英国利物浦大学Michael Hopkins教授即将来中心讲座，预演讲的题目是冷战时期的美国国务卿与美国对外政策。
时间：23日晚7：00-9：30，第一场；24日上午9：00-11：30，第二场；
地点：国际冷战史研究中心会议室（闵行校区人文大楼5号楼5401室）
The US Secretary of State and American Foreign Policy in the Cold War Era
By Michael F. Hopkins
University of Liverpool
These lectures aim to examine the role of the Secretary of State in the formulation and execution of American foreign policy from the emergence of the Cold War in the 1940s to the end of the conflict in 1988-1991. They give particular emphasis to three themes. First, the individuals holding this office, their talents, character, grasp of international affairs and working relationships. Secondly, the institutional framework for formulating and executing policy, in particular the extent to which the secretary and the State department were at the centre of the process and the degree to which White House aides, the National Security Adviser and the NSC, the Defense Secretary and the Pentagon had an influence. Thirdly, the foreign policy ideas of the administration and the contribution of the secretary to these ideas.
The first lecture considers the presidency of Harry S. Truman (1945-1953), who was served by Edward R. Stettinius, James F. Byrnes, George C. Marshall and Dean G. Acheson. It pays particular attention to Byrnes and Acheson. Both were talented but only under Acheson did the President-Secretary relationship work effectively. These years saw the emergence of tensions over Iran, Turkey and Greece, but Germany was the main focus of trouble that saw the development of the Cold War and the American policy of containment that would influence US policy for a generation and more. It concludes that Acheson was the most influential, an influence based on his service as under secretary 1945-1947 and as secretary in 1949-1953.
The second lecture addresses the administrations of Ronald Reagan (1981-1989) and George H. W. Bush (1989-1993) and their secretaries Alexander M. Haig, George P. Shultz and James A. Baker. This decade saw greater competition for influence in foreign policy making than in the Truman years. The NSC and the National Security Adviser, the Secretary of Defense and the Pentagon all wielded more influence. The Nixon presidency witnessed a growth in the role of White House officials. The secretary could not assume the ascendancy he had enjoyed in the Truman (and Eisenhower) presidencies. But Shultz and Baker did play important parts. These years saw the articulation of a strong anti-communist ideology with Reagan calling the Soviet Union an ‘evil empire’ while analysts talked of a new Cold War. The second lecture concludes that Reagan gave vital direction to the breakthrough with the Soviet Union by seizing the opportunity that Gorbachev offered, but that only happened thanks to the skilful exploitation of the situation by the gifted Shultz. The final removal of the remaining features of the Cold War world was accomplished by Baker whose talents as a deal maker were crucial. Shultz stands out as the most effective secretary in this era, someone who valued the work of the State department more than either Haig or Baker.
The general conclusion is that American foreign policy was at its most successful when there was an effective working relationship between the secretary and the president and when the secretary was talented and was able to have a prominent voice in the president’s counsels, and when they adopted a clear strategy and a coherent diplomacy. This was true in the second Reagan administration and in the Bush administration. However, it was most visibly true for Marshall and Acheson in the Truman years, for neither Shultz nor Baker enjoyed the dominant position as foreign policy advisers that Truman gave to his secretary of state.
(责任编辑：冷战编辑)
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