Nuclear Weapons, Arms Control, and the Threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction
1996–2001
Reel 12
2001
0001 Joint Service Chemical and Biological Defense Program, FY00–FY01 Overview.
U.S. Department of Defense, Deputy Assistant of the Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Defense Programs, Washington, D.C. January 2001. 83pp.
This report highlights the major programs of DoD’s CBDP. Army, navy, air force, and marines work together in the Joint Service CBDP. This document summarizes fiscal year 1999 accomplishments and describes goals for fiscal year 2000 and beyond incorporating Joint Vision 2010, Joint Future Operational Capabilities, and the commanders in chiefs’ counterproliferation priorities.
0084 Proliferation: Threat and Response.
U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C. January 2001. 133pp.
The publication serves as a multifaceted tool for decision making by providing background on the threat and U.S. progress toward countering that threat. The first section of this report details the proliferation of NBC weapons and their delivery systems and the threat they pose to U.S. and allied forces and U.S. interests abroad. The second section of the report describes DoD’s coordinated, comprehensive strategy to combat the international threats posed by the proliferation and possible use of NBC weapons and their delivery systems.
0217 This Arms Control Dog Won’t Hunt: The Proposed Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty at the Conference on Disarmament.
USAF Institute for National Security Studies, U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, Colorado. Guy B. Roberts. January 2001. 33pp.
Since 1993, a key component of U.S. nonproliferation strategy is the negotiation of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) in the Conference on Disarmament (CD). FMCT is packaged as a nonproliferation measure primarily designed to place a check on the weapons programs of the so-called “threshold” states: Israel, India, and Pakistan. It is also viewed as an arms control measure by engaging these nations in a limited, palatable process of capping expansion of their nuclear weapons programs and those of the nuclear weapons states: the United States, Russia, China, France, and Great Britain. The negotiations for an FMCT have stalled in the CD for over five years and could easily be called a failure. This paper contends that arms control measures will not resolve the reasons that have precipitated the proliferation of fissile materials. Consequently, it is argued that the United States will be better able to pursue its nonproliferation objectives through bilateral diplomacy encouraging the development of democratic institutions and peaceful resolution of regional disputes.
0250 Nuclear Nonproliferation: Security of Russia’s Nuclear Material Improving; Further Enhancements Needed.
U.S. General Accounting Office, Natural Resources and Environment and International Affairs and Trade. Washington, D.C. February 28, 2001. 48pp.
DOE is improving security of 192 metric tons of weapons-usable nuclear material in Russia by installing modern security systems that detect, delay, and respond to attempts to steal nuclear material. These systems, while not as stringent as those installed in the United States, are designed to reduce the risk of nuclear material theft at Russian sites. While Russia and the United States have worked cooperatively to reduce the risk of theft in Russia, Russian officials’ concerns about divulging national security information continue to impede DOE’s efforts to install systems for several hundred metric tons of nuclear material at sensitive Russian sites. Continued progress in reducing the risk of nuclear material theft in Russia hinges on DOE’s ability to gain access to Russia’s sensitive sites and reach agreement with the Ministry of Atomic Energy to reduce the number of sites and buildings where nuclear material is located. DOE currently does not have a means to periodically monitor the systems to ensure that they are operating properly on a continued basis. Such a mechanism would provide DOE officials with increased confidence that the security systems are reducing the risk of nuclear material theft. The strategic plan developed by DOE should provide an estimate of how much sustainability assistance is required on the basis of an analysis of the costs to operate and maintain the systems and the sites’ ability to cover these costs. In addition, the plan should provide options for completing the program on the basis of the progress made on gaining access to sensitive sites and the closure of buildings and sites.
0298 The Rollback of South Africa’s Biological Warfare Program.
USAF Institute for National Security Studies, U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, Colorado. Stephen F. Burgess and Helen E. Purkitt. February 2001. 51pp.
The profile of South Africa is of an increasingly isolated state that has felt threatened by a more powerful state actor and hostile regimes and movements in neighboring states. One response of the apartheid regime to changing threat perceptions in the region was to develop a chemical and biological warfare (CBW) program, along with continued support for a nuclear weapons program, to counter perceived threats. The decisionmaking process, which was secretive and controlled by the military, enabled a sophisticated program to be developed with little outside scrutiny. Today a divide exits between those who believe that South Africa developed one of the most sophisticated biological (and chemical) warfare programs and are concerned about proliferation and those who believe that it was a “pedestrian” program. The latter are focused more on the criminality and corruption of the program.
0349 USAMRIID’s Medical Management of Biological Casualties Handbook.
U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, Fort Detrick, Frederick, Maryland. February 2001. 136pp.
Medical defense against biological warfare or terrorism is an area of study unfamiliar to most military and civilian health care providers during peacetime. The purpose for this handbook is to serve as a concise pocket-sized manual that will guide medical personnel in the prophylaxis and management of biological casualties. It is designed as a quick reference and overview and is not intended as a definitive text on the medical management of biological casualties.
0485 General Report on Weapons Tests: Preliminary Hydrodynamic Yields of Nuclear Weapons.
Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico. Francis B. Porzel. February 27, 2001. 69pp.
This report presents the results of the analytic solution for hydrodynamic yields on test bombs during 1953. The report includes test results from each separate operation. It summarizes the principal results of studies over a number of years by the author.
0554 Preventing Catastrophe: U.S. Policy Options for Management of Nuclear Weapons in South Asia.
Air War College, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Martin J. Wojtysiak. March 2001. 46pp.
This paper proposes a response to the dangerous proliferation of nuclear weapons in India and Pakistan. The author highlights the threat in “The Nuclear Catastrophe of 2005,” a gripping projection of the worst-case scenario on the current realities of the Indian subcontinent. Written a year after the fictional catastrophe, it vividly describes the events leading up to the disaster as well as the grim aftermath of a South Asian nuclear war. The remainder of the paper looks at U.S. regional objectives and suggests how they might be achieved. The author proposes a regional proliferation regime that realistically addresses the threat and moves the United States to a pragmatic approach to manage and limit the ongoing proliferation in South Asia.
0600 Human Behavior and WMD Crisis/Risk Communication Workshop—Final Report.
Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and U.S. Joint Forces Command, Washington, D.C. March 2001. 77pp.
This report is a comprehensive analysis of a workshop on behavioral aspects of WMD, sponsored by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, the FBI, and the U.S. Joint Forces Command on December 11–12, 2000. It describes the results of the workshop and includes lessons learned from past experiences, addresses unresolved issues that were identified by combining the expertise of the participants, and presents prioritized recommendations for future research, analysis, and other activities. The report includes recommendations not only from the panel itself, but also from a senior advisory board created specifically for this workshop.
0677 Application of National Guard Civil Support Teams in Support of WMD Mitigation Efforts.
U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Michael Bosma. March 7, 2001. 22pp.
The function of this paper is to support the contention that CSTs are a valuable resource in DoD’s effort to mitigate the effects of WMD. The research focuses on the cost-benefit analysis, legal basis, tactical employment, and technological threat assessment involving these teams. The history of how CSTs were developed and organized is discussed as well as current operating challenges. Presidential policy directives and title 10 of the United States Code are referenced as guiding documents for the utilization of CSTs. The