Transforming the Cold War: China and the Changing World，1960s-1980s
An International Conference
冷战转型：1960-1980年代的中国与变化中的世界
国际学术讨论会摘要
第一场 中苏分裂――由来与发展 December 20 （12月20日）
Session I Sino-Soviet Split：Origins and Development（10:30-12:30 ）
Socialist Brotherhood or Great-Power Chauvinism: Reexamining the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship，Alliance and Mutual Assistance
社会主义兄弟情谊还是大国沙文主义：1950年中苏友好互助同盟条约再探讨
Douglas Stiffler，李滨
Summary
On March 31, 1956, less than two months after Khrushchev shocked the 20th CPSU Congress with an account of Stalin’s crimes and incompetence, the Soviet ambassador to China, Pavel Iudin, was received by Mao Zedong. Iudin’s goal was to brief Mao on the 20th CPSU Congress, but Mao -- assuring Iudin that he was already quite familiar with the content of the Congress – instead spent three hours telling Iudin how wrong Stalin had been on the Chinese revolution. Mao focused particularly on mistakes Stalin and the Comintern had made in the late 1920s and in the 1930s, when the CCP was led by Li Lisan and then Wang Ming, and then on mistakes made in the post-World War II period. Mao charged that Stalin had forced the CCP into negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek in 1945, had tried to force a peace agreement on the CCP in 1947, and had long harbored suspicions of Mao becoming a “Chinese Tito.” Mao charged that when he went to Moscow in December 1949 Stalin “avoided a direct answer” on the signing of a Sino-Soviet Treaty. Even when Stalin did agree to negotiations, Stalin made unreasonable demands, “proving once again Stalin’s lack of trust in and suspicion of the Communist Party of China.” [See P. Iudin, “Zapis’ besedy c tovarishchem Mao Tszedunom, 31 Marta 1956 goda,” Problemy dal’vogo vostoka Vol. 5 (1994), pp. 105-106]
Even though Iudin’s account of Mao’s comments, found in the Soviet Central Committee archives, was published only in 1994, scholars have known for years that Mao said many less-than-complimentary things about Stalin and the Comintern. Mao was most vocal after Khrushchev’s Secret Speech in 1956, when criticism of Stalin was no longer taboo in the socialist world. To what degree have scholars relied on Mao’s post-1956 statements on the wrongs done to the Chinese revolution by Stalin, and how reliable are these statements in reconstructing the history of Sino-Soviet relations? In this paper, I argue that an over-reliance on Mao’s post-1956 statements by Western scholars has led to fundamental misunderstandings of the Sino-Soviet relationship. Mao was a notoriously “flexible” thinker, one whose opinions and strategies changed not just with time, but sometimes on a day-to-day basis. It should not be surprising that Mao most often made statements with contemporary political purposes in mind, and that these cannot be relied upon – exclusively – by historians.
The contemporary political atmosphere in which scholars have written and their access to sources seem to have largely conditioned their attitudes towards Sino-Soviet relations. In the first phase, in the late 1940s and early 1950s knowledgeable American analysts accurately predicted that Sino-Soviet comity would break down, eventually. But politicians and popular commentators in that decade spoke of a Socialist bloc, a monolith comprising more than half of the world’s peoples: this fear became embedded in American politics and popular culture.
As is well known, the rupture in Sino-Soviet relations dates back at least to Khrushchev’s withdrawal of Soviet advisers in 1960, itself in part a response to the escalating Sino-Soviet polemic. The Sino-Soviet “war of words” might be said to have begun in Sino-Soviet disagreements over the Secret Speech in 1956 and to have reached its public peak in the years leading up to the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution in 1966 (at which point a new dynamic ensued). [This is the subject of Lorenz Luthi’s forthcoming book.]
In a second scholarly phase, Western scholars produced a mountain of literature documenting a “Sino-Soviet Split” which at times American politicians and pundits seemed not to quite believe. With the border skirmishes between Soviet and Chinese troops in 1969, however, evidence of mutual hostility became undeniable to all but the most dyed-in-the-wool conspiracy theorists. The Cultural Revolution-era revelations of speeches Mao made in the late 1950s in which he castigated Stalin for his errors seemed to confirm that there had been a “secret history” of enmity stretching back to the very beginning. All one had to do was look to the statements of one who was there at all the key points: Mao Zedong.
With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the concomitant flood of new documents, a third phase of scholarship has begun. A new generation of scholars (and some of the previous generations) has undertaken to re-analyze the Sino-Soviet relationship in the light of new archival documents and new memoirs. (Archival releases have been selective, however, and memoirs of events a half-century in the past have not been totally illuminating, either.) The result has been new scholarship – much of it published by Chinese scholars who are now in regular contact with their Western counterparts – showing that Sino-Soviet relations were neither a case of “unbreakable friendship” nor a case of “great-power chauvinism” from the beginning. Using a range of sources, including but not limited to Mao’s ex-post-facto statements, scholars are now able to show the Sino-Soviet relationship as one not “over-determined” by either brotherhood or emnity, but a relationship subject to twists-and-turns, contingencies… even accidents of history.
In reexamining the Stalin-Mao negotiation of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1950, I will show that Western scholars – perhaps over influenced by Mao’s ex-post-facto statements and the scholarly imperative to find the “roots” of the Sino-Soviet Split – have right up to the present continued to misinterpret this Treaty negotiation as a negative experience for Mao and as a Treaty skewed towards the benefit of the Soviet Union. In fact, Chinese scholars have more recently – and accurately, in my view – argued that the Treaty was a victory for Mao, one which substantially bolstered the CCP and Mao himself in the first years of existence of the PRC. As we shall see, some of the Treaty’s key provisions, later complained about by Mao and cited by the Chinese as evidence of “great-power chauvinism” were originally proposed by the Chinese side.
