Session II
Sino-Soviet Split: Consequences and Influences
第二场 中苏分裂――后果与影响
The Collapse of the Sino-Soviet Alliance: Causes and Consequences
中苏同盟破裂：原因与结果
Shen Zhihua，沈志华
Summary
As revealed by recent studies, the fundamental differences between China and the Soviet Union did not result from the Soviet Party’s 20th Congress in the year of 1956. In actuality, the Chinese-Soviet relations were still in rise in 1956-1957. It was at the Summit of leaders of Communist states and parties held in Moscow in November 1957 that the Sino-Soviet alliance reached the peak of its power and influence. Mao Zedong’s speeches at the Summit—and the styles and ways in which that the Chinese chairman delivered the speeches—clearly indicated that the Chinese Communist Party had achieved a status of virtual equality with the Soviet Party in the international Communist movement. However, it was exactly at the same moment that the differences between the two began to emerge.
In summer 1958, between Beijing and Moscow occurred the “long-wave radio transmitter” and the “joint submarine fleet” incidents. For a long period, both in Chinese society and among the Chinese scholarly circle it was widely accepted that the conflict between Beijing and Moscow over these two incidents triggered the process eventually leading up to the collapse of the Sino-Soviet alliance, and that the main reason underlying the process was that the Soviet Union had violated China’s sovereignty and that the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev had meant to control China. These interpretations, however, lack the support of historical evidence. What had exposed the crucial differences between the domestic and international policies of China and the Soviet Union—and caused sharp conflict between them—were two other events in 1958.
In August 1958, Mao Zedong and the CCP leadership suddenly ordered the PLA to conduct artillery bombardment of the Chinese Nationalist-controlled Jinmen islands. This not only angered Moscow but also made Khrushchev feel that Beijing’s actions intolerable. There were several reasons. First, Beijing did not inform Moscow, let alone consult with Khrushchev, about the bombardment. Khrushchev was greatly offended, and he believed that China’s action had violated any of the norms of the behavior between two allies, which he saw as Beijing’s contempt and insult of Moscow. Second, Mao Zedong intentionally demonstrated to the Soviets that China had the independent position and capacity to take any action, and that the Taiwan issue belonged to China’s internal affairs, and Beijing could do anything about the issue without asking for instruction from or consulting with anyone else. Third, the bombardment itself clearly revealed that Beijing was in strong disagreement with Moscow’s foreign policy of relaxing international tension. Mao Zedong even went so far as to argue that “international tension was not favorable to the United States.” Fourth, China delayed sending an American Sidewinder missile to the Soviets, which greatly angered Khrushchev. As the Soviet leader viewed it, Mao Zedong simply did not treat the existence of the alliance between China and the Soviet Union seriously.
As Mao Zedong viewed it, the launching of the Great Leap Forward and, especially, the emergence of thousands of People’s Communes in China meant that the Chinese Communists had identified a bright path toward the changing communism from ideal to reality. If this was recognized by other socialist countries, and especially if this was recognized by the Soviet Union, that would mean that the Chinese Communist Party’s central position in the international communist movement was also widely and formally recognized. However, after a long period of silence, Khrushchev finally chose to openly challenge and criticize what had happened in China, and the Great Leap Forward and the People’s Communes in particular. What made things even worse was the timing chosen by Khrushchev was extremely inappropriate—he chose to make open his critical opinion of Mao and the CCP at a time when, after the Lushan conference, Peng Dehuai (China’s defense minister) was being criticized for his “attacks” on the Great Leap Forward and the People’s Communes. Mao Zedong could not suppress his extreme anger and was more determined than ever before to challenge Khrushchev.
Consequently, the Taiwan Strait crisis exposed the serious differences between China and the Soviet Union on international affairs, and Khrushchev found Beijing’s management of the crisis intolerable. The Soviet leadership thus decided to punish China. And the Great Leap Forward and the People’s Communes revealed the profound differences between Beijing and Moscow on domestic policies, and Mao Zedong found Khrushchev’s attitudes toward these issues unacceptable. The CCP leadership thus decided to openly criticize Moscow. All of this caused the heated face-to-face dispute between Mao and Khrushchev during the Soviet leader’s visit to Beijing for celebrating the PRC’s tenth anniversary in October 1959. After the dispute, Beijing and Moscow respectively—yet in quite similar style—set up their principles toward handling the relations between the allies: The alliance between China and the Soviet Union should be maintained on the basis that the other side must acknowledge and correct its own “mistakes.”
Since 1960, the two sides had begun to publish articles in the media to state their own viewpoints and opinions, aiming at “advising” and “persuading” the other side. Then Beijing and Moscow began to attack each at the world conference of unions, and at the Bucharest conference of leaders of Communist parties. Neither side was willing to make real concessions. Consequently, Khrushchev decided to openly challenge Beijing, announcing that all Soviet experts working in China would be withdrawn. As a result, the differences between China and the Soviet Union were exposed to the whole world. Although—in 1961-1962—both Beijing and Moscow demonstrated willingness to control the contradictions and improve the relations between them, the principles that they both adhered to were that the other side must acknowledge its own mistakes. The meetings between the two Parties in July 1963 made it clear once again that there existed no ground on which China and the Soviet Union might reach compromises. The collapse of the Sino-Soviet alliance was inevitable.
In the late 1950s, between the Chinese and Soviet Parties emerged “differences in ideologies.” While the Chinese Communists believed that the Soviet Party was one of “revisionism and rightist opportunism,” the Soviet Communists believed that CCP followed “dogmatism and leftist radicalism.” Underlying these differences were the following reasons: First, China and the Soviet Union were facing different international environments and having different international positions, and their understandings of world politics, therefore, were different. Second, the Chinese and Soviet Parties were in different stages of historical development, and their understandings of the path of development of nation-states were therefore quite different. The time difference—about 30-40 years—between the success of the Russian Revolution and the success of the Chinese revolution made it easy for China and Soviet Union to have different visions, understandings, and policies in their leaders’ management of their revolutions.
