Transforming the Cold War: China and the Changing World，1960s-1980s
An International Conference
冷战转型：1960-1980年代的中国与变化中的世界
国际学术讨论会摘要
第三场 越南战争的阴影（12月20日）
Session III The Shadow of the Vietnam War（16:00-18:00）
Containing Beijing? The Role of China in Lyndon Johnson's Decision to Escalate in Vietnam
遏制北京？中国在约翰逊关于越战升级决定中的地位
Fredrik Logevall，弗莱德里克·罗格维尔
Summary
This paper concerns the U.S. decision to escalate the Vietnam War in the mid 1960s, with particular emphasis on the China factor. From the start of U.S. involvement in Indochina, in the late 1940s, China had loomed large in American thinking. As successive administrations made the geopolitical argument for intervention in Indochina, they often framed the discussion around the domino theory, which linked the outcome in Vietnam to a chain reaction of regional and global effects. For some twenty years, U.S. officials argued that defeat in Vietnam would have calamitous consequences not merely for that country but for the rest of Southeast Asia and perhaps beyond. The nature of the domino theory shifted over time, but the core claim remained the same: If Vietnam were allowed to “fall,” other countries would swiftly follow suit, thereby allowing Beijing and its ally in Moscow to consolidate Communist control over the region, and ultimately over much of Asia.
Even after American thinking about the Cold War strategic stakes in Vietnam underwent an important shift in the Kennedy-Johnson era, China remained a focal point. In the documentary record for the period 1961-65, one sees less concern about the fall of Vietnam immediately leading to the fall of the rest of the region—the CIA, the Intelligence and Research desk (INR) at the State Department, and even numerous senior administration officials now concede that, as Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs William Bundy put it in October 1964, the original domino theory “is much too pat.” Instead, the concern now is less tangible, more amorphous, as US officials begin to expound what Jonathan Schell has aptly called the “psychological domino theory.” To be sure, from the start the domino theory had contained an important psychological component; now, however, that component becomes supreme. Credibility is the new watchword, as policy makers declare it essential to stand firm in Vietnam in order to demonstrate America’s determination to defend its vital interests not only in the region but around the world. Should the United States waver in Vietnam, friends both in Southeast Asia and elsewhere would doubt Washington’s commitment to their defense, and might succumb to enemy pressure even without a massive invasion by foreign communist forces—what some scholars have called a “bandwagon” effect. The Chinese and the Soviets, meanwhile, would be emboldened to challenge U.S. interests worldwide.
Vietnam, in this way of thinking, was a “test case” of Washington’s willingness and ability to exert its power on the international stage. It was, in a sense, a global public-relations exercise, in which a defeat anywhere in the world, even in comparatively small and remote (from an American perspective) place such as Indochina, could bring serious, even irreparable harm, to America’s geopolitical position. Even the incontrovertible evidence of a schism between the USSR and China, which affected the strategic balance in the Cold War in the mid-1960s in serious ways, seemingly did not lessen the importance of the credibility imperative. Beijing appeared to be the more hostile and aggressive of the two communist powers, the more deeply committed to global revolution, but the Soviets, too, supported Hanoi; any slackening in the American commitment to South Vietnam’s defense could cause an increase in Soviet adventurism. Conversely, if Washington stood firm and worked to ensure the survival of a non-communist Saigon government, it could send a powerful message to Moscow and Beijing that indirect aggression could not succeed.
Again and again in the internal record, and in the public pronouncements, one sees references to this psychological domino theory. In 1965 President Johnson warned that “around the globe, from Berlin to Thailand, are people whose well-being rests, in part, on the belief that they can count on us if they are attacked. To leave Vietnam to its fate would shake the confidence of all these people in the value of America's commitment, the value of America's word.” Early the following year, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs John McNaughton put it this way: “The present U.S. objective in Vietnam is to avoid humiliation. The reasons why we went into Vietnam to the present depth are varied; but they are now largely academic. Why we have not withdrawn is by all odds, one reason: to preserve our reputation as a guarantor, and thus to preserve our effectiveness in the rest of the world. We have not hung on (2) to save a friend, or (3) to deny the Communists the added acres and heads (because the dominoes don’t fall for that reason in this case), or even (4) to prove that ‘wars of national liberation’ won’t work (except as our reputation is involved).” In short, according to McNaughton, maintaining American credibility was now the sole reason for the United States being in Vietnam.
