[27] “Memorandum by Young to Allison”, June 13, 1952, FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. XV, pp. 328-337.
[28] 大使馆官员代表的急进观点则走得更远,他们关注于政权的内部合法性基础,而不仅是外部象征性。
[29] John Kie-chiang Oh, “Role of the
[30] “Murphy to Muccio”, June 20, 1952, FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. XV, pp. 346-347.
[31] “Muccio to Murphy”, June 23, 1952, FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. XV, pp. 349-351.
[32] “JCS to
[33] 即“达成一个宪法妥协方案,既能体现李要求的直接选举和两院制,又能包括国会提出的对政府的控制;取消戒严令;释放被捕议员并不予审判;对部分议员的审判应该公开;在独立监察的情况下进行选举;不得清洗反对派和以死刑进行政治袭击;解除李承晚亲信如李范奭等人的职务;军队不受政治干预和政治任命;停止排外宣传。” “Johnson to Embassy in UK”, June 24, 1952, FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. XV, p. 352.
[34] 宪法修订案的最主要的四个方面:1)总统及副总统由选民而不是国会直接选出。2)建立一个选举产生的上院分享现有国会的权力,以形成两院制国会。3)国务总理提名内阁成员,由总统任命,国会批准。4)内阁主要向国会负责。国会若以三分之二多数票通过不信任案,内阁须辞职。如果内阁已经任期一年,简单多数即可。
[35] “Muccio to Department of State”, July 12, 1952, FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. XV, pp. 402-403.
[36] Chung G. Kim,
[37] 《朗文当代英语辞典》(英文1995年版)的解释是:to improve something by supporting it。
[38] Douglas J. Macdonald, Adventures in Chaos: American Intervention for Reform in the Third World,
[39] Edward A. Olsen, “
[40] Douglas J. Macdonald, Adventures in Chaos: American Intervention for Reform in the
[41] Jong Yil Ra, “Political Crisis in
[42] Adam Garfinkle, “Friendly Tyrants: Historical Reckoning”, in Daniel Pipes and Adam Garfinkle (eds.), Friendly Tyrants: An American Dilemma, p. 250.
[43] David S. Painter, “Explaining
[44] Edward C. Keefer, “The Truman Administration and the South Korean Political Crisis of 1952: Democracy’s Failure?” Pacific Historical Review, Vol.60 (1991), pp. 145-168.
原载于《史林》2008年第1期
(责任编辑:冷战编辑)
版权、转载等相关信息请阅读本站的“版权声明”