When the origins of the Treaty are seen in this light, the Sino-Soviet Split of the 1960s begins to look less historically over-determined and more contingent on the events and personalities of those years.
内容提要
在苏共二十大赫鲁晓夫发表令人震惊的揭露斯大林罪行和不当行为的秘密报告的一个多月后，毛泽东接见了苏联驻华大使尤金。尤金此次谈话的目的是要向毛泽东介绍苏共二十大的情况。但毛泽东却让尤金放心，说他已经很了解二十大的内容了，然后花了三个小时的时间来谈斯大林过去在中国革命问题上犯的错误。毛泽东主要谈了斯大林和共产国际在李立三、王明领导下的20和30年代以及二战后期在中共问题上犯的错误。毛指责斯大林在1945年强迫中共与蒋介石谈判，并在1947试图强迫中共接受一个和平条约。而且斯大林一直心存疑虑，担心毛会变成一个“中国铁托”。毛泽东指出，他1949年12月前往莫斯科时，斯大林不愿就关于签署中苏条约的问题给予中方直接回复。即使在已经同意就签署新的同盟条约进行协商之后，斯大林仍向中方提出许多苛刻要求。斯大林的这些举动再次表明了他对中共缺乏信任。[1]
前苏联中央档案馆内发现的尤金关于毛与他的这些谈话的记录直到1994年才被公开发表。但在此之前，相关研究学者们其实早已了解到毛泽东说了许多对斯大林和共产国际表示不满的话。在赫鲁晓夫1956年秘密报告后，社会主义阵营内斯大林的盖子被揭开，毛泽东批评斯大林和共产国际的调子也提到最高。那么，研究学者们究竟在多大程度上能倚赖毛泽东1956年后期的这些讲话来评判斯大林在中国革命问题上所犯的错误？以及毛泽东的这些讲话在多大程度上能帮助我们重构冷战中苏关系的历史？我在这篇论文中要论证由于过于毛泽东在1956年后期讲话的这些内容，西方学者在冷战时期中苏关系的问题上产生了许多根本上的误解。毛泽东是一个出了名的“灵活”思想家，他的想法和策略经常随着时间、情势而变，有时甚至是一天一变。所以我们不必惊讶于毛泽东会经常根据当时心中的政治目的来谈问题，而历史学家们则不能不加分析就把他的这类谈话内容用作解读历史的唯一根据。
研究学者们身处的政治环境和资料来源在很大程度上制约了他们对中苏关系的看法。 在40年代末和50年代初冷战研究的第一个阶段，那些颇有见地的美国分析家们就准确地预测了中苏同盟必然最终分裂。 但是对于那个时代的政客们以及时事评论家们来说，社会主义阵营就是一个拥有世界过半人口的牢不可破的整体。这种对社会主义阵营的恐惧感深深植入了美国政治和大众文化的体内。
正如大家所熟知的，中苏关系破裂至少可以追溯到1960年赫鲁晓夫单方面召回全部在中国工作的前苏联专家。而苏联的这一举动，在一定程度上也可以看作是对正在升级的中苏争论的一个回应。或许可以说，中苏争论在中国与苏联在关于1956年秘密报告问题上产生不同观点时就已经开始了。这场争论随之向深层次发展，然后达到分歧公开且白热化，并一直持续到1966年中国文化大革命开始（这时，新的动向产生了）[这是Luthi即将出版的书的主题]
在第二个学术研究阶段，西方学者写了大量著作来论述“中苏分裂”。而那个时期的美国政治家和政治评论家们对这类论调并不十分相信。但是随着1969年中苏边境冲突的发生，除了那些彻头彻尾的阴谋论者，所有人都相信了已经证据确凿的中苏分歧与对立。而文革期间揭露的毛泽东在50年代后期的那些讲话内容似乎表明的确存在一段中苏之间由来已久的敌意的“秘密历史”，而其根源可以追溯到中苏关系建立的最初。冷战中苏关系所有关键时刻都在场的毛泽东的讲话似乎可作为充分证据。
1991年前苏联解体以来大量档案材料的解密推动了相关历史研究进入一个新的时期。新一代的研究学者（和一些前一时期的学者们）利用这些新近解密档案和历史亲历者们的回忆录，重新审视并分析冷战中的中苏关系（当然，档案的解密是经过审核和挑选，而那些对过去半个世纪历史事件的回忆也并不是完全清晰) 。新时期中苏关系研究的文章有很大一部分是中国学者发表的，他们现在经常与西方学者们沟通。这一时期的冷战历史研究表明中苏关系从一开始就既不是“牢不可破的友谊”也不是“大国沙文主义”。通过解读各类相关材料，当然也包括毛泽东那些事后的讲话，我们现在可以证实不能用兄弟情谊或充满敌意来简单地给中苏在冷战中的关系定性。事实上，中苏之间的关系受到历史诸多曲折因素、紧急情况甚至突发状况的影响。
通过重新研究斯大林与毛泽东关于1950年中苏同盟条约的谈判，我发现西方的学者直到现在仍将这个中苏友好同盟条约误解为“一边倒”地有利于苏联的条约。事实上，中国学者们研究认为，1950年的中苏同盟条约对毛泽东来说是一个胜利。在新中国建立的最初几年里，这个条约的成功签署在相当程度上支持和巩固了毛泽东和中共的领导地位。在我看来，他们的这个论断比西方学者的论述更新、更准确。我们可以看到，一些被毛泽东引用证明苏联“大国沙文主义”的条约规定，最初其实是中方提出的。
当了解到中苏条约的根源后，60年代中苏分裂也因受到很多事件和人物个性因素的影响而变得更具偶然性，不单纯是历史演变的必然了。
Engagement or Containment? Soviet Policy toward China，1965-66
交往还是遏制？1965-1966年的苏联对华政策
Sergey Radchenko[2]，拉钦科
Summary
Following Khrushchev’s fall in 1964 the new Soviet leadership with Leonid Brezhnev as the First Secretary and Aleksei Kosygin as the Prime Minister, set out to correct perceived mistakes in their predecessor “adventurist” foreign policy. A large part of this effort was an attempt at a rapprochement with China. The Soviet leadership was not uniform in thinking about China. Newcomers to foreign policy making – most importantly, Aleksei Kosygin – entertained hopes of an early rapprochement. China, in his mind, had an affinity of interests with the Soviet Union since both countries shared the same ideology. He was certain that once Soviet communists and Chinese communists sit down together, nothing would prevent them from overcoming their differences. Others, such as policy veterans Anastas Mikoyan and Yuri Andropov, maintained a more cautious approach and ruled out any prospect of early reconciliation but their voices were silenced by the less experienced yet more ideologically inclined conservative leadership. Brezhnev at this stage did not have a policy and flowed with the current. As a result, in November 1964 the Russians made an all-out effort to mend fences with China.
