms, and levels of military equipment and manpower in Europe. Lawrence Korb, a leading scholar, looks at the U.S. experience with WMD, and Amy F. Woolf, a congressional expert, outlines the status of arms control legislation in the U.S. Congress. U.S. Senator Richard Lugar examines the dismantlement of WMD in the former Soviet Union, while Peter R. Lavoy, a DoD official, and Bruce O. Riedel, a National Security Council official, focus on arms proliferation in India, Pakistan, Iraq, and Iran.
0726 The Military Role in Countering Terrorist Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction. Air War College, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Lansing E. Dickinson. September 1999. 59pp.
This paper examines the U.S. military capability to counter terrorist use of WMD. It describes the terrorist threat to U.S. forces and reasons why terrorists would use these types of weapons. Current U.S. national policy, strategy, and doctrine highlight the problem but show a need to improve interagency coordination and cooperation in the fight against terrorism. On the military level, combating the threat is an integral part of U.S. strategy but needs increased emphasis at the planning level. Capabilities do exist to deter or counter the threat, protect U.S. forces, and sustain and operate after an NBC attack. But countering a terrorist threat presents unique challenges to future leaders and requires improvements in intelligence, equipment, training, and education. The key to defeating the terrorist threat is timely and accurate intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination for detecting, characterizing, and countering the threat. Improvements in individual and collective protection are necessary to sustain operations. As important, the military needs to emphasize realistic joint and combined training and must add chemical and biological scenarios to future war games. Finally, the United States must be prepared to find and destroy terrorist weapons before they can be used against us.
0785 A Chemical and Biological Warfare Threat: USAF Water Systems at Risk.
Air War College, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Donald C. Hickman. September 1999. 42pp.
Water and the systems that supply it are national critical infrastructures. Attacks to deny or disrupt these systems could have catastrophic effects on the U.S. economy and military power. Water is particularly vulnerable to chemical or biological attack. Not limited to the “traditional” chemical weapons, an adversary has a plethora of cheap, ubiquitous, and deadly chemicals on the worldwide market. Using an Internet search and $10,000, the adversary could build a biological fermentation capability, producing trillions of deadly bacteria that don’t require missiles or bombs for delivery. The U.S. Air Force water supplies are particularly assailable by asymmetric attack. Institutional myopia renders water system vulnerability assessments disjointed and ineffective. Understanding this vulnerability requires systemic analysis. Probing notional water systems, this study identifies critical points, which if vulnerable could be targeted with chemical or biological weapons to functionally kill or neutralize USAF operations. Though water attacks are historically common, USAF conventional wisdom and official policy center on aerial chemical or biological attack. This study conclusively demonstrates the efficacy of chemical and biological weapons in drinking water. The author proposes four thrusts to improve force protection: comprehensive threat and risk assessment, focused water system vulnerability assessments, re-evaluation of the CW/BW conventional wisdom, and a review of Civil Engineering water system outsourcing and management practices.
0827 Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the U.S. Thru 2015.
National Intelligence Council, U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Langley, Virginia. September 1999. 15pp.
This is an unclassified summary of the U.S. intelligence community’s 1999 NIE on missile threats. As such, it reveals important insights into official U.S. thinking about long-range missile threats. It includes a realistic assessment of several countries that have or have had ICBM or space launch vehicle programs or intentions to pursue such programs. The report stresses ICBM threats from Russia, China, and North Korea, probably from Iraq, and possibly from Iran. The report takes into account the 1998 Rumsfeld Commission recommendations. The report notes that the probability that a WMD–armed missile will be used against U.S. forces or interests is higher in recent years than during most of the cold war.
0842 National Security Report Reforming the Department of Energy: Safeguarding America’s Nuclear Secrets.
House of Representatives, Armed Services Committee, Washington, D.C. Floyd D. Spence. September 1999. 4pp.
This critique of the Clinton administration nuclear energy policies was issued in response to the bipartisan Cox Committee report on the national security implications of U.S. technology transfers to the People’s Republic of China. Chairman Spence believes that reforming DOE is the next step in preventing nuclear espionage.
0846 Nuclear Nonproliferation: Heavy Fuel Oil Delivered to North Korea Under the Agreed Framework.
U.S. General Accounting Office, Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division, Washington, D.C. Gary L. Jones. October 27, 1999. 14pp.
During the 1990s, North Korea’s nuclear program was suspected of producing nuclear material capable of being fashioned into nuclear weapons. To address this threat, the United States and North Korea signed the Agreed Framework in October 1994. In exchange, the United States pledged to help North Korea acquire two light-water nuclear reactors for electricity generation. The United States also pledged to arrange for deliveries of 500,000 metric tons of heavy fuel oil annually until the first reactor was completed. The agreement stipulates that the fuel oil is to be used for heating and electricity generation. Reports have alleged that North Korea has diverted some of the heavy oil for purposes not specified in the Agreed Framework, including resale abroad. This is GAO’s fourth report on issues related to the implementation of the Agreed Framework. This testimony summarizes the September 1999 report.
0860 China and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Implications for the U.S.