Does this mean that the Johnson administration’s fateful decision in 1964-65 was all about containing Chinese ambitions in the region? No. A close examination of the massive American archival record makes clear that, while credibility concerns remained extant in U.S. official thinking, they cannot by themselves explain the escalation decision. For at stake was not merely America’s credibility, but also the administration’s domestic political credibility and senior officials’ personal credibility. Lyndon Johnson worried that failure in Vietnam would harm his domestic agenda; even more, he feared the personal humiliation he imagined would inevitably accompany a defeat—and for him, a negotiated withdrawal constituted defeat. Senior advisers, meanwhile, many of whom had for years publicly trumpeted Vietnam’s importance, knew that to start singing a different tune now would be to expose themselves to potential ridicule and to threaten their careers. For this reason, the paper concludes, the keys to the large-scale American escalation in Vietnam in 1964-65 lay at home in the United States more than in Asia.
内容提要
本文所关注的是60年代中期美国越战升级的决定，其中尤为重视中国一方的因素。自40年代末美国涉足印度支那伊始，中国一直都是美国所考虑的重要因素。历届政府引述干涉印支的论据时，往往将多米诺骨牌理论作为讨论的基础——将越南的失败同地区和全球的连锁反应联系起来。在大约20年的光景当中，美国官员一直以为越南的失利不仅会给该国，也会给东南亚其他国家和该区域之外带来灾难性的后果。随着时间的流逝，多米诺理论的特点也在发生变化，但是其核心不变：如果任越南 “沦陷”，其他国家很快将会步其后尘，从而使北京和其在莫斯科的盟友巩固共产主义对该地区的统治，并最终控制亚洲大多数地区。
在肯尼迪—约翰逊时期，即便是美国对越南战略关注的理解发生了重大转移，不过中国依然是美国考虑的核心要素。根据1961－1965年的文件记录，人们会发现对失去越南马上会造成整个地区沦陷的焦虑已经减轻了——中情局、国务院的情报调研部，甚至众多的政府高官现在也都承认了这一点。也正如1964年10月国务院负责远东事务的助理国务卿威廉·邦迪所指出，原先的多米诺理论“非常合宜”。恰恰相反，这种焦虑真实可见不足，并且更多地缺乏固定形态。这正如美国官员开始阐释地、被乔纳森·斯凯尔非常恰当地描述为“心理多米诺理论”。可以确信的是，从一开始多米诺理论就含有重要的心理成分，不过现在这一部分的作用已经变得至关重要了。正如决策者所宣称的那样，必须坚定不移地站在南越一方，从而展现美国保护在该地区乃至全球重要利益的决心。“可信性”成了新的标语口号。如果美国在越南犹豫不决，东南亚和世界其他地区的朋友将会怀疑华盛顿对他们防卫的承诺，从而使他们有可能屈从于敌人的压力，即便是外国共产党力量并没有发动大规模的入侵——这就是一些学者所说的“追随潮流效应”。同时，中苏将会从中受到鼓励并挑战美国在全球的利益。
在这种思维方式之下，越南就成了一个试验场——检验华盛顿在国际舞台动用权力的决心和能力。从某种意义上来讲，这是一次全球公共关系的检验，世界上任何一处的失败，哪怕只是一个像印度支那一样相对弱小和偏远的地区（从美国人的视野来看），都会给美国的地缘政治态势带来严重的、甚至是难以弥补的伤害。甚至在60年代中期，中苏之间无可辩驳的裂痕已经严重地影响到了冷战的战略平衡，但是这并没有减轻可信性的重要性。在两个共产主义强权当中，北京看起来更具敌意、更富侵略性、更多地卷入到全球革命当中。然而苏联同样也支持河内。美国任何对南越防卫承诺的松懈都可能引发苏联冒险主义的增长。相反，如果华盛顿立场坚定并努力确保非共产主义西贡政权的生存，这将会给莫斯科和北京传达一个强烈信号，即任何间接入侵都不会取得成功。
人们从美国的国内记录以及公开声明当中，可以发现心理多米诺理论的存在。1965年，约翰逊总统警告说“环顾全球，从柏林到泰国，人们的福利部分上依赖于这种信念——当他们遭受攻击的时候，我们是他们可以指望的对象。让越南接受其自身命运的裁决，将会动摇所有民族对美国承诺价值以及美国誓约价值的信心。”在接下来一年的早些时候，负责国际安全事务的助理国防部长麦克诺顿也有类似表述：“当前美国在越南的目标是避免蒙羞。我们涉足越南之深达到目前这种地步，原因众多，并且这些原因目前很大程度上都是理论上的。我们为何还不退出原因也很多，其中一个原因就是：维护我们作为保护人的威望，并由此维护我们在世界其他地方的有效性。不撤出是为了拯救朋友，是为了不让共产党获得额外的土地和人口（就是这个原因多米诺骨牌才不会坍塌），是为了证明民族解放战争不会起作用（除非当我们的威望卷入进去）。”简言之，根据麦克诺顿的讲话，维护美国的可信性是当时美国卷入越南的唯一原因。