These efforts met with skepticism in Beijing; Mao Zedong’s outlook on a rapprochement was dim. He believed that the new Soviet leaders would maintain Khrushchev’s hostility toward China, if with added flexibility. Nevertheless, Mao authorized “contacts” with Moscow; Zhou Enlai led a Chinese delegation for talks with the new Soviet leadership in November 1964. Although records of these talks remain unavailable, Brezhnev subsequently made a detailed report on the discussions with Zhou. These discussions in large part came down to a quarrel over an incident that had occurred between Soviet Defense Minister Rodion Malinovskii and Chinese Marshal He Long. Malinovskii, under influence, suggested to He Long to throw out Mao Zedong the way the Soviets threw out Khrushchev to allow relations between Moscow and Beijing to improve. For the rest of Zhou’s delegation’s talks with the Soviets, Brezhnev and Kosygin tried in vain to convince the Chinese that Malinovskii’s remarks did not represent the official Soviet position.
And, indeed, despite the debacle of the November talks, China-optimism in the Kremlin did not die out. Kosygin was fired up with the idea of improving relations. It would take only as little as a personal meeting with Mao Zedong to settle the differences, he thought. Of course, Kosygin, who for a time in the 1960’s nurtured hopes of taking the leadership from Brezhnev in foreign policy, expected that a rapprochement with China would boost his personal prestige. Moreover, Kosygin, with his little experience in foreign affairs before 1964, was susceptible to ideological solutions to foreign policy problems. Kosygin traveled to Beijing in February 1965, but, despite a semblance of understanding with Zhou (which made the Soviet Premier a firm believer that Zhou was about the only rational Chinese policy maker) he failed to obtain a breakthrough in a conversation with Mao Zedong.
There are multiple records of this conversation floating around, and contradictions abound. Nevertheless, Kosygin generally maintained a much tougher line on the US than what had been the case in the final months of Khrushchev’s tenure. Kosygin called for practical steps to solve the Sino-Soviet differences, in particular – joint actions in Vietnam, to help Hanoi defend itself against the US. Mao turned down these approaches. Kosygin did not despair, and Soviet efforts to enlist China in “joint actions” continued in the spring of 1965. These entailed proposals of trilateral consultations, as well as offers of military cooperation (stationing of Soviet planes on the Chinese territory). These initiatives were invariably (and incorrectly) interpreted in China as efforts to impose Soviet military control. Mao’s failure to accept Soviet gestures resulted in disillusionment in Moscow and undermined the China-optimistic engagement lobby in the Soviet leadership.
Instead of engagement the Soviet leadership turned toward isolation and containment of China. Ideological tilt of the Brezhnev-Kosygin duumvirate underpinned a more active Soviet policy in Asia. Moscow increased economic and military support to North Korea and North Vietnam. Although this support did not immediately translate into Soviet political influence in Pyongyang and Hanoi, the Chinese “bloc” in Asia, which had worried the Soviet leadership in 1963-64, rapidly disintegrated. In a conscious move to contain the mounting Chinese threat, Brezhnev visited Mongolia in early 1966 to conclude a mutual assistance treaty with that country.
Once containment of China developed into a coherent policy (summer-fall of 1965) it worked according to a logic of its own. Rapprochement with China was shelved indefinitely. Nevertheless, it was not until early 1967 that the Soviet Politburo became concerned enough with the Chinese “menace” that it authorized substantial build-up of Soviet forces along the Sino-Soviet frontier. There was an important change in the Soviet perceptions of China between late 1965 and late 1966. The Cultural Revolution, with its violent aspects (which included siege of the Soviet Embassy in Beijing) was interpreted in Moscow as an anti-Soviet campaign aimed at preparing the Chinese population for a war with Russia. The Chinese problem was thus no longer a problem of ideological disagreements. China became an enemy in a traditional sense.
