Transforming the Cold War: China and the Changing World，1960s-1980s
An International Conference
冷战转型：1960-1980年代的中国与变化中的世界
国际学术讨论会
Session IV
China，South Asia，and the Changing Cold War（/12月21日）
第四场 中国、南亚与冷战的变局（9:00-10:30）
The Transition of the Cold Ear and the Focal Point of the Chinese-Indian Border Dispute
冷战转型与中印边界争议的焦点
Masui Yasuki，真水康树
Summary
From the late 1960s to the early 1980s, because of such events as the Sino-Soviet split and Chinese-American rapprochement, the structure of the Cold War had experienced profound changes. However, its impact upon Chinese-Indian relations was relatively limited. The fundamental turning point toward improvement of Chinese-Indian relations was Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to China in December 1988. Or in other words, from the 1960s to the 1980s, there was no sign for obvious improvement in Chinese-Indian relations. Therefore, it is necessary to reassess the Chinese-Indian border dispute—indeed, this provides the important ground on which to assess the evolution of Chinese-Indian relations after the border clash, and this allows one to pursue a deeper understanding of the origins of the problems existing between China and India.
In the “Agreement on Trade and Transportation between India and the Tibet Region of China” signed on April 29, 1954, neither China nor India was willing to touch upon the border issue between them, and the Chinese-India border issue was in a status of ambiguity. However, toward such ambiguity, the two sides had very different definitions. For India, this meant that this issue ‘had been settled” (the border was already established); for China, this meant that this issue might be “put aside for the moment” (the border was yet to be established). When the status of ambiguity was not possible to be maintained, conflict between the two countries became inevitable. A fundamental reason that made it impossible for the status of ambiguity to continue lay in that the dispute in the western section of the border became highlighted.
In the meeting between Chinese and Indian prime ministers (Zhou Enlai and Nehru) in April 1960, the Chinese made it clear that China was ready to make major concessions on the eastern section of the border, and the key of the Chinese proposal was to use the concession in the eastern section to exchange for India’s concession in the western section. However, the proposal was rejected by India. It thus can be deducted that since China was willing to pursue compromises in the border’s eastern section on the basis of the McMahon Line, which China had never recognized, it is clear that what caused the failure of the meetings between the prime ministers of the two countries was the dispute over the border’s western section.
China’s construction of the Xinjiang-Tibet highway was a question concerning China’s actual control of the territory that the road went through, and this became the focal point of Chinese-Indian dispute in the border’s western section. After this, Nehru abandoned the policy of friendship toward China.
However, it was the 1954 agreement that sowed the seed of mutual opposition between China and India. From that moment, China and India already were “sleeping in the same bed yet having different dreams.” It thus can be said that in the dealings and discussions leading up to the 1954 agreement, the ambiguity of the border issue became a real issue between China and India. However, it was India that finally turned this situation of disadvantages in diplomacy into a confrontation between the two sides. The Indians insisted that, even without signing the border agreement, Indian’s borders with China had already been established—and the Indians also tried to impose this stand on the other side
What had caused the antagonism between China and India was the 1954 agreement—asthe “same bed, different dreams” experience between China and India began at that time. Although measures were taken to remedy the situation, compromises were unable to be reached. Therefore, in the discussion leading up to the 1954 agreement, allowing ambiguity to exist in the border issue was a problem for both China and India. However, it was India that finally changed this diplomatic problem into a confrontation between the two sides. The Nehru government’s practice of insisting that the border had been established—under the circumstance that an agreement on the border issue was yet to be worked out—and trying to impose it on the other side was highly problematic. The Nehru government, restricted by such a wrong understanding and lacking true intention to solve the dispute through negotiation, was brought into an alley of dead end. The Nehru government was locked by its own stand that “the border had been established,” and also by its stubborn claim that Aksai Chin was part of Indian territory. The highly provocative “marching forward policy” was a natural extension of the above stand. In a sense, the policy revealed that India’s quibble that “the border had been established” was no more than an “establishment” in words. Consequently, it was India’s provocative “marching forward policy” that finally caused the counter-offensive by China.
But in 1962, there was still the possibility of reaching compromises. An example in this respect was what was revealed by A. Lall, Indian ambassador to the United Nation. In July 1962, after the Geneva conference on Laotian neutrality, three times Chen Yi, China’s vice premier and foreign minister, Zhang Hanfu, deputy foreign minister, and Qiao Guanhua, assistant to the foreign minister, met with K. Menon, India’s defense minister, and A. Lall. Chen put forward in the meeting the proposal of dividing the Aksai Chin region under the condition that the Xinjiang-Tibet highway would remain Chinese territory. Lall reported this proposal to New Delhi. However, Nehru was not in New Delhi at that time, so he did give a reply in a timely manner. The meeting between the Chinese and the Indians did not achieve any further progress. When the Indian media discovered this Chinese-Indian contact, inquiries were made at the parliament. Nehru denied that there was contact between China and India. Lall believed that Nehru’s response at the parliament made the Chinese side feel that the Indian side had rejected resolving the border dispute through mutual consultation. If indeed there was the Chinese proposal, it is evidence that China was willing to resolve the dispute by peaceful means. In addition, K. Nayar had heard that before Indian Defense Minister Menon’s trip to Geneva, India had raised a similar proposal, which the Chinese side accepted. According