这是否意味着约翰逊政府在1964－1965年至关重要的决定是为了全力以赴遏制中国在这一地区的野心？答案是否定的。通过仔细审视大量美国文件记录，可以清楚地发现：虽然可信性考虑在美国官方思维当中的地位很突出，但是这不能解释升级决定。危如累卵的不仅仅只是美国的可信性，还包括这届政府的国内政治可信性和高级官员的个人可信性。林登· 约翰逊担心越南的失败会危及他的国内政治议程。甚至让他更为担心的是：其个人颜面扫地将不可避免地造成其个人的失败，谈判撤军也是一种失败。与此同时，很多高级官员多年来公开鼓吹越南的重要性。他们知道现在开始采取不同对策将会使他们有可能遭受讥讽并威胁他们的前程。基于这个原因，本文认为，造成1964－1965年美国越战升级决定的关键，美国国内的因素要多于亚洲的因素。
Ideology vs. Technology and Security: How the Vietnam War Undermined the Communist Coalition in the late 1960s
意识形态、技术及安全因素：越南战争如何瓦解了社会主义阵营
Xiaobing Li，李小兵
Summary
China played a crucial role in the Vietnam War in two different ways. First of all, it sent the troops of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to North Vietnam in 1965, preventing a perceived American invasion of the North. With China standing in the middle, as Chen Jian points out, it was less likely that the United States and Soviet Union—the two superpowers engaged in the Cold War—would become involved in a direct military confrontation in Indochina. Second, China withdrew its troops and reduced its aid to Hanoi in 1968. Its early withdrawal in the middle of the war forced Moscow to increase Russian involvement, which led to the serious overextension of the Soviet Union’s power. China’s withdrawal worsened the Sino-Soviet relationship and eventually led to the Sino-Soviet border clash in 1969-71. The conflicts which had pined down 1 million Russian troops along the Sino-Soviet borders continued after U.S. President Richard Nixon visited Beijing in 1972. These China-centered events had transformed the Cold War from a pi-polar stand-off to multiple-front confrontations, and made the competition between the two superpowers became less significant, if not totally meaningless. The United States and Soviet Union began to use the “China card” and play a different game in the late 1970s, the beginning of the end of the Cold War.
This paper examines the factors that led to Chinese military withdrawal from North Vietnam. The paper begins with an overview of the PLA operation problems against the American “Rolling Thunder” air bombing campaign in 1965-67. Then, it explains how the technology gap handicapped Chinese in a futile competition against the superior Soviet air defense systems in North Vietnam. The findings in the paper suggests that when Russia became more involved in Indochina, the Vietnamese Communist (or Democratic Republic of Vietnam, DRV) government went closer to Moscow for better military technology and more economic aids. Beijing lost the war of ideology and left Vietnam in 1968. To support these arguments, the paper utilizes the Chinese sources, including veteran recollections, personal interviews, and recent publications. It also looks at how much the American military and government knew about the change in China’s strategy, and how good their intelligence was. Hopefully, its finding may shed some light on the Chinese military involvement in their longest foreign war.