It thus appears that the Soviet military build-up was primarily a defensive measure, a hedge against uncertainties on the Chinese political scene, which moreover did not occur until at least February 1967. Before that Moscow acted with reserve. Even though the prospects of a rapprochement dimmed the Soviets were not in a hurry, for example, to deploy forces to Mongolia. Records show that the introduction of Soviet forces into the MPR was an idea advanced by the Mongolian leadership. Policy makers in Ulaanbaatar had their own, long-lasting reasons, to fear China, and these reasons were not necessarily shared in Moscow. This explains the delay between the Mongolian request for Soviet forces (December 1965) and the entry of Soviet forces into Mongolia (1968).
It is also to 1966 and 1967 that we can date two important developments in Soviet strategic thinking (which by 1971-73 became major pillars of Soviet foreign policy). First was the Soviet fear of the Sino-US collusion. Unsure of the direction of policy-making in Beijing but certain that Mao had shed any pretence of Marxist ideology, Soviet leaders were concerned about rumors of increasing contacts between Beijing and Washington. On the other hand, the Soviets made feelers to West about the possibility of East-West cooperation against China. From the Kremlin’s viewpoint, Western politicians were intrinsically more interested in a partnership with the USSR than with radical and militant China.
内容提要
1964年赫鲁晓夫垮台以后，新上台的苏联领导人第一书记勃列日涅夫和部长会议主席柯西金开始纠正前任冒险主义外交政策的错误。努力中的很大一部分是试图重新接近中国。苏联领导层对中国的看法并不一致。外交决策上的新手——尤为重要的是柯西金，希望早日接近中国。柯西金以为，由于中苏两国拥有共同的意识形态，所以两国利益密切相关。他确信，一旦中苏两国重新坐在一起，两国的分歧肯定会得到解决。其他人，比如老练的米高扬和安德罗波夫，则持一种更加谨慎的立场，他们排除了中苏较早实现和解的可能性。不过经验相对不足、意识形态较为保守的领导人的意见压过了他们的声音。在这一时期，勃列日涅夫随波逐流，并没有形成自己的政策。结果1964年10月，苏联人开始全力修复与中国的关系。
这些努力遭到北京的怀疑。毛泽东对于中苏接近的态度并不明朗。他相信，即便苏联人呈现出新的灵活性，苏联领导人仍会继续维持赫鲁晓夫对中国的敌视态度。不过，毛批准同莫斯科进行“接触”。1964年11月，周恩来率领中国代表团同苏联新领导层进行谈判。苏联国防部长马林诺夫斯基和中国将军贺龙之间的一次偶发事件将谈判在很大程度上变成了一场争吵。马林诺夫斯基向贺龙建议，中国人应当像苏联人推翻赫鲁晓夫一样，把毛泽东赶下台，从而改善北京和莫斯科的关系。在代表团与苏联谈判的其余时间里，勃列日涅夫与柯西金只能徒劳地去说服中国人： 马林诺夫斯基的话并不代表苏联的官方立场。
实际上，11月的会谈破裂后，克里姆林宫对中国的乐观主义并没有消失。柯西金仍然希望改善与中国的关系。柯西金认为，为了解决分歧，这可能不仅仅只是需要一次与毛的会晤。柯西金一度期望由勃列日涅夫在外交上发挥带头作用，他认为中苏接近将会有助于提升他个人的威望。1964年之前，柯西金在外交事务上并没有太多的经验，他更容易受到意识形态解决外交问题这一方式的影响。柯西金在1965年2月访问北京。尽管他表面上与周恩来达成谅解（这使他坚信，周是中国唯一的理性决策者），但是他没有在与毛的会晤上实现突破。
这次会晤有若干记录，前后不一之处颇多。不过，大体上柯西金的对美路线要比赫鲁晓夫下台前最后几个月的立场要强硬。柯西金主张务实地解决中苏分歧，尤其是在越南问题上采取联合行动，以帮助河内抵抗美国。毛泽东拒绝了这些提议。柯西金并没有陷入绝望，在1965年春天苏联继续谋求中国在“联合行动”上的支持。这样三边磋商的建议和军事合作的请求便成为必须。这些提议不可避免地(错误地)被解释为苏联把军事控制强加给中国。毛拒绝接受苏联的提议，从而导致了莫斯科幻想的破灭，并损害了莫斯科领导层中国乐观主义的努力。
这样苏联领导层就从交往转向孤立和遏制中国。勃列日涅夫—柯西金两头政治的意识形态倾向性促使苏联在亚洲采取积极政策。莫斯科加大了对北韩和北越的军事、经济支持。虽然支持并没有马上转化为苏联在河内和平壤的政治影响力，但是1963－1964年担心苏联领导的亚洲中国“集团”，很快就土崩瓦解。为了遏制中国快速增长的威胁，1966年初勃列日涅夫访问蒙古并达成双边互助条约。
根据其自身逻辑，一旦遏制中国政策演变成为一项连贯政策（1965年夏天到秋天），中苏接近便被无限期地搁置。不过，直到1967年初，中国威胁的程度使苏联政治局感到了担忧，它批准在中苏边境的苏联军队进行大规模的军力建设。这样，1965年底到1966年底苏联对中国认知发生了重大变化。莫斯科将文化大革命的暴力特征（包括围攻苏联驻北京大使馆）解释为旨在为中国人和苏联人之间的战争做准备的运动。中国问题不再是意识形态分歧上的问题，中国已经成为传统概念上的敌人。
这样看来，苏联的军备建设基本上属于防御措施——筑起一道防御中国政局不确定性的篱笆。这种不确定性至少在1967年2月之前并没有发生。在这之前，莫斯科的反应是有节制的。即使中苏接近的前景已经不甚明了，苏联人也并不急于在蒙古部署军队。文件显示苏军进驻蒙古是由蒙古领导人所推动的，乌兰巴托的决策者长期以来有理由对中国感到恐惧，而这些理由莫斯科并不一定都赞同。这就解释了蒙古向苏军提出请求（1965年12月）与苏军入驻蒙古之间的延误（1968年）。
1966到1967年期间，我们可以发现苏联战略思维当中两个重要发展（1971－1973年它们成为苏联外交政策的主要支柱）。首先是苏联对中美共谋的恐惧。苏联虽不能确定北京的决策发展方向，但对毛披着马克思主义的伪装却深信不疑，苏联对中美接触加大的谣言感到忧虑。另一方面，苏联就东西方可能共同压制中国向西方提出试探性建议。根据克里姆林宫的观点，同极端、好战的中国相比，西方政治家从本质上对与莫斯科的伙伴关系更感兴趣。
Political Fighters and Adversaries: Chinese-Soviet Border Relations in the 1960s
政治斗士与敌手：1960年代中苏边界关系
Li Danhui，李丹慧
Summary
This paper, the second in a series of studies of the borders relations between China and the Soviet Union, concentrates on the Sino-Soviet border issue in the 1960s.