However, differences between China and the Soviet Union did not form a sufficient condition to cause the split between the two. A more fundamental reason underlying the disintegration of the Sino-Soviet alliance lay in several structural flaws in alliance relations between members of the socialist camp. The first was the contradiction between the vision of internationalism and the pursuit of nationalism, and, as a result, the perceived “ideological identity” of Communist parties became in conflict with the differences in national interests. The second was the contradiction between, on the one hand, that within the alliance there were the division of “those who lead” and “those who are led,” and, on the other, that each member of the alliance is entitled to equal rights. State-to-state relations had been confused with party-party relations.
In the development of the Sino-Soviet relations, in addition to the common problems that existed in the relationships between all socialist countries, there was also a problem more specifically belonging to Beijing and Moscow, that is, the competition for the leadership role in the international communist movement and, as a result of the competition, the struggle for proving that one’s own ideology represented the true Marxism-Leninism.
Consequently, the differences in domestic and international policies were “upgraded” to differences in political lines and ideological beliefs. The resolution of differences in interests could be achieved through concessions and compromises. But the competition for leadership role could not, as the competition—and the confrontation resulting from the competition—was not about which side was stronger or weaker, or which side deserved more interest or less interest; it was about which side was correct in political lines and ideological beliefs, and which side was wrong. In principle, these were issues that could not be compromised. The relationships between Marxism and revisionism and between Leninism and dogmatism were like that between water and fire, and the contradictions between them could not be reconciled. Under these circumstances, how could the Sino-Soviet alliance avoid the fate of total collapse?
The disintegration of the Chinese-Soviet alliance had produced huge impact upon China, the Soviet Union and the process and consequences of the global Cold War. First, it played a blocking role on the attempts of reforming socialism in both China and the Soviet Union. The new platforms introduced by Khrushchev at the Soviet Party’s 20th Congress represent the third major attempt, after the introduction of the New Economic Policy in the 1920s and the forming of the “Leningrad Faction” after the Second World War, that the Soviet Communists tried to reform socialism in the Soviet Union. In the meantime, the CCP’s Eighth Congress also began to consider and explore the question of how to define “socialism” by reforming the practice of socialism in China. The split between China and the Soviet Union blocked these attempts and considerations. Mao Zedong’s criticism of revisionism profoundly hindered reforms in the Soviet Union while, at the same time, pushing China one step after another toward a path of “revolutionary extremes.” The Sino-Soviet split also formed one of the most important reasons for the coming of the “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution” in China.
Second, the disintegration of the Sino-Soviet alliance produced decisive impacts on the changing structure of the global Cold War. If the making of the Sino-Soviet alliance had seriously influenced the orientation of American’s Far Eastern strategy, making it inevitable for the Cold War to expand from Europe to Asia; then, the collapse of the Sino-Soviet alliance paved the way for the rapprochement and “normalization” of relationship between China and the United States, resulting in China’s acutal withdrawal from the global Cold War characterized by the confrontation between the two camps headed respectively by the United States and the Soviet Union. Consequently, Mao Zedong introduced his “Three World” theory.
Third, the disintegration of the Sino-Soviet alliance prepared some of the most important conditions for the “defeat” of the Soviet Union in the confrontation against the United States in the global Cold War. Following the split between China and the Soviet Union, the socialist camp virtually collapsed, and the balance of power between the two camps headed by the United States and the Soviet Union changed dramatically in America’s favor. The Soviet Union, in order to deal with the challenge and threat from China, had no other choice but divert a large portion of its resources to deal with China, which not only significantly increased the consumption of the Soviet Union’s strength that was already under too heavy a burden but also greatly weakened its capacity to confront the United States and control East European countries. Therefore, the final collapse of the Soviet Union was closely related to the disintegration of the Sino-Soviet alliance.