内容提要
中国在越南战争中起了两个重要作用。第一，中国于1965年出兵越南，阻止了美国对北越的入侵。有中国在北越的介入，美国和苏联这两个超级大国，就不会在印度支那直接发生冲突。第二，中国于1968年从越南撤军，增加了苏联的压力。中苏关系的进一步恶化，中苏边境冲突，及苏联在印度支那越陷越深，改变了冷战的格局。美国开始打“中国牌”，中苏矛盾加剧。本文试图说明：中国在60年代末，70年代初期冷战转型中，起了重要的作用。
本文试图从军事技术的角度，分析中国从越南撤军的原因及过程。以中国撤军为例，来说明中国战略重点的转移。从1965年到1968年，中国在援越抗美斗争中，认识到中国的军事技术落后于苏联的军事技术，北越政府和越南人民军越来越依赖于苏联的军事技术。由于越南向苏联靠拢，使中国援越抗美的大量努力和积极援助，未能达到“反帝反修”的预期效果。
China，the Soviet-bloc，and Negotiations in Vietnam，1965-67
中国、苏联集团与关于越南的谈判，1965－1967
Jim Hershberg，赫斯伯格
Summary
China’s role in the Vietnam War, while murky at the time, has been the subject of extensive re-examination since new sources from all sides in the conflict began to open up since the era of Deng Xiaoping’s modernizations and the end of the cold war. Internationally, English-language works by such scholars as Zhai Qiang and Chen Jian have dramatically expanded our understanding of Beijing’s actions and policies toward the conflict, as well as the interrelationship between the Vietnam War and the concurrently widening Sino-Soviet split.[1]
In this presentation, I focus on one crucial yet still incompletely-understood aspect of Chinese involvement that was the subject of intense scrutiny by U.S. officials at the time and historians ever since: Beijing’s attitude toward the issue of potential peace talks, and particular whether and how it attempted to influence the North Vietnamese leadership as it considered entering negotiations with the American enemy between 1965 (when Washington began to dramatically escalate its military involvement) and April 1968 (when Hanoi agreed to what eventually became the Paris peace talks). During this three year stretch, with the two sides lacking normal diplomatic relations, a parade of third parties and would-be mediators attempted to broker the opening of direct negotiations between the enemies. Perhaps most importantly, while Beijing consistently advocated armed struggle until total victory, the Soviet Union supported opening a diplomatic track to accompany and eventually replace the military struggle, and encouraged its Warsaw Pact satellites to urge Hanoi in this direction.
All these efforts failed, however, and what is still unclear is the extent to which Chinese opposition to negotiations influenced, if at all, North Vietnam’s generally—but not totally, I argue—negative responses to such probes. In particular, as part of a broader book project, I use recently-opened archival sources from Eastern Europe to raise and examine three China-related mysteries during the year 1966 in connection with secret peace initiatives involving the People’s Republic of Poland. In each case, documents from the Warsaw archives raise interesting questions about the fate of the failed peace initiative that can only be finally resolved with the aid of Chinese sources and perspectives.[2]
The first case occurred during U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson’s 37-day “pause” in bombing North Vietnam from late December 1965 until the end of January 1966. Prompted by a visit from LBJ emissary Averell Harriman (the former US ambassador to Moscow), the communist Polish government of Wladyslaw Gomulka agreed to transmit U.S. proposals to the North Vietnamese, and for this purpose dispatched to Hanoi a secret envoy, Jerzy Michalowski, the director-general of the Polish foreign ministry (and chief Asia aide to minister Adam Rapacki). En route, Michalowski stopped in both the Soviet Union and China, and my presentation examines the Polish perception that Beijing not only opposed but actively sabotaged Michalowski’s mission. “God damn those Chinese,” he was reported to have muttered on his return.[3]
The next Polish peace initiative arose in the summer of 1966, and once again some sources and circumstances raise the question of whether blame should be pinned, in whole or in part, on Beijing for its failure. This was the first phase of the peace initiative which U.S. officials code-named “Marigold” in which the Saigon-based Polish ambassador to the International Control Commission set up by the 1954 Geneva conference served as a communications channel between Washington and Hanoi, able to convey messages and ideas between DRV leaders and the US ambassador to South Vietnam, Henry Cabot Lodge. It has long been known at the end of June 1966, the Polish diplomat, Janusz Lewandowski, conveyed (via the Italian ambassador in Saigon) a series of purported North Vietnamese positions and proposals that sounded surprisingly reasonable to American ears, arousing LBJ’s hope that a breakthrough towards peace might be imminent. However, in late July, Hanoi rebuffed a U.S. probe through Lewandowski for further talks, and the “Marigold” channel was temporarily closed.
Why did Hanoi seem suddenly to harden its position? New Polish evidence reveals that the more moderate North Vietnamese position emerged in a June 2 conversation between Premier Pham Van Dong and Lewandowski, almost a month before the U.S. learned of it. In the intervening period, on June 10-11, Ho Chi Minh made a secret visit to the PRC, and according to East German records was strongly pressured by Mao Zedong and other Chinese leaders against entering peace negotiations with the Americans; the exchanges also coincided with the dramatic intensification of the Cultural Revolution. Did the radicalization in Beijing stiffen Hanoi’s resistance to direct talks with Washington, thereby dooming the Polish initiative?