In the 1950s, when China and the Soviet Union maintained a very friendly relationship, the CCP leadership decided the principles that, in handling China’s border issues with neighboring countries, Beijing would deal with the existing border treaties in accordance with the general principles of international law. Therefore, the government of the People’s Republic of China actually recognized the borders between China and the Soviet Union as established in the treaties signed between Russia and the Qing, accepting the legal status of the territoriality as defined by these treaties. In this sense, China’s “lost territory” of 1.5 millions square kilometers, as the result of the “unequal treaties” between the Czarist Russia and the Qing, was no longer an unsolved issue. Toward unsettled territorial issues and border incidents between China and the Soviet Union, the CCP Central leadership consistently adopted an attitude characterized by caution, tolerance, and willingness to make concessions, and China carried out a policy of pursuing to resolve any remaining problems through peaceful and friendly discussions and negotiations. The Soviet side also placed pursuing friendship and unity at the top of its agenda in handling the border issue. The long Chinese-Soviet borders were at that time managed in a spirit of peace and harmony.
In fact, if both the Chinese and Soviet parties and governments continuously followed this path of friendship and mutual understanding in handling the border issue, it was likely that China, with it gaining more information and, on the basis of it, achieving a thorough understanding of the actual situation along the borders, would work out a comprehensive solution—one that was also fully acceptable by the Soviet government—of any remaining difference toward the border issue. However, entering the 1960s, in the context of the continuous deepening of the differences between the Chinese and Soviet parties and, along with it, the deterioration of the overall relationship between China and the Soviet Union, the border disputes between China and the Soviet Union also were increasingly politicized. The development of the Chinese-Soviet border disputes was led toward a different direction.
In the early 1960s, China faced an extremely difficult economic situation, which forced Mao Zedong to deal with China’s relationship with Khrushchev and the Soviet Union from a more realistic perspective, and the ideological differences with Moscow were temporarily put aside. For the moment, Beijing decided to pursue a more reconciling policy toward Moscow. From the summer of 1960 to late 1961, the relationship between China and the Soviet Union was in a status of quiet improvement. In August 1960, when an incident of conflict occurred on the Chinese-Soviet border, China’s management of the incident, as well as the differences on the border issue with the Soviet Union, was positive and appeasing.
In late 1961, the 22nd Congress of the Soviet Party put forward a new Party platform, and the CCP believed that this was a document of “revisionist essence.” In the meantime, China’s domestic economic situation improved gradually. Under these circumstances, the CCP took the occasion of defending the Albanian party in the wake of it challenge to Moscow, and began to conduct another round of ideological struggle against the Soviet Party. Mao Zedong changed the basic tone of China’s policies toward the Soviet Union, emphasizing that it was crucial to take the initiative to struggle against the Soviet revisionism. The “relaxing” period in Chinese-Soviet relations thus ended, and the great Sino-Soviet polemic debate emerged to dominate the relations between the two parties and two countries. The Chinese government’s policyline toward handling and resolving the Sino-Soviet border disputes also changed. In March 1963, the Chinese side for the first time openly announced that the existing border treaties between China and the Soviet Union were “unequal treaties.” In the context that the ideological differences and struggles between the two parties became a dominant theme in the policies and politics of the two countries, tensions along the Chinese-Soviet borders also escalated.
In 1964, China and the Soviet Union conducted the first round of negotiations on the border issue between them. The great polemic debates had caused hostile sentiment between the two countries, and China, in determining its principles in handling the negotiation, decided to adopt a general strategy emphasizing the importance of “pursuing justice.” According to the strategy, the China side would “take the offensive” and maintain a belligerent approach in the negotiation, insisting upon that any progress in the negotiation would have to be pursued on the basis that the Soviet side accepted that it had “owed debts” to China because of the border treaties that the Czarist Russia imposed upon China. At the meeting the China side insisted upon calling the existing treaties as “unequal treaties” and repeatedly imposed this upon the Soviets. In the meantime, both sides still demonstrated a willingness to resolve some of the concrete issues. The Soviet side, in particular, took the initiative to make some concessions to the Chinese side. Consequently, the negotiations achieved modest process, and there was the prospect that the two sides might reach the agreement on resolving the differences on the eastern section of the Chinese-Soviet borders.
It was at the moment that, on July 10, 1964, Mao Zedong stated to a visiting Japanese Socialist Party delegation that the “debts” of China’s lost territory to the Czarist Russia were yet to be paid back. To echo Mao’s statement, the Chinese delegation again turned into “taking the offensive” in the border negotiation, and “paying back the debts” of “lost territory” became a dominating theme throughout the meetings, and the “negotiation” was turned into a battlefield of political fighting. Khrushchev’s responses were unyielding, and he announced that anyone who was to encroach on the territory of the Soviet Union would receive a “destructive blow.” The negotiation finally was deadlocked and ended without achieving any progress.