内容提要
新的研究表明，中苏之间的原则性分歧并非产生于苏共二十大或1956年。应该说，在1956-1957年，中苏关系恰恰处于上升时期。1957年11月的莫斯科会议是中苏同盟显示其力量和影响的最高峰，毛泽东在会议期间的言谈举止充分反映出一个客观事实——在国际共产主义运动中，中共已经可以同苏共平起平坐了。但也就在这时，双方的分歧开始露出苗头。
1958年夏天，发生了“长波电台”和“联合舰队”事件。长期以来，在社会上和史学界普遍认为，这场冲突是中苏关系走向破裂的导火索，其原因在于苏联的做法侵害了中国主权，赫鲁晓夫企图控制中国。但这种观点是缺乏根据的。真正反映出中苏在对外对内政策上出现重大分歧，并引起尖锐对立的，是后来发生的两件事。
中共突然采取的炮击金门的军事行动触怒了莫斯科，并使赫鲁晓夫感到无法容忍，其原因在于：第一，事前中国丝毫没有向苏联透露早已谋划的这次行动。赫鲁晓夫为此十分恼火，认为中国的这种违反常规的做法不啻为对盟国的蔑视和侮辱。第二，毛泽东有意向苏联显示中国可以独立行事的地位和能力：如何解决台湾问题是中国的内部事务，无须向别人请示或与别人协商。第三，炮击行动本身充分表明中国不赞成苏联缓和国际紧张局势的对外政策。毛泽东认为，中国也可以搞“战争边缘政策”，因为“国际紧张”实际上对美国不利。第四，中国拖延向苏联提供在台海危机空战中获得的一枚美国“响尾蛇”导弹，这使赫鲁晓夫愤怒不已。总之，在赫鲁晓夫看来，毛泽东根本无视同盟的存在。
在毛泽东看来，人民公社是中国共产党为人类指出的一条通向共产主义的光明大道，只要得到社会主义各国的支持，特别是莫斯科的认可，也就等于承认了中共在社会主义阵营中的领导地位。然而，经过了长期的沉默，赫鲁晓夫还是在公开场合表示反对中国的做法，而且他选择了一个非常不恰当的时机——庐山会议正在批判彭德怀对大跃进和人民公社的“攻击”。毛泽东怒不可遏，决定向赫鲁晓夫宣战。
台海危机反映出中苏在对外政策上的重大分歧，赫鲁晓夫对此不能容忍，苏联决定给中共一些颜色看；公社问题反映出中苏在对内政策上的严重分歧，毛泽东对此不能容忍，中共决定公开批评莫斯科。于是在1959年10月两国领导人发生激烈争吵后，中苏分别确定了处理两国关系的相同的方针：继续维护中苏之间的同盟，但对方必须承认错误。1960年伊始，双方便开始在报刊上发表文章，阐述各自的观点和主张，意在规劝和说服对方。后来又在世界工联会议和布加勒斯特会议上互相攻击，双方没有一个愿意让步。于是，赫鲁晓夫终于决定撕破脸皮，宣布限期撤退全部在华工作的苏联专家，从而使中苏分歧公开化。尽管1961-1962年中苏都有意缓和矛盾，修复关系，但是所坚持的原则仍然是要对方承认错误。而1963年7月的两党会谈的结果再一次表明，中苏之间已经没有妥协余地。中苏同盟的破裂成为不可挽回的事实。
1950年代后期出现了中苏两党之间的原则性分歧：在中共看来，苏联是修正主义和右倾机会主义，而在苏共看来，中国是教条主义和左倾激进主义。其根源在于：1、中苏两国处于不同的国际环境和国际地位，因而对世界政治的认识不同。2、中苏两党处于历史进程的不同发展阶段，因而对民族国家发展道路的理解不同。就是这30-40年的时间差，构成了中苏之间在理念、认知和政策上的产生分歧的必然趋势。
不过，分歧并不一定导致分裂。中苏同盟破裂的根本原因在于社会主义阵营同盟关系中某种固有的结构性弊病。第一，是国际主义理念与民族主义追求的矛盾，以意识形态的同一性替代或掩盖国家利益的差异性；第二，是同盟内部领导与被领导的组织原则与各国享有平等权利的准则之间的矛盾，把党际关系等同或混淆于国家关系。
在中苏关系的变化过程中，除了隐含着上述社会主义国家关系的普遍性矛盾外，还有其特殊性，即存在着争夺国际共产主义运动领导权以及为此而产生的证明其意识形态正统地位的斗争。而国际共产主义运动领导权的重要体现是意识形态的正统地位，于是，中苏之间在具体的对内对外政策上的分歧就上升为思想政治路线的斗争，意识形态领域的斗争。单纯的利益之争可以让步，可以妥协，但领导权之争不在于实力大小、利益多少，而在于思想政治路线的正确与否，因此在原则上是不可调和的。马克思主义与修正主义不共戴天，列宁主义与教条主义水火不容，所以，中苏同盟的结局只能是分裂。
中苏同盟的解体对于中国、苏联乃至世界政治的发展都发生了重大影响。
1、对中国和苏联的社会主义改革尝试产生了阻断性影响。赫鲁晓夫在苏共二十大提出的新纲领，是继20年代新经济政策和战后列宁格勒派之后，苏共第三次开始的改革尝试。同样，中共八大也开始思考和探索中国的社会主义发展道路问题。但是，中苏分裂阻断了这种尝试和思考。毛泽东对于修正主义的批判，严重妨碍了苏联的改革，也把中国逐步推向了极端的革命道路。中苏分裂构成中国文化大革命的重要起源。
2、对冷战国际格局的变化产生了决定性影响。如果说中苏同盟条约的签订，最终决定了美国远东战略的走向，从而使冷战从欧洲扩展到亚洲，那么，中苏同盟关系的破裂，则最终导致中美关系趋向缓和及正常化，以至中国实际上退出了以美苏为首的两大阵营对抗为标志的冷战舞台。此后，毛泽东又提出了三个世界的构想。
3、对苏联在冷战对阵中败北的结局也产生了深刻影响。中苏分裂的直接结果就是社会主义阵营的瓦解，从而导致在以美苏为首的两个阵营对抗中的力量对比发生了巨大变化。同时，苏联在不得不分散力量对付中国的威胁时，不仅增加了本来已不堪负重的国力消耗，而且大大削弱了自身对抗美国和控制东欧的能力。因此，苏联最终解体与中苏分裂不无联系。
Interkit and the Eastern Front in the Soviet Cold War，1966-1986
Interkit和苏联冷战中的东方战线，1966－1986
David Wolff，王大卫
Summary
At a Soviet-bloc summit held in Moscow on 21 October 1966, all the General-Secretaries described the widening threat from Beijing and the need for a unified response. Ulbricht spoke of the Chinese “trying to transfer their own quarrelsome politics” to Asia and Africa, concluding that “the time has come that the communist and workers’ parties meet both at the multilateral and bilateral levels to come to an agreement on how to conduct the fight against anti-communism.” Mongolia’s Tsedenbal told about Cultural Revolution propaganda and military espionage being conducted along his borders “on a daily basis.” He also called for “uniform opinion” leading to “uniform and concrete steps toward strengthening the international communist movement.” Brezhnev, representing the Eurasian link between clients East and West, followed up on both lines of argument, confirming Ulbricht’s concerns about the breadth of Chinese aspirations by mentioning the newly formed Red Guard “world headquarters” and Mao’s claim to be “leader of the world revolution.” He also echoed Tsedenbal by describing border incidents involving Soviet fishermen being trapped in Chinese nets. He affirmed his solidarity with the Mongolian position by wondering rhetorically “how other parties would react if they were treated in this way?” He concluded that “unity is dear to communist parties.”
Indignation went hand-in-hand with fear for Brezhnev continued, still in a rhetorical vein, that “given all this, I ask the comrades: does the danger of war exist? Given the uncertain politics of China, nobody can give any guarantee.” The 1966 establishment of the Institute of the Far East increased funds for the study of contemporary China and for the training of more specialists, a guarantee of future growth in this area. A year later, the founding of Interkit would be an answer to the call for the coordinated international containment of China. Mao could not mistake these intentions, nor does it seem that any attempt was made to mask the new undertaking, a special initiative of the USSR Central Committee International Department for Relations with Fraternal Parties.