Finally, there is the climax of the “Marigold” affair in the fall of 1966. In late November, Lewandowski’s visit to Hanoi with new American proposals conveyed by Lodge led to the scheduling of a secret US-DRV meeting in Warsaw for December 6 to confirm a ten-point plan to end the war. But the meeting was never held—instead, the effort collapsed in mutual acrimony, with the Poles blaming the US for resuming the bombing of Hanoi for the first time since the summer and scaring the North Vietnamese off, and the Americans suspecting that Warsaw was never really authorized to proceed in the first place. Polish evidence confirms that the DRV had in fact authorized the direct contact in Warsaw, and also raises surprising questions about Beijing’s part in the affair. Though the US and some Poles believed Hanoi had acted behind China’s back, a series of cables from the Polish ambassador to North Vietnam cites an unidentified Vietnamese source as divulging that during a secret trip to the PRC in November by the powerful communist party leader Le Duan, the Chinese leadership had offered a mixed assessment of the North Vietnamese apparent willingness to begin peace exchanges with the Americans—Zhou Enlai, predictably, firmly opposed such a move, but Mao Zedong was reported to have taken a far less hard-line stand against talks, conceding that Hanoi knew best what to do and China would be supportive regardless of what it decided. Other sources also record Zhou’s strident opposition yet Mao reacting moderately toward Hanoi’s entering negotiations—but only two years later, in conversation with Pham Van Dong in November 1968.[4]
Did Mao and Zhou really use this “good-cop, bad-cop” routine with Hanoi and Le Duan two years earlier? Did Hanoi find it necessary to obtain Beijing’s consent before entering peace talks, or at least a talking-while-fighting strategy? Are the Polish sources reliable? More broadly, did North Vietnamese discontent with China’s position—its internal chaos as a result of the Cultural Revolution, and its focus on single-minded pursuit of military victory—help prod it to seek Moscow’s help in opening direct talks with the Americans beginning in early 1967, and eventually lead it toward adopting a position closer to the Soviet line in early 1968? Did pressure from Beijing or Moscow influence this evolution of policy, or were such decisions exclusively generated as a result of internal North Vietnamese considerations and processes, contrary to speculation in Washington that “pro-Chinese” and “pro-Soviet” factions competed for influence?
My presentation, based largely on Polish rather than Chinese sources, is intended to stimulate discussion and inquiry regarding these and other questions and events to this important aspect of the PRC’s involvement in the Vietnam war.
内容提要
以前还不太清楚中国在越南战争中的角色，但是自从这场冲突中各个方面的新材料开始出现后，自从邓小平开启了中国现代化的新时代以及冷战的结束时起，这个课题已经被广泛地重新思考了。从国际上来说，翟强（Zhai Qiang）、陈兼（Chen Jian）等一批学者在英语语言方面的工作，极大地扩展了我们对于北京在这场冲突中的行为和政策的理解，以及对越南战争和中苏分裂加剧的理解。[5]