Thus the failure of the first round of border negotiations between China and the Soviet Union was primarily the result of the functioning of the ideological struggle between the two countries. A reasonable Chinese approach toward the border issue—even with the need to offer convincing explanations to the Chinese people on China’s stand toward the border issue—should have given more emphasis on the importance of observing international laws, so as to properly direct China’s public opinion toward this issue. It is not reasonable and certainly not desirable to placing exclusive emphasis on clearing up the “historical debts” with a neighboring country; and it is even less reasonable and desirable to concentrate on “pursuing justice” in accordance with ideological values and political interests.
As far as China’s international strategic environment is concerned, Zhou Enlai once pointed out that it would better serve China’s national interests if the Chinese side, instead of concentrating on clearing up historical debts, would put aside political disputes for the purposes of pursuing improvement of relations with neighboring countries, so that China’s border issues with these countries might achieve early settlements. In fact, it was after China emphasized that the existing border treaties between China and the Soviet Union were “unequal treaties” that Moscow strengthened its military cooperation with Mongolia. After the failure of the border negotiations, the Soviet leaders, in response to what they saw as China’s intention to “recover” the “lost territories” from the Soviet Union, began to deploy more troops in the Soviet Far East. Consequently, China’s strategic environment in surrounding areas deteriorated further. Facing this situation, Mao Zedong repeatedly mentioned the danger of Soviet military invasion of China in talks with visiting foreign communist leaders.
Entering 1965, the Chinese and Soviet parties started a new round of debates surrounding the Moscow conference of Mary 1965 and the question of supporting Vietnam. The Soviet Union continuously strengthened military deployment along its borders with China, constructing military pressures upon the PRC’s core areas northern China. Meanwhile, the Cultural Revolution that was being shaped in China demonstrated a very strong anti-Soviet-revisionist feature. Against this background, clashes and incidents along the Chinese-Soviet borders increased in number and expanded in scope and size. From 1966 to early 1968, the conflicts between Chinese and Soviet border garrisons escalated from verbal quarrels to physical punching and fighting. Finally, on several occasions, reportedly the Soviet border garrisons fired warning shots over the Chinese garrisons. While the military situation along the borders was deteriorating continuously, the border issue was increasingly politicized. With border disputes now being treated as a military issue in Beijing and Moscow, it was given a much heavier weight in the decisionmaking in both countries that would have huge impact upon the prospect of the Chinese-Soviet relations as a whole.
In face of the deepening tensions along the Chinese-Soviet borders, Mao Zedong decided to use military means to conduct a “counter-offensive” against the Soviets. In early 1969,tThe CCP central leadership and the Central Military Commission decided that before the convening of the CCP’s Ninth Congress, military action against the Soviets would be taken in the Zhenbao island area. The timing and place of the “counter offensive” was well considered. At the time that the CCP’s national congress would introduce new policies and missions, Mao obviously believed that by emphasizing “opposing revisionism and preventing revisionism” and, especially, by using the tension created by border incidents, he and the new CCP leadership would be able to eliminate factionism and promote unity in China’s domestic politics, thus restoring and stabilizing the domestic political and social orders that had been dramatically disturbed by the Cultural Revolution. Furthermore, since the Zhenbao island had been under the control of the Soviet troops for over twenty years, the “counter-offensive” to be taken there would produce larger impact upon Moscow; but since in the preliminary agreement reached by the two sides in the 1964 Chinese-Soviet border negotiations the Soviet side already agreed that the island belonged to China, Mao and his comrades believed that the Soviets probably would not react excessively to the Chinese “counter-offensive.” Or in other words, a clash at Zhenbao was more controllable than clashes elsewhere. The plans of taking military actions at the Zhenbao island were reviewed and approved by Mao Zedong and the CCP leadership. On March 2, a clash occurred between Chinese and Soviet border garrisons on the island.
After this, Moscow responded vigorously. On March 15, a second clash occurred between the Soviet and Chinese garrisons on Zhenbao. China made further response with the intention of using the clashes to serve larger purposes. Beijing delayed responding to Moscow’s proposal of resuming negotiations on the border issue and holding high-level talks. The CCP’s Ninth Congress, held in April 1969, raised the slogans of “down with Soviet revisionism” and “preparing for wars.” All of this made the Soviet leaders worry about worsening threats from China. In order to force China to return to the negotiation table, Moscow managed to put more pressure on Beijing. In the context of continuing and back-and-forth confrontation with China, in August 1969, the Soviets took the revenge action of eliminating a whole Chinese border garrison squadron in the western section (Xinjiang) of the Chinese-Soviet borders. Moscow also implicitly threatened to use a preemptive nuclear strike against China while, at the same time, trying to propping up any “pro-Soviet” element within the CCP leadership. All of this was for forcing Beijing to make concessions. In responses, Beijing, on the one hand, agreed to hold the Zhou Enlai-Kosygin meeting at the Beijing airport in September, and, on the other, made excessive reactions to a perceived “big war” between China and the Soviet Union. Beginning in late August 1969, the whole Chinese military entered top-level mobilizations, and, throughout China, the whole country was preparing for an imminent war. The Chinese-Soviet treaty of friendship and strategic alliance had been virtually nullified.