The first meeting of Interkit took place in December 1967 in Moscow, where the International Departments of seven fraternal countries (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, and the USSR) sent representatives, either their directors or deputy directors for a full week. Suslov and Ponomarev both met and exhorted the other delegates, while the USSR delegation was led by A. M. Rumiantsev, the Vice-President of the USSR Academy of Sciences, O. B. Rakhmanin, the Deputy Director of the International Department, and M. I. Sladkovskii, the Director of the newly-founded Institute of the Far East. These three showed great initiative and firmness in successfully pressuring recalcitrant representatives The German report states blandly that “before the beginning of the meeting, it was visible that the Soviet comrades were treating the meeting as extremely significant.” They immediately put forth an agenda that called for shared evaluations of Mao and coordinated policies toward China.
During the next twenty years annual Interkit meetings, rotated through the capital cities of the fraternal countries, and declared year after year that China had not changed and that therefore rapprochement was not possible. An ever wider range of ties to China were targeted for coordination among the membership. Foreign policy, trade, especially restrictions on sensitive military or dual-use technology, propaganda and research were all areas included. The membership also grew as Cuba and Vietnam joined
The second meeting in late January 1969 confirmed that this alliance of effort against China would go forward in a variety of activities which required additional international meetings of the relevant cadres from each of the countries (press, films, television, literature, translators etc.). In 1967, the Polish group had already expressed fears that either “shared evaluation” or “an agreed document” for this “could be interpreted as a grouping” and by 1971, the Soviets were reporting that “the Chinese leaders are visibly alarmed by the effectiveness of the political, economic and other cooperation of the socialist countries.” Possibly Interkit also had its part in China’s decisive and bloody turn away from the USSR and toward the US.
内容提要
1966年10月21日，在莫斯科举行的苏联堡垒国家峰会上，各国总书记都谈到了来自于北京的不断扩展的威胁以及对此作出共同反应的需要。乌布利希说中国“正在试图将他们自己的争论政治输出”到亚洲和非洲，他总结说“现在是到了共产党和工人政党在多边和双边水平上都对怎样引导反对反共产主义运动的斗争达成协定的时间了。”蒙古的泽登巴尔谈到了文化大革命的宣传和中国在中蒙边界“每日”进行军事的间谍活动。他同样要求“统一的意见”进而形成“统一和固定的行动以增强国际共产主义运动。”勃列日涅夫——代表东西方代理人的欧亚联系人，进一步探究了这两种观点，他谈到了最近成立的红卫兵“世界总部”和毛宣称要“成为世界革命的领袖”，从而肯定了乌布利希对中国目的关注的广度和深度。他同样通过讲述诸如苏联渔民被中国囚禁之类的边界冲突回应了泽登巴尔的观点。他通过询问“如果其他的政党遭到这样的对待，他们会怎样反应？”，承认了与蒙古的一致。最后得出的结论是“对于共产党来说，团结是宝贵的。”
随着勃列日涅夫讲述的继续，带着恐惧的愤怒从一个国家传递到另一个国家，他仍然是通过语言表达，说道“考虑到所有这些情况，我要问一下在座各位：战争的危险存在吗？考虑到中国政治的不确定性，没有人能作出任何保证。”1966年成立的原东学院增加了用于研究当时中国情况和训练更多专家的经费，这是对该领域未来发展的保证。一年之后，Interkit的成立是对要求协调对中国的国际遏制的回答。毛不会误解这些意图，Interkit也没有作出任何尝试以掩盖新的行动——这是苏联中央委员会负责兄弟党关系的国际部的特殊动机。
Interkit的第一次会议于1967年12月在莫斯科召开，整整一个星期内七个兄弟党（保加利亚、捷克斯洛伐克、东德、匈牙利、蒙古、波兰和苏联）的国际部都派出了代表，或是主任或是副主任。虽然苏斯洛夫和波诺马廖夫都同其他代表团会了面并热情劝告他们，但是苏联代表团是由苏联科学院副院长鲁缅采夫、国际部副主任拉赫马宁和新成立的原东学院院长斯拉德科夫斯基领队。这三个人表现出了巨大的积极性和强硬立场，成功说服了持反对意见的代表。德国的报告坦率的提到“在会议开始之前就可以看到苏联通知对于会议相当重视。”他们立即提出了一项议程，要求共享对毛的情报评估和协调针对中国的政策。
在接下来的20年中，每年的Interkit会议在兄弟国家的首都轮流举行，年复一年的宣布中国还没有改变，因此恢复友谊是不可能的。针对中国的范围更广的联系定位于成员国之间的合作。外交、贸易——尤其是对敏感军事或者双重功效技术的限制，宣传和研究都包括在内。成员国后来还增加了古巴和越南。
1969年1月底的第二次会议确定联盟反对中国的努力会通过一系列行动继续向前，这一点需要每个国家相关的部门（出版、电影、电视、文学、翻译等）举行额外的国际会议。1967年，波兰就已经表达了他们的担心，无论是“共享情报”还是“一项协定文件”都“会被作为集团解释”。到1971年时，苏联报告说“通过社会主义国家们的政治、经济和其他共同行动，中国领导人显然受到了警告。”很可能Interkit对中国毅然决定远离苏联趋近美国也起到了作用。
For Internal Circulation Only: A Cultural Phenomenon in Sino-Soviet Relations in the 1970s
‘内部发行’：1970年代中苏关系的一种文化现象
Yu Weimin，余伟民
Summary
The 1960s and 1970s witnessed the low ebb in Chinese-Soviet relations. The Sino-Soviet border clash of 1969 resulted in the collapse of normal relations between the two countries. The Chinese-American rapprochement of 1972 led to the shaping of a new “triangular” structure characterized by a Sino-American partnership against perceived “Soviet expansionism.” In the meantime, the internal political processes in China and the Soviet Union also experienced subtle yet profound changes. In the Soviet Union, Brezhnev’s conservative political line blocked the trend of reforms initiated during the Khrushchev era. However, the once “liberated” intellectuals, by organizing dissidents movement and using critical literature as a tool to expose problems in Soviet politics and society, continuously accumulated energy for the coming of the next round of reforms. In China, the Cultural Revolution made Mao Zedong’s “continuous revolution” occupy a position of absolute domination, yet under the surface was ordinary people’s increasingly stronger resistance to the domination’s negative consequences. The questioning of the legitimacy of the Cultural Revolution created the initial possibility in Chinese politics for changes toward the direction of reforms in the future. It was against these backgrounds that the changes in Chinese-Soviet relations were not only reflected in international politics but also were revealed as a legitimacy contest and thus had profound impact upon both countries’ domestic politics and ideology. Because of the deepening hostilities between China and the Soviet Union—indeed, China regarded the Soviet Union as its primary and most dangerous enemy—the competition between the two for claiming ideological legitimacy also was pushed to the extreme. As a result, each side was criticizing the same ideology held by the other side to the extent of completely negating the legitimacy of the other side’s system, institution, or even way of life. All of this inevitably resulted in a strange “mirror effect” in the ideological field when the two sides criticized each other. What were meant to be the reasons to criticize the other side, in the process of conducting criticism, turned out to be elements—at the level of self consciousness—of pursuing reform and change. Within this context, China’s publications “for internal circulation only” emerged as a unique “cultural intermediary” in the highly closed Chinese sphere of political culture.