在这篇介绍中，我主要关注中国卷入越南战争这一方面的问题，这是一个至关重要的但是还没有完全弄清楚的问题，在当时美国官方就已经对此非常关注了，历史学家从那时到现在都关注：北京对于潜在的和平谈判问题的态度，特别是在1965年（华盛顿开始大规模地增加其军事干涉）和1968年4月（河内同意进行最终演变为巴黎和平会谈的谈判）之间，当它考虑与美国敌人进行谈判的时候，它是否并且如何试图影响北越领导层。在这三年里，双方缺少正常的外交关系，许多第三方和自诩的调停人试图为这两个敌人之间开始直接谈判而牵线搭桥。也许最重要的是，当北京一贯提倡坚持武装斗争，直到取得完全胜利的时候，苏联却支持通过外交途径去补充军事斗争，以至最终取代军事斗争，并且鼓励它的华约卫星国们在这个方面督促河内。
然而，所有的这些努力都失败了，现在仍然不清楚的是中国在谈判问题上的反对态度——如果是根本反对的话——在多大程度上影响到北越对这样的试探一般——我认为并不是完全的——采取拒绝的反应。特别是作为一个更大的写作计划的一部分，我使用来自东欧的最新开放的档案资料去提出并调查在1966年期间与中国相关的三个神秘问题，以及涉及波兰人民共和国的秘密主动和平试探。在每一事例上，来自华沙档案馆的文件都提出了关于失败了的主动和平试探的命运的有趣问题，这一点只能在中国方面的资料和观点的帮助下才能得到最终解决。[6]
第一个事例发生在从1965年12月底到1966年1月底为期37天的美国总统林登·B. 约翰逊（Lyndon B. Johnson）“暂停”轰炸北越的期间。受来自约翰逊的使者埃夫里尔·哈里曼（Averell Harriman）（美国驻莫斯科前大使）访问的敦促，波兰共产党瓦迪斯瓦夫·哥穆尔卡（Wladyslaw Gomulka）政府同意将美国的建议传达给北越，出于这个目的还派遣波兰外交部主任米哈诺夫斯基（Jerzy Michalowski）[亚当·洛巴克（Adam Rapacki）部长的亚洲事务的主要助手]作为秘密使者前往河内。途中，米哈诺夫斯基（Michalowski）在苏联和北京作了停留，而我的介绍研究了波兰的看法——那就是北京不仅仅反对，而且还积极地破坏米哈诺夫斯基（Michalowski）的使命。据说他在返程中抱怨说：“这些该死的中国人的。”[7]
波兰的下一个主动和平试探出现在1966年的夏天，一些资料和情况又一次提出了这个问题，是否要北京为这次失败负——全部的或部分的——责任。这是美国官方称之为“万寿菊”的主动和平试探的第一阶段，驻西贡的波兰大使在1954年日内瓦会议上建立的作为华盛顿和河内联系渠道的国际控制委员会（International Control Commission）上，能够在越南民主共和国（DRV）领导人和美国驻南越大使亨利·卡伯特·洛奇（Henry Cabot Lodge）之间传递信息和意见。很早就知道在1966年6月底，波兰外交官贾纳兹·柳安多夫斯基（Janusz Lewandowski）传达了（通过西贡的意大利大使）许多传闻中的北越的立场和建议，足以让美国人听了之后感到很惊讶。这唤起了约翰逊在短期内在和平问题上取得突破的希望。然后，在7月底，河内回绝了美国通过柳安多夫斯基（Lewandowski）表达的希望进一步对话的试探，而且“万寿菊”渠道也暂时被封闭了。
河内为什么似乎突然就强化了其立场？波兰方面的新证据显示，在美国了解到这个差不多一个月之前，在范文同总理与柳安多夫斯基（Lewandowski） 6月2日的会议上，北越表现出来了更为温和的立场。在这期间，胡志明对中华人民共和国（PRC）作了一次秘密访问，而根据东德的报告，他受到了毛泽东和其他中国领导人反对与美国进行和平谈判的压力；争论也符合了当时正急剧激化的文化大革命。是北京的激进行为强化了河内反对直接与华盛顿对话的立场，然后导致了波兰主动试探的失败吗？
最后，“万寿菊”事件在1966年秋天出现了高潮。在11月底，柳安多夫斯基（Lewandowski）带着由洛奇（Lodge）传递的美国的新建议访问了河内，这致使制定了于12月6日在华沙举行美国——越南民主共和国（US－DRV）秘密会议以确定十点计划结束战争的时间表。但是这场会议未能举行——取而代之的是，这种努力在双方尖酸刻薄的攻击中失败了，波兰人指责美国在这个夏天首次恢复了轰炸河内，并吓跑了北越，而美国人则首先怀疑华沙从来没有真正得到继续进行下去的委托。波兰方面的证据确认了越南民主共和国（DRV）确实批准了在华沙的直接接触，而且也提出了令人惊讶的关于中国在这个事情上所扮演的角色的问题。尽管美国人和一些波兰人相信河内是背着北京行动的，但是波兰大使发到北越的一系列电报引用了一条未经证实的越南材料泄漏说，强有力的共产党领袖黎笋在11月秘密访问中华人民共和国（PRC）期间，中国领导人拿出了一份显示北越明显愿意与美国展开和平对话的综合评估——可以预料，周恩来强烈反对这样的举动，但是据说毛泽东却站在一个并不是很强硬的立场上反对对话，这迫使河内知道最好做什么，中国支持什么，而不管其决定了什么。其他的资料也记录了周恩来对河内进入谈判的强烈反对，而毛泽东的反应则比较温和——只是这是在两年之后与范文同在1968年11月的会谈上。[8]
毛泽东和周恩来真的在两年前就使用“好警察、坏警察”（good-cop，bad-cop）的程序来对待河内和黎笋？河内真的觉得在进入和平对话之前有必要获得北京的同意？或者至少是坚持边打边谈的策略？波兰方面的资料可靠吗？更直接地说，北越是因为对中国立场的不满——文化大革命导致了其国内的混乱，而且它一心一意追求军事上的胜利——而促使它寻求莫斯科的帮助，与美国在1967年初开始直接对话，并最终导致它在1968年初采取了一个更靠近苏联路线的立场吗？来自北京或莫斯科的压力影响了北越政策的演变，或者是这样的决定作为北越国内思考和变化过程的结果而产生，与华盛顿关于“亲华派”与“亲苏派”为权势而争斗的想法相反？
我的介绍，主要基于波兰而不是中国方面的材料，目的是引起讨论并探究中华人民共和国（PRC）卷入越南战争这一重要方面的这些和其他一些的问题和事件。
The Sino-Vietnam war of 1979 and the Repercussions on the End of the Cold War
1979年中越战争及其对冷战结束的影响
Enrico Fardella，法恩瑞
Summary
The normalization with the United States was a key factor in Deng’s strategy, especially in view of a solution of the problems with Vietnam.