It was against this background that Mao Zedong finally made the strategic decision of opening relations with the United States. China’s international strategies thus experienced fundamental transformation, changing from confronting the United States and the Soviet Union simultaneously to uniting with the United States to concentrate on confronting the Soviet Union. Along with the Chinese-American rapprochement, the Sino-Soviet alliance collapsed completely.
When China and the Soviet Union were engaged in political and military confrontations, they still wanted to avoid a large-scale and direct military confrontation between them. Therefore, in October 1969, they began to conduct the second round of negotiations on the border issue. Compared with the first round of negotiation, in terms of its general atmosphere, the round had changed from China’s unilateral criticism of the Soviet Union to China’s and the Soviet Union’s mutual criticism of each other. Until June 1978, when this round of negotiation ended, the two sides were unable to reach any agreement. However, the negotiation at least was not interrupted until then, and no further military clash occurred on the borders between the two countries.
As a matter of fact, China treated this round of negotiation as not more than playing lip service. Therefore, it is not strange at all that discussion and negotiation between the two sides did not achieve any progress in a prolonged period. In the wake of the Chinese-American rapprochement, Sino-Soviet relations had been placed into the framework of the Chinese-American-Soviet triangular diplomacy. The interests and policy orientation of the three countries increasingly became interactive, which formed a new pattern of “strategic triangular.” It is extremely revealing that, during the Chinese-Soviet border negotiation, in every of the Chinese delegation’s post-meeting discussion, the first thing that Zhou Enlai usually would inquire about was not the negotiation itself, but Washington’s responses and reactions.
In conclusion, along with the readjustment of China’s diplomatic strategy, the Cold War structure in Asia or even the whole world began to experience profound changes. In the Cold War in Asia in the 1950s, China allied with the Soviet Union and consistently stood on the forefront of a confrontation against the United States. China and the United States were in a face-to-face confrontation. Entering the 1960s, the split between the Chinese and Soviet parties led to the disintegration of the socialist camp. By the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Sino-Soviet alliance had collapsed. China began to unite with the United States in a confrontation against the Soviet Union. In this sense, China virtually had withdrawn from the Cold War confrontation between the two camps, and the United States and the Soviet Union were standing on the first front of the Cold War. Consequently, the structure of the international Cold War experienced another major transformation since the first one in the early 1950s, after China and the Soviet Union signed the treaty of alliance.
内容提要
1950年代中苏关系友好时期，中共中央在处理与邻国边界问题时，确定了按照国际法一般原则处理旧有界约的指导方针。据此，中国实际上承认了中俄之间的历史界约和条约，接受了中国原有领土的法律地位。从这个意义上说，中苏之间150多万平方公里的“领土账”已经销账了。对于中苏领土争议问题和边界纠纷，中共中央也始终坚持了谨慎、宽容和谦让的宗旨，以及和平协商解决问题的方针。苏联方面采取的亦是讲友好、讲团结的态度。中苏国境上蜿蜒着一条和睦的边界线。事实上，如果在中苏两党两国关系继续友好的基础上按照这条道路走下去，中国政府随着边界调查摸底的深入，应该可以找到与苏方各自都能接受的结合点，达成某种共识，进而采取和平谈判的方式解决领土争端。但是进入1960年代后，随着中苏两党关系由分歧加深到实际破裂，两国关系逐渐恶化，中苏之间的界务纠纷开始逐渐被政治化，事务的发展最终走向了它的反面。