The so-called “for internal circulation only” was a unique publication model in China. The publication agencies of the Party-state, following the restrictions upon “information circulation” established by the ideological authorities, made differentiations in the readers’ qualifications of accessing different publications. The general readers were denied accesses to “for internal circulation only” publications. For example, only cadres or researchers above a certainly level were qualified to have accesses to the publications. These “for internal circulation only” publications were not for open sale at bookstores. Only those with introduction letters from their working units (which should also be above the qualified level) as well as personal identification cards were able to purpose the publications either in the special departments of bookstores (which were closed to the general readers). According to the statistics provided by General Catalogue of Publications for International Circulation Only, 1949-1986, the total number of books published “for international circulation only” during the 37-year period reached 17754. There were different types of books “for internal circulation only.” A large portion were “study materials for internal use” compiled in the political campaigns prevailing in China in the 1950s-1970s. Many “for internal circulation only” books were translations of foreign publications in the fields of natural science, engineering, and technology, and were with no political implications. Since there existed not normal cultural exchanges between China and the West, these books were published in China “for internal circulation only” primarily due to copyrights restrictions. The publications “for international circulation only” that this paper discusses do not belong to the above. They were publications for political and ideological purposes, and they were treated as “books with negative meanings,” and were made “for international circulation only” primarily for restricting and controlling their circulation.
It was in this category that, along with the Chinese-Soviet polemic debate and the continuous deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations in the 1960s and 1970s, translations of selected books were published “for internal circulation only.” From the beginning, the Chinese ideological authorities realized that although these books were published for helping criticize Soviet revisionism, they might also produce unexpected negative impact upon the readers of these books. Therefore, “for internal circulation only” was used by the authorities as a way to control the possible side effects. Although underlying these publications were obvious political purposes, they served as the only “intermediary of cultural changes” delivering information about the Soviet Union—no matter to what extent the information was distorted or meant to be distorted. Therefore, this was a special and unique cultural phenomenon in the years that China and the Soviet Union were in total confrontation, and the two societies thus were isolated from each other.
According to materials now available and the recollections by participants, the publication of printing materials “for international circulation only” with “Soviet revisionism” as the target of criticism began in the early 1960s. The first group of such publications was in the literature field and also used yellow covers, and they were thus called the “Yellow Books.” The planning of the publication of the “Yellow Books” started with a “Cultural Affairs Working Conference” convened by the CCP Central Propaganda Department at Xinqiao Hotel in Beijing toward the end of 1959. Renmin wenxue Chubanshe (the People’s Literature Press) in Beijing was assigned with the task of taking charge of this matter. Also involved were Zuojia Chubanshe (Writers Press), and Zhongguo Xiju Chubanshe (Chinese Drama Press). From 1962 to 1966, about 20 Soviet novels, more than 10 poems collections and plays, and more than 10 critical literature volumes were published in the “Yellow Book” series. In the meantime, a series of books in the fields of politics and history were published in grey covers by Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe (World Affairs Press), Shangwu Yinshuguan (Commerical Press), and Shanlian Shudian (Joint Publications). Among them were Leon Trotsky’s The Revolution Betrayed: What IS the Soviet Union Doing and Where Is It Going, Milovan Djilas’s The New Class, An Analysis of the Communist System, Harrison E. Salisbury’s A New Russia, etc. However, relatively few copies of these books were printed and circulated.
When the Cultural Revolution began in 1966, the publication of books “for internal circulation only” was interrupted for several years. In 1971, when various presses in China resumed publication business, the project on publishing books “for international circulation only” was also resumed. This time, with the changing leadership in China’s ideology control system following the emergence of the “Gang of Four” in Chinese politics, the emphasis of publishing “for international circulation only” books was also moved from Beijing to Shanghai. In 1972, several Soviet novels that were published for “international circulation only,” such as Living in the World, What Do Your Want, and Snow Filled Winter, were all translated by the Translation Group of Shanghai May-Seventh Cadres School and published by Shanghai Renmin Chubanshe (Shanghai People’s Publishing House). Then, until 1978, a large portion of the “for internal circulation only” books released for the purpose of “criticizing Soviet revisionism” were published in Shanghai.
During this period, about 18 Soviet novels (for internal circulation only) were published in Shanghai, and only 7 were published by the People’s Literature Press in Beijing. During the same period, Zhaiyi (Translation Digest), a translation series “for international circulation only” was launched in Shanghai. The series had two sub-series, one on social sciences, which existed in 1975-1976, and one on humanities, which existed in 1973-1976. As far as its background is concerned, the series’ creation revealed the ideological orientation of the Chinese leadership during the later years of the Cultural Revolution. The series covered a wide-rangesd topics and dealt with many countries. However, the Soviet Union and Soviet-related issues were clearly a main focus of attention of the series.
After the Third Plenary Session of the CCP’s Eleventh Central Committee (held in December 1978) adopted the policy of “reform and opening to the outside world,” the phenomenon of publication “for internal circulation only” continued in the next decade. Yet both its purposes and contents had changed. For example, the “Editor’s note” of “Selected Translations of Contemporary Foreign Political and Scholarly Works,” a series of publications “for international circulation only” in the late 1970s and 1980s, emphasized that books in the series were published as “research reference,” rather than as “targets of criticism.” In the meantime, publication of the literary works from the Soviet Union and other East European countries was no longer in need of being included in the “for internal circulation only” category.