Like Deng, Brzezinski, looked at Sino-American cooperation as the crucial step in contrasting Moscow. He set up an effective strategy within the Carter administration in order to create a security cooperation with Beijing.
His visit was the crucial step in this direction: it marked a cornerstone in the history of Sino-American relations and deeply contribute to internazionalize the Sino-Vietnamese conflict.
After his visit Beijing adopted a wilder tone towards Hanoi and started its plans for an attack against its Southern neighbor. The alliance between Moscow and Hanoi formally established, China and the US followed.
The strategic ‘honeymoon’ between Washington and Beijing made a decisive step forward with Deng’s visit to the US. (January 28th to February 5th, 1979). The Vietnam issue was at the core of the meetings.
During the visit, Deng helped the administration to sell the normalization to the Congress and the American people by saying as much as he could afford about the ‘peaceful settlement’ of the Taiwan issue. In exchange for his flexibility on this point he got the US backing for China’s expedition against Vietnam. That was what he needed to succeed in his plan.
On these premises it it possible to review the common assumption that, prior to his US visit, Deng had already decided to attack Vietnam and would have done so with or without American support. The corollary of this idea then is that Deng traveled to Washington in search of simple ‘moral support’.
Although different sources show that the decision to attack Vietnam had been made before Deng’s visit to the States, a decision was not necessarily a guarantee of successful execution.
On February 17th, China started teaching its ‘lesson’ to Vietnam.
During the hostilities, the US's official position - based on a reciprocal withdrawal that implied a de facto justification of Chinese attack – the ‘imposed’ restraint on Moscow, and Brzezinski’s daily briefings with Chai Zemin are only the most evident clues of the support granted by Washington to Beijing.
An era was over. By abrogating, a month after the end of the conflict, the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed with Moscow in 1950, Beijing symbolically showed the global change of its foreign policy.
By evaluating the PLA performance on the ground many commentators have interpreted the Chinese attack on Vietnam as a failure. However, it was not a military operation but a political one and it led to a massive change in China’s and Us’s strategic picture in Asia and globally.
In Brzezinski’s eyes, China served mainly a strategic function. Nonetheless the economic relations built at that time to sustain and reinforce political relations among China and United States deeply contributed to the success of an epoch-making event: the economic reform in China.
The interaction between Us foreign policy and Deng’s reforms had an important effect on the development of the last phase of the Cold War.
The progressive ‘marketization’ of the economy of the most populated communist country in the world and its involvement in international trade marked a massive ideological defeat for the communist bloc and, “helped undermine the faith in socialist solutions not just in the rest of Asia, but also in all the Third World。
内容提要
与美国关系正常化是邓小平战略的一个关键要素，特别是考虑到越南问题的解决。
像邓小平一样，布热津斯基在与莫斯科对比中，把中美合作看作是至关重要的一步。他为卡特政府中提出一种有效的战略，以建立与北京的安全合作。
他的访问是这一方针的关键步骤：它是中美关系史上的一块奠基石，并极大地促进了中越冲突的国际化。
在他访问后，北京对河内采取了一种更加激烈的语气，并开始实施它进攻南部邻居的计划。莫斯科与河内之间联盟的正式建立，中国与美国也随之建立联盟关系。
华盛顿与北京之间的战略“蜜月”随着邓的访美（1979年1月28日至2月5日）推进了决定性的一步。越南问题是会晤的中心问题。
访问期间，邓帮助（卡特）政府向国会和美国人民宣传关系正常化，说了许多关于台湾“和平解决”的计划。由于他在该问题上的灵活性，他在对越南的远征问题上获得了美国的支持。那正是他的计划需要的成功之处。
在这些前提下，考察这种共同的假设才是有可能的，即在访问美国之前，邓已经决定进攻越南，有没有美国的支持下都要这样做。那么，这种观点的推论是，邓前往华盛顿是寻求的只是“道义的支持”。
尽管不同的资料表明，进攻越南的决定在邓访美之前已经做出，但是这一决定胜利实现的保证所必需的。
2月17日，中国开始“教训”越南。
在对抗中，美国官方立场是建立在意指中国的进攻实际上是正义的行动——对莫斯科的“强制性的”限制——的相互退让基础之上，布热津斯基与Chai Zemin 的每日简报只是华盛顿对北京给予支持的最明显的线索而已。
一个时代结束了。冲突结束一个月后，1950年与莫斯科签署的《友好与合作条约》废除，北京象征性的消闲出它外交政策全球性的变化。
通过评估中国人民解放军在战场上的表现，许多评论员把中国人对越南的进攻解释为一场失败。然而，它并不是一场军事行动，而是一场政治行动，它使中国和美国在亚洲和全球战略图景的大规模转变。