1960年初，中国面临的经济困难局面，使毛泽东不得不从更为务实的角度去考虑同赫鲁晓夫的关系，暂时搁置意识形态论争，确立了对苏让步方针。由此，1960年夏季至1961年后期止，双方关系逐渐进入缓和期。1960年8月中苏边界冲突事件肇始后，中国处理中苏边界摩擦的态度还是积极并平和的。
苏共二十二大提出被中共认为是修正主义性质的新党纲后，在中国国内经济状况逐渐好转的情况下，中共从维护阿尔巴尼亚党入手，开始与苏共进行新一轮意识形态斗争。毛泽东将对苏方针的基调调整为以主动进攻、做针锋相对的斗争为主，两党两国关系缓和的局面结束，大论战随之开始。中国政府解决中苏边界问题的指导方针也相应发生变化，于1963年3月公开提出了不平等条约问题。中苏边界斗争出现了随着中苏两党政治斗争起伏而起伏的形势，两党意识形态上的分歧与斗争日益在两国边界事务中反映出来。两国边界摩擦和边防斗争趋向紧张。
1964年中苏两国举行了第一次边界谈判。大论战造成的思想上的敌对情绪，导致中国在确定谈判立场时纠缠于要苏方承认旧界约的老账，以进攻、好战的姿态，争所谓的正义、原则。当谈判在意识形态论战的进程中出现务实地渴望解决具体问题的层面后，苏方在解决边界具体问题上迈出了迎合中国的一步。谈判取得初步成果，有了签署边界协议，解决东段边界问题的可能性。
但就在这时，毛泽东7月10日对日本社会党人士发表了关于算中俄领土账的谈话。其客观结果是，一方面，中国代表团再度转入攻势，谈判充满政治斗争的气氛，算领土账的问题贯穿会谈始终。一方面，赫鲁晓夫以强硬态度回应毛泽东，声称谁侵犯苏联边界，谁就将遭到苏方的毁灭性打击。谈判最终搁浅。
中苏第一次边界谈判的破裂，主要的还应该是意识形态斗争作用的结果。事实上，在中苏领土账问题上对国人有所交待的更为合理的方式，应该是加强国际法的教育和宣传，以此疏导民情。而不是分清历史是非，胶着于意识形态、政治斗争的胜负高下。从中国国际战略环境的角度考虑，根据周恩来曾有的思路，不纠缠历史旧账，以求和缓的目的搁置政治争议，务实地争取及早和平解决边界问题，更符合中国的国家利益。而苏联正是在中国提出不平等条约问题后加强与蒙古的军事合作，并且于边界谈判破裂后，以中国有收复国土的意向为由，开始加紧向远东地区增兵的。由此，中国周边战略环境实际上进一步恶化。
进入1965年后，中苏两党围绕莫斯科3月会议和援越问题展开了新的冲突。苏联继续增强苏中边界地区的军事部署，构建起了对中国北部核心区域的军事压力态势。中国国内的文化大革命运动，则渲染出了浓重的反苏氛围。与此同时，中苏边界冲突逐渐升级，次数、范围、形式和规模都发生了变化。1966至1968年初，中苏双方的冲突由口头争辩发展到相互推搡和斗殴，直至苏军用冲锋枪向中国巡逻队方向点射进行威胁。边界问题愈益被政治化，领土纠纷作为一种新的军事冲突因素，成为两党两国领导人决策中的一个砝码，介入到了两国关系的前途之中。
面对中苏边境紧张局势进一步加剧的形势，毛泽东选择了用武力反击的方案。中共中央、中央军委最终确定在中共九大召开之前，于珍宝岛地区进行对苏作战。这种时间和地点的选择，即可以借新的党代表大会将提出新政策新任务之机，进一步突出反修防修方针，通过边境事件造成某种紧张局势，强调团结，消除严重的派性，稳定国内局势；又因为珍宝岛已为苏军控制二十多年，在这里进行反击造成的影响较大，而该岛在中苏1964年边界谈判达成的初步协议中已被划归中国，估计苏方不会为此岛做出过分强烈的反应，故有一定的安全系数。珍宝岛反击战方案经毛泽东、中共中央批准后，至2月末，中国方面已对在该地区进行反击战问题做了周密的安排。3月2日，中苏珍宝岛第一次边界武装冲突爆发。
此后，莫斯科迅速采取回应步骤；中国方面也做出了异乎寻常的反应，其中心意图是用这次事件做文章。中国对苏联提出的恢复边界磋商、举行高级会谈的建议长时间不予理睬，以及中共九大号召打倒苏修、要准备打仗的做法，令苏共领导人对中美联手抗苏的前景忧心忡忡，开始加大对中国的压力，以迫使中国回到谈判桌前。在中苏双方进行的反复较量中，苏联通过8月在苏中西段边界武力报复中国、加强对中国实施核威胁和扶植中共党内亲苏领导人的政权替代威胁等措施，迫使中国一方面做出让步，同意与苏方举行两国总理会谈，接受举行边界谈判；一方面，对中苏之间可能发生的战争做出了过火反应。全军各部队进入一级战备，从中央到地方都处于临战状态。《中苏友好同盟互助条约》实际名存实亡。毛泽东最终做出了打开中美关系僵局的重大决策，调整中国的对外战略，改对美苏两面作战为联合美国集中力量对抗苏联。随着中美关系的解冻，中苏同盟彻底破裂，两国关系最终转入政治、军事上的对抗阶段。
中苏两国在进行政治和军事对峙的同时，仍然都希望避免发生直接的军事冲突，由此，于1969年10月开始举行第二次边界谈判。与前次边界谈判相比较，这次谈判在气氛上已由中方的单方面控诉，变为中苏双方的控诉，内容上也增加了新的东西。到1978年6月谈判结束，双方始终未能达成任何协议。但是谈判毕竟持续未断，两国边界上也没有再发生武装冲突。
事实上，中国的这次谈判只是做表面文章，磋商长期没有进展已是必然的结果。由于中美两国的化敌为友，中苏双边关系这时已转入中美苏三角外交的轨道，其中注入了更多的战略利益因素，三国之间的利益走向和政策制定日益卷入一种互动状态，构成了一种战略三角关系。谈判期间，在中国代表团于双方会晤后的每次讨论中，周恩来最先询问的不是谈判的情况，而是美国方面有何反应就是一个证明。
总之，随着中国外交战略的调整，亚洲，乃至整个世界的冷战格局开始发生了微妙的变化。在1950年代的亚洲冷战中，中苏结盟共同对美，中国始终处于反美的前沿，中美之间进行了面对面的较量。进入1960年代，中苏两党分裂导致社会主义阵营的瓦解。及至60年代末70年代初，中苏同盟瓦解，中国开始联合美国共同抗衡苏联。从这个意义上说，中国实际退出了两大阵营之间的对抗，美苏重新站在冷战的第一线，使国际冷战格局出现了继中苏签订同盟条约后的第二次转型。
[1] P. Iudin, “Zapis’ besedy c tovarishchem Mao Tszedunom, 31 Marta 1956 goda,” Problemy dal’vogo vostoka Vol. 5 (1994), pp. 105-106
[2] This paper presents, in a much shortened version, main ideas of my graduate thesis, The China Puzzle: Soviet Policy Toward the People’s Republic of China, 1962-67, completed in 2005 under Odd Arne Westad’s supervision. I am ever grateful to Arne for his guidance and encouragement. Thanks are due also to the Russian Foreign Policy archive (AVPRF), especially Elizaveta Guseva, and to many friends and colleagues who have helped me develop some of the ideas presented in this paper: Jim Hershberg, Chen Jian, Mark Kramer, Christian Ostermann, Balazs Szalontai and others. I have also benefited from work of Lorenz Luthi, Shen Zhihua, David Wolff and Vlad Zubok. Please do not cite this paper, the book is hopefully on its way.