In retrospect, in the 1960s and 1970s, China’s ideological and cultural sphere was in a highly closed status. During this period, not only was China in total cultural isolation form the Western world, but also, because of the needs of “struggling against revisionism and preventing revisionism from happening in China” and the “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution,” the cultural exchanges between China and the Soviet Union and East European countries were cut off almost completely. The channels through which ordinary Chinese might get information about the outside world were restricted to those very limited ones dominated by party/state ideological authorities. The information screened and conveyed through these channels was highly limited and inevitably distorted. Consequently, ordinary Chinese were only allowed to see a highly distorted “outside world.”
Under these circumstances, the limited numbers of publications “for internal circulation only” about the Soviet Union provided many Chinese party cadres and intellectuals with some first-hand materials to learn about the outside world. Although all these publications were identified as “targets of criticism” and a majority of them were led by lengthy “reading aid” that served to “direct” the readers to read them in the “right ideological direction,” reading activity, in the final analysis, is an individual behavior. Anyone with the ability of independent thinking would not allow his reading activity be “framed” in accordance with the pattern established by the authorities. Consequently, the reading materials from or about the “enemy side” opened a unique window to allow people to look at and understand the “realties of the enemy” in ways different from those official ones. What is important here are not the ideological factors that had been “instilled” into the reading experience, but that the reading experience provided a more truthful perspective about the Soviet society. As a result, the reading experience did not necessarily serve the original purposes of the ideological authority that had initiated the experience. Criticism of the Soviet Union and Soviet-style socialism caused reconsideration of China’s own political and social problems. After all, the Chinese revolution occurred in the first place by following “the path of the Russian revolutionaries.” The post-1949 Chinese systems and institutions were also created by learning from the Soviet model and experience. The image of “Soviet revisionism” was made for pursuing China’s leadership role in the international communist movement, as well as for legitimating Mao’s “continuous revolution” at home. Therefore, the negation of the Soviet system and Soviet-style socialism served Mao’s purposes of shaping and launching the Cultural Revolution. In the meantime, however, it also turned out to be a strange point of departure for many to critically rethink China’s own political and social realties. In this sense, the “anti-revisionist” materials published “for internal circulation only,” while serving the needs of the Cultural Revolution, provided some important intellectual resources for constructing the foundation on which China’s path toward “reform and opening to the outside world” was eventually shaped.
“For internal circulation only,” therefore, should be looked as a special and unintentional way of cultural exchanges. Reading activities related to “for internal circulation only” publications played a subtle and gradual role of knowing about the other and, on the basis of it, understanding the other. In the 1980s, when both China and the Soviet Union adopted “reform and opening” policies, the adjustment and improvement of the relations between China and the Soviet Union, in addition to the impact of political, strategic, and diplomatic factors, was also—and at a deeper level—related to the mutual acknowledgment of the legitimacy of the other’s political systems. And this was made possible, in retrospect, partially because of the potential influence of the reading activities among the Chinese population—and the Chinese intellectuals in particular—of the publications “for internal circulation only.”