在布热津斯基看来，中国此举主要是用于一种战略功能。然而，那时为了维持与加强中国与美国之间的政治关系而建立的经济关系极大的推动了一场划时代的成功：中国的经济改革。
美国的对外政策与邓的改革之间的相互作用对冷战最后时期的发展产生了重要的影响。
世界上人口最多的共产主义国家经济“市场化”的进步及其参与国际贸易标志着共产主义集团的一次大规模的意识形态的失败，“不仅有助于削弱亚洲其他地区，而且也削弱了所有第三世界的社会主义解决中的信仰。”
[1] For English-language scholarship using Chinese sources on the Vietnam war, see, e.g., Zhai Qiang, China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2000); Chen Jian, Mao’s China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), chaps. 5, 8; Priscilla Roberts, ed., Behind the Bamboo Curtain: China, Vietnam, and the World Beyond Asia (Washington, DC: Stanford University Press/Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2006); and Odd Arne Westad, Chen Jian, Stein Tonnesson, Nguyen Vu Tung, and James G. Hershberg, eds., 77 Conversations between Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the Wars in Indochina, 1964-1977 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center: Cold War International History Project Working Paper No. 22, April 1998).
[2] For the present author’s earlier findings on East European peace diplomacy during the Vietnam War, see James G. Hershberg, “Who Murdered ‘Marigold’?—New Evidence on The Mysterious Failure of Poland’s Secret Initiative To Start U.S.-North Vietnamese Peace Talks, 1966,” Cold War International History Project Working Paper No. 27, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C., April 2000; James G. Hershberg, “Peace Probes and the Bombing Pause: Hungarian and Polish Diplomacy During the Vietnam War, December 1965-January 1966,” Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Spring 2003), pp. 32-67; and James G. Hershberg, “‘A Half-Hearted Overture’: Czechoslovakia, Kissinger, and Vietnam, Autumn 1966,” in Lloyd Gardner and Ted Gittinger, eds., Vietnam: The Search for Peace in the Johnson Years, 1964-1968 (College Station, TX: Texas A & M University Press, 2004), pp. 292-320.
[3] David Kraslow and Stuart H. Loory, The Secret Search for Peace in Vietnam (NY: Random House, 1968), p.149.
[4] See record of conversation between Mao Zedong and Pham Van Dong, Beijing, 17 November 1968, in Westad et al., eds., 77 Conversations, pp. 140-155.
[5] For English-language scholarship using Chinese sources on the Vietnam war, see, e.g., Zhai Qiang, China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2000); Chen Jian, Mao’s China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), chaps. 5, 8; Priscilla Roberts, ed., Behind the Bamboo Curtain: China, Vietnam, and the World Beyond Asia (Washington, DC: Stanford University Press/Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2006); and Odd Arne Westad, Chen Jian, Stein Tonnesson, Nguyen Vu Tung, and James G. Hershberg, eds., 77 Conversations between Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the Wars in Indochina, 1964-1977 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center: Cold War International History Project Working Paper No. 22, April 1998).
[6] For the present author’s earlier findings on East European peace diplomacy during the Vietnam War, see James G. Hershberg, “Who Murdered ‘Marigold’?—New Evidence on The Mysterious Failure of Poland’s Secret Initiative To Start U.S.-North Vietnamese Peace Talks, 1966,” Cold War International History Project Working Paper No. 27, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C., April 2000; James G. Hershberg, “Peace Probes and the Bombing Pause: Hungarian and Polish Diplomacy During the Vietnam War, December 1965-January 1966,” Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Spring 2003), pp. 32-67; and James G. Hershberg, “‘A Half-Hearted Overture’: Czechoslovakia, Kissinger, and Vietnam, Autumn 1966,” in Lloyd Gardner and Ted Gittinger, eds., Vietnam: The Search for Peace in the Johnson Years, 1964-1968 (College Station, TX: Texas A & M University Press, 2004), pp. 292-320.
[7] David Kraslow and Stuart H. Loory, The Secret Search for Peace in Vietnam (NY: Random House, 1968), p.149.
[8] See record of conversation between Mao Zedong and Pham Van Dong, Beijing, 17 November 1968, in Westad et al., eds., 77 Conversations, pp. 140-155.