ve the management, organizational, and programmatic structures it has inherited from DOE.
0692 U.S. Assistance in the Destruction of Russia’s Chemical Weapons.
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. December 2000. 75pp.
The thesis examines the present status of Russia’s chemical weapons destruction program, which is to be implemented according to the 1993 CWC. It assesses the magnitude of the challenges in destroying the world’s largest chemical weapons stockpile, which is located at seven sites in western Russia. It also evaluates the environmental and international security concerns posed by the conditions at these sites and the disastrous implications of a failure of this chemical demilitarization program. The thesis then investigates the development of the pilot nerve agent destruction facility at Shchuch’ye, Russia, which has been the primary focus of U.S. Cooperative Threat Reduction program support to the destruction of Russia’s chemical weapons. The thesis examines the apparent causes of decisions by the U.S. Congress to eliminate funding for this destruction facility in fiscal years 2000 and 2001, including concerns about Russian commitment to full implementation of the CWC. The thesis concludes with a review of arguments for continued U.S. and allied support for the destruction of Russia’s chemical weapons.
0767 Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through 31 December 2000.
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Langley, Virginia. [September 7, 2001]. 12pp.
Legislation directs the DCI to report to Congress on the acquisition by foreign countries during the preceding six months of dual-use and other technology useful for the development or production of WMD (including nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and biological weapons) and advanced conventional munitions; and trends in the acquisition of such technology by such countries. Acquiring countries noted by the DCI include Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Libya, Syria, Sudan, India, Pakistan, and Egypt. Key suppliers noted in the report include Russia, North Korea, China, and Western countries. Trends noted in the report include that countries determined to maintain WMD and missile programs over the long term have been placing significant emphasis on increased self-sufficiency and attempts to insulate their programs against interdiction and disruption, as well as trying to reduce their dependence on imports by developing domestic production capabilities.
0779 Nuclear Nonproliferation: Implications of the U.S. Purchase of Russian Highly Enriched Uranium.
U.S. General Accounting Office, Natural Resources and Environment, Washington, D.C. December 15, 2000. 41pp.
In 1993, the United States agreed to buy five hundred metric tons of highly enriched uranium from Russia. This uranium was extracted from dismantled nuclear weapons over a twenty year period. USEC, Inc. (the company that acts as an executive agent for the United States) paid Russia about $1.6 billion for more than three thousand metric tons of low enriched uranium blended from highly enriched uranium. Five of these deliveries to USEC have been delayed because, among other reasons, Russia was dissatisfied with the revenue it was getting from the sales. By the end of 1999, USEC had received about nineteen metric tons less than the agreement called for at that point in the contract. The U.S. government and USEC expect that the shortfall will be made up in the next few years. In addition to the uranium obtained from dismantled nuclear weapons, Russia is also proposing that the United States buy newly produced uranium processed in its commercial facilities. GAO recommends that this arrangement be assessed to determine its impact on the nuclear fuel industry and national security.
0820 Nuclear Weapons: Improved Management Needed to Implement Stockpile Stewardship Program Effectively.
U.S. General Accounting Office, Natural Resources and Environment, Washington, D.C. December 14, 2000. 112pp.
The NNSA’s ODP seeks to maintain the safety and reliability of the nation’s nuclear weapons stockpile without nuclear testing. This report discusses DOE’s management of its NNSA Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP), focusing on the program’s plans, budgeting, organization, and life extension process. ODP has developed a new structure for its fiscal year 2001 budget that can improve the overall management of the SSP. Several external and internal studies have found that ODP has a dysfunctional organization with unclear lines of authority that lead to a lack of accountability. Finally, one of the nine types of nuclear weapons in the current stockpile has begun the life extension process—a step that will be necessary to keep the nation’s nuclear weapons safe and reliable without explosive testing.