In conclusion, as a special cultural phenomenon, the publication pattern of “for internal circulation only” should serve as a unique yet important angle from which to examine Chinese-Soviet relations and explore the interactive relationship between international relations and domestic politics.
内容提要
一
1960—70年代是中苏关系处于最低谷的时期。1969年发生的中苏边界武装冲突使两国关系完全破裂，1972年中美关系的解冻形成了中美联手对抗苏联扩张的“大三角”新格局。与此同时，中苏两国的内部政治进程也在发生着微妙的变化。就苏联而言，勃列日涅夫的保守主义政治路线阻遏了赫鲁晓夫时期开始的改革趋势，但曾被解放的思想潮流继续以“持不同政见者”运动和批判现实的文艺作品形式为下一波改革积聚着能量。就中国而言，“文革”的发生使毛泽东的“继续革命”路线完全占据统治地位，但其负面后果的暴露也引起日益强大的抵制，围绕“文革”合法性的斗争使中国的政局开始出现趋向改革的可能性。正是在这样的背景下，由中苏关系的变化而导致的冷战转型不仅表现在国际政治领域，而且也在制度合法性这一冷战的本质层面上展现了它对国内政治和意识形态的影响。由于中苏关系的“敌对化”（中国将苏联视为自己最主要的敌人），双方的意识形态“正统性”之争被推向极端，因此而产生了同质制度间的否定性批判这一奇特现象，并不可避免地导致批判领域的“镜像效应”，使原本否定对方的理由转化为自我意识的变革因素。在这个过程中，中国当时的一种特殊出版行为——“内部发行”发挥了潜移默化的“文化中介”作用。
二
所谓“内部发行”，是中国的一种特殊出版行为。隶属官方的出版部门根据意识形态领导机关划定的“信息传播范围”，将不同类型的出版物的“受众”也作了区分，其中，有一些出版物有明确的读者界限，如：一定级别的干部和一定层次的专业研究人员等。这部分出版物是不在书店公开出售的，必须持一定级别的“单位证明”和个人身份证件才能在特殊供应部门或书店的特设柜台购买。这就是曾经持续了三十多年的“内部发行”出版物。据《全国内部发行图书总目（1949—1986）》统计，各种类型的内部书籍总量达17754种。各种内部书的发行目的并不相同，除去在历次政治运动中编写的大量“内部学习资料”，就翻译出版的国外书籍而言，很多“内部发行”书（尤其是自然科学、工程技术类和一般文化知识类读物）同当时因为中国与西方文化交流中断而无法获得必需的版权有关。但被纳入政治范畴、作为意识形态斗争需要的出版物，其内部性主要不在版权意义上，而是在控制“反面教材”阅读范围的意义上。后一种出版行为在1960—70年代表现得特别明显，它是中苏论战以及随之而来的中苏交恶这一特殊背景的产物。由于从一开始就意识到，对苏联的批判会产生难以避免的“副作用”，所以，受控制的“内部发行”就成为领导部门选择的可行手段。从这个意义上，尽管广义的“内部发行”书籍不局限于苏联出版物的翻译作品，但在政治和意识形态领域发挥了最大作用（从目的和效果两方面看都是如此）的内部书正是这些苏联作品或批判苏联的作品。因此，将“内部发行”狭义地定位于特殊年代中苏关系的一种文化现象也是可以成立的。
三
据现有资料和当事人的相关回忆，以批判“苏修”为宗旨的“内部发行”出版行为开始于1960年代初。最早的一批文学类系列出版物因为用了统一的黄色封面而被称作“黄皮书”。“黄皮书”的策划是根据1959年底中共中央宣传部在北京新侨饭店召开的文化工作会议精神，由人民文学出版社（及其副牌作家出版社和中国戏剧出版社）具体操作。从1962年至1966年，“黄皮书”系列共出版了苏联小说作品近20种，诗歌和剧本10余种，文艺理论著作10余种。与此同时，还有一批用灰色封面的政治、历史类图书，由世界知识出版社、商务印书馆和三联书店出版，主要是批判苏联的作品，如：托洛茨基的《被背叛的革命》、德热拉斯的《新阶级：对共产主义制度的分析》、索尔兹伯里的《新俄国？》等，但数量较少。
1966年“文革”兴起曾一度停顿了内部书的出版。1971年出版社重新组建后恢复出版工作，内部书的出版也再次上马。这时，随着意识形态部门领导人的变化，内部书的出版重心已转到上海。1972年出版的几部苏联文学作品如：《人世间》、《你到底要什么？》、《多雪的冬天》都是由上海新闻出版系统“五七”干校翻译组翻译，上海人民出版社出版。此后直到1978年，以批判“苏修”为宗旨的“内部发行”书籍，在上海出版的占了较大比重。以文学作品为例，据不完全统计，此阶段在上海出版的苏联小说作品有18种，人民文学出版社出版了7种（其中5种出版于1978年）。此阶段上海还创办了一份“内部发行”的不定期的连续出版丛刊——《摘译》。《摘译》分为两个系列——“外国文艺”和“外国哲学社会科学”，按系列编排目次。《摘译（外国文艺）》，从1973年起，至1976年结束；《摘译（外国哲学社会科学）》从1975年起，也是至1976年结束。从编辑的指导思想看，《摘译》更集中地表达了当时中国领导层的意识形态观念。从刊登的作品内容看，《摘译》涉及的国家虽然有一定的广度，但苏联仍是其最关注的对象。
中共十一届三中全会确定了改革开放路线，此后，“内部发行”的出版行为继续存在了十多年，但是目的和内容都发生了很大变化。如1970年代末至1980年代出版的“现代外国政治学术著作选译”丛书，其“出版说明”已经从引导批判转为提供研究参考，而苏联及其他国家的文学作品这时已经不需要“内部发行”了。
四
1960—70年代，中国的思想文化领域处于最封闭的时期。当时，不仅与西方世界持续着文化隔绝状态，而且，由于“反修防修”和“文革”的需要，也切断了与苏联东欧国家的文化联系。中国人对外部世界的了解被局限在单一的国家媒体发布的信息渠道，而这种经过意识形态过滤的信息已经严重失真，除了极少数能够接触“信息源”的高层官员和专业人士，绝大多数民众只能看到被扭曲的外部世界。在这种情况下，为了批判“苏修”而有选择地“内部发行”的出版物客观上成为较大范围的干部和知识分子了解外部世界（主要是苏联社会）的“第一手资料”来源。尽管这些出版物的扉页都有提醒读者注意“供批判用”的“出版说明”，有些还配有导读性的批判文章以引导读者的思维，力图将读者的阅读行为纳入意识形态轨道。但是，阅读毕竟是个体行为，只要是具有独立思考能力的读者，其阅读过程产生的思想是不可能被规制到一个模子中的。因此，这些来自“敌对方”的作品就像打开了一扇窥视对手真相的窗户，其价值并不在于它所承载的对立面意识形态元素，而在于它的“叙述”本身就是一种客观对象，可以提供解读苏联社会的真实材料。于是，就出现了与出版目的相背离的阅读效果，对苏联的批判同时引起了对自身社会问题的思考。中国革命原本就是“走俄国人的路”，1949年以后中国的体制也是学习苏联的结果。至于中苏论战和中国的“反修防修”所塑造的“苏修”形象，只是表达了国际共运权力斗争中争夺意识形态制高点的需要。因此，对苏联体制的否定既是引发中国“文革”的一个动因（激进的“无产阶级专政下继续革命”理论的根据），也是反思中国社会现实的一个契机。正是在这个意义上，“内部发行”提供的“反修防修”材料，既是当年发动“文革”的助力因素，也是后来走向改革开放的思想资源之一。
另一方面，作为中苏敌对年代的一种特殊文化交流，“内部发行”的阅读效果还发挥了潜移默化的由了解对方进而“理解对方”的作用。1980年代，当中苏两国先后走上改革道路之际，中苏关系的调整除了外交政治因素之外，对各自制度合法性的再认识无疑是双方互相沟通和认同的重要思想文化因素。
总之，作为一种特殊的文化现象，“内部发行”的出版行为可以成为我们考察中苏关系和探讨国际政治与国内政治交互作用的一个独特视角。
Tipping the Balance: East Asian Communism and Soviet Global Optimism
打破平衡：东亚共产主义运动和苏联的‘乐观主义’全球观
Bernd Schaefer，谢弗
Summary
“It was us who brought Nixon to Beijing and Moscow in 1972, and China into the United Nations”, North Vietnamese General Secretary Le Duan and Prime Minister Pham Van Dong stated repeatedly with nationalist pride, adding that top leaders in both Beijing and Moscow had affirmed this theory to their Vietnamese counterparts. Be it as it may, North Vietnam was indeed able to shatter hegemonic collusions of American “triangular diplomacy” with USSR and PRC. It also transformed its own “national salvation” triumph of 1975 into a major inspiration for revolution and “national liberation” elsewhere. Both inadvertently and willfully, Hanoi’s unrelenting drive for American withdrawal and towards unification, for calibrated Indochinese revolution in Laos and Cambodia, as well as for the creation of indigenous socialism, furthered Moscow’s active internationalism and interventionism.
