summary and conclusion positively reflect the position that CSTs are an invaluable resource in WMD mitigation efforts. The CST program itself, however, would benefit from a reassessment of its organization and staffing.
0699 Integrating the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve into the Weapons of Mass Destruction: Consequence Management Role.
U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. George E. Irvin Sr. March 29, 2001. 75pp.
The reserve component (RC) has played a major role in the defense of this nation for more than a quarter of a century and will have an extensive role in defending against the terrorist threat. This paper examines how the Army National Guard (ARNG) and the Army Reserve (USAR) have stepped forward to assume their roles in national defense. The ARNG and the USAR were once referred to as weekend warriors with little credibility with the active component (AC). The paper details the ARNG and the USAR roles in WMD consequence management of homeland defense, as well as the training, equipment, and ARNG response role of chemical and biological threats. It also shows how ARNG and USAR partner with the AC and other federal agencies, such as FEMA, to carry out this mission. The paper also shows how state and local communities will be integrated into the WMD defense preparedness process.
0774 Slowing the Genie’s Spread: Reversing the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.
Air Force Fellows Program, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. William T. Eliason. April 2001. 86pp.
This paper identifies the theoretical debate on why states chose to possess WMD capabilities and how they chose to control their use. It reviews U.S. and international efforts to identify, track, deter, and control the development and deployment of WMD after the demise of the USSR in 1991. A theoretical model of emerging WMD nations is proposed to assist in shaping counterproliferation policy and capabilities. A discussion of U.S., allied, and international organizations obligations and opportunities for preventing further development and deployment of WMD around the world, countering these capabilities before, during, and after combat operations, is provided. A number of case studies and a theoretical scenario are presented to define potential alternatives available to deter and counter potential adversaries. A counter WMD “toolkit” of policies and capabilities, which will provide the United States, allies, and international organizations a potential improved ability to deal with these emerging threats, is also proposed.
0860 National Missile Defense: Laying the Groundwork for Future U.S. Security Policy.
Air Force Fellows Program, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Jeffrey P. Harrell. April 2001. 56pp.
This paper considers national missile defense and U.S. national security. It posits that international security has come to a crossroad. A time has come for the United States to examine its role and policies with relation to international security. In addition to changes in the international security environment, major technological changes have altered the capabilities and roles of defense systems. It is possible that we now have the capability in a national missile defense program to field a defensive system capable of protecting nations from WMD. This paper examines the geopolitical impacts of fielding the national missile defense system to include the impact on U.S. relations with other nations and the impact on arms control treaties. In addition, it examines the relationship between missile defense, deterrence, and diplomacy and recommends a map for future U.S. security policy.
0916 New Conventional Weapons: Reducing Reliance on a Nuclear Response Toward Aggressors.
Air Force Fellows Program, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Gary W. Lane. April 2001. 71pp.
This paper describes a new era of warfare, one in which war fighting and strategy paradigms must change due to unconventional threats and the U.S. position is further complicated by evolving technology, emerging states, rogue nations, and terrorist groups. This paper explores military options to acts of aggression against American citizens, forces, and allies that the U.S. tactical nuclear weapons stockpile previously held in check during the cold war. It does not advocate totally removing the tactical or limited nuclear options or doing away with the strategic nuclear shield; it notes only that the United States has the means to reduce the tactical nuclear stockpile size given new conventional weaponry technology and its ability to pick up some of the missions/targets previously assigned to nuclear weapons. To develop this premise, this paper reviews the history of United States nuclear policy, explores emerging threats the United States and its allies face, examines new conventional weapons, and provides a range of military options to acts or threats of terrorism or warfare.
0987 Coalition Warfare: Gulf War Allies Differed in Chemical and Biological Threats Identified and in Use of Defensive Measures.
U.S. General Accounting Office, Applied Research and Methods, Washington, D.C. April 24, 2001. 51pp.
GAO confirmed differences among the United States, the United Kingdom, and France in the rates at which illnesses have been reported among their Gulf War veterans; their assessment of NBC threats in the Gulf; and their preparations to meet them. Because of differences in the experiences of the three sets of veterans, however, there is no single, unambiguous cause that can be identified for the reported illnesses. If multinational allies are to act in a coordinated fashion, they require a similar level of awareness of and preparation for the threats to be faced; otherwise, force protection and operational success could be jeopardized and the utility of some forces restricted. Gulf War coalition members prepared for somewhat different threats and used different countermeasures. In addition, the United States lacked clear doctrine for timely and systematic warning of allied forces and U.S. ground troops about pending strikes on suspected NBC targets.
1038 Managing Proliferation in South Asia: A Case for Assistance to Unsafe Nuclear Arsenals.
Air War College, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Robert E. Rehbein. April 2001. 35pp.
Three years ago, the series of nuclear explosions in South Asia removed any hope that nuclear weapons would remain “in the closet.” This paper notes that in order to reduce the chances for an inadvertent nuclear exchange in South Asia, American policy makers should adopt a novel solution to help “manage” proliferation: they should transfer selected nuclear weapon C2 systems to India and Pakistan. The objective is to transform inherently destabilizing nuclear arsenals into forces less likely to be fired in anger or in error. This paper reviews why these countries developed nuclear weapons and why it will be so hard to force them to abandon them. It asks whether nuclear weapons inherently improve stability, paying special attention to unique challenges in South Asia. It addresses whether nuclear C2 can mitigate problems associated with nuclear weapons. Finally, it examines where the shortfalls are in India and Pakistan’s nuclear C2 arrangements, recommending where the United States should lend assistance.
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2001 cont.
0001 HOMA: Israel’s National Missile Defense Strategy.
Air Command and Staff College, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Guermantes E. Lailari. April 2001. 117pp.
This paper addresses a research question posed by the USAF Institute for National Strategic Studies. The desired general objective of the research was to discuss the strategic needs and military objectives in a particular region or country of how theater missile defense supports or jeopardizes U.S. NMD strategy. This research examines Israel’s national missile defense program, called Homa (Hebrew for Fortress Wall). From all the research conducted for this paper and after examining all the costs, risks, and benefits of an Israeli NMD, the author strongly recommends that the United States and Israel, along with other friendly countries, continue to work hard against the missile threat and overcome its tactical, operational, strategic effects.
0118 Homeland Biological Warfare Consequence Management: Capabilities and Needs Assessment.
Air Command and Staff College, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Dawn E. Rowe. April 2001. 57pp.
In the late 1990s, concern over potential terrorist WMD acts in the United States has blossomed. Between 1995 and 2001, the United States has passed legislation and published PDDs designed to enhance U.S. capabilities to respond to such an incident. Additionally, millions of dollars have been spent on domestic preparedness. Yet the number of agencies involved makes a comprehensive, organized solution to the problem difficult. This paper examines the consequence management, functions (incident identification, unity of effort, containment, treatment, security, fatality management and social response) and capabilities and shortfalls of local, state, and federal assets. The paper notes significant progress by the federal government and National Guard in building treatment supply st