Indochina’s 1975 “revolutionary victory” was considered powerful evidence by the USSR that the “global correlation of forces” had been “tipped in favor of socialism”. Apparently the “third main force in the process of world revolution” was advancing and on the move against “imperialism”. Even more remarkable, Hanoi’s victory had been achieved against all military odds and over constant repeated Soviet skepticism and internal bickering since the late 1950s. In order to save face and its standing in international communism, in 1975 the USSR prided itself for its vital arms supply and embraced Hanoi’s triumph as a “joint victory”.
Leading Soviet and Eastern European ideologues propagated compatibility, and even mutual re-enforcement and complement, of simultaneous détente in Europe and “anti-imperialist struggle” in the Third World. Parallel pursuance of such concepts was considered essential to foster the supposed deterministic turn of global balances in leftward direction through “national liberation revolutions”. Similar notions the USSR had harbored already since the late Fifties before they became scuppered by the emerging Sino-Soviet split. After 1969, however, they re-appeared more forcefully, not the least out of strong impulses to curtail China’s global influence.
As origins and reasons for détente were seen in growing socialist military and political strength that had forced the United States and Western Europe to accommodate, Moscow now interpreted its further advances in the Third World at Western expense as helpful to maintain overall superpower détente and even make it irreversible. According to this peculiar view, for instance, prospects for détente had been significantly improved by Vietnam because the United States had been weakened and the Soviet Union strengthened.
Simultaneously, Beijing’s ideological challenge to Soviet hegemony over the “socialist world” and ‘Mao Zedong Thought’ inspired Moscow-critical forces in communist and revolutionary parties and movements worldwide. Only as long as the USSR reacted with restraint did this challenge remain manageable. It changed to the long-term detriment of Moscow when it proved unwilling to recognize what it had provoked through heavy military retaliation and subsequent nuclear threats during the 1969 conflicts. Moscow responded to the Maoist “provocation” in ideological and practical terms in such a way that tensions became exacerbated and did not dissipate. Ideology and status in the global socialist movement were fundamental points of reference for Soviet foreign policy in general. They were so to much larger extent than realist American- or European-style geopolitical thinking would have wanted to imagine. Finally, constant deterioration of relations between USSR and PRC caused Soviet strategic adaptation and armament in the Far East. It furthered Moscow’s interest into parallel accommodation in Europe and expansion in the Third World. Ultimately it prolonged the Cold War to the Soviet Union’s disadvantage.
内容提要
“是我们在1972年将尼克松带到北京和莫斯科，并使中国重返联合国的。”北越总书记黎笋和总理范文同带着民族主义者骄傲再三这样说，并补充道，中国和苏联高层已经认同了他们的这种说法。尽管北越主要领导人的说法可能有些夸张，北越的确有能力打破美国联合苏联及中国霸权共谋的“三角外交”。同时，北越还将其1975年的“民族解救”的胜利转变成激发其他地区革命和“民族解放”的主要力量。北越抗击美军直到其撤离并最终实现全国统一的决心和毅力，推动老挝和柬埔寨印度支那人民标准化革命的干劲和缔造本土社会主义的热情都在有意无意间促使苏联更主动地发展其国际主义和干涉主义。
1975年的印度支那“革命性胜利”被苏联视为“全球相互关联的力量”已经转向社会主义的强有力的证据。很显然，“世界革命过程中的第三种主要力量”正在发展并走上反对“帝国主义”的道路。更值得注意的是，越南是在克服了所有的武力劣势，苏联持续的不信任以及从50年代以来长期存在的国内争论这些困难后取得了胜利。为了挽回颜面并保持其在国际共产主义阵营中的威望，苏联在1975年夸耀其对越战提供的关键武器供给并称越南的成功为“共同的胜利”。
主要的苏联和东欧国家意识形态倡导者都在宣传欧洲各国缓和局势的兼容性、互利和互补性，以及第三世界“反帝国主义斗争”。这些宣传观念中还包含着一个目的，那就是可以通过这些宣传来培养并鼓励[各地人民]通过“民族解放革命”来实现在他们看来是注定的世界政治局势左倾化发展。早在50年代末，受到中苏关系走向破裂困扰之前，苏联就已经有了这种想法。1969年后，尤其在力图限制中国在全球影响的驱使下，这种观点重新出现并变得更加强烈，
在苏联看来，冷战局势的缓和的根源和原因在于不断增强的社会主义军事和政治力量迫使美国和西欧妥协。莫斯科方面于是认为利用西方来更深入地插手第三世界事务将维持超级大国间的基本缓和态势，甚至可能使缓和成为全球不可逆转的发展趋势。那么从这种角度来看，越南削弱了美国，增强了苏联的力量，大大改善了冷战缓和的前景。
与此同时，北京方面对苏联在“社会主义世界”的霸权进行的意识形态挑战以及“毛泽东思想”激发了世界共产主义和革命党派及运动中的批判苏联的力量。事实上，只要苏联对此类挑战的回应有所克制，局面都还可以控制。可是在1969年的中苏冲突中，苏联对中国采取激烈的武力报复并随之威胁施以核打击，导致中苏对立升级。尽管苏联不愿承认，局面的恶化对苏联利益造成了长期的损害。苏联对毛式意识形态和实际行动上的挑衅的反应进一步激化了紧张局势，并使双方矛盾变得无法调和。总的来说，意识形态和在世界社会主义运动中的地位是苏联外交政策的重要依据。这两个因素对于苏联的重要性远远超乎美国现实主义或者欧洲地缘政治思想的想象。最后，中苏关系的不断恶化致使苏联对其远东战略和军备进行调整。使苏联在倾向于进一步增强欧洲平衡力量的同时，加大了在第三世界进行扩张的兴趣。最终这些因素都导致冷战的拖延，向着不利于苏联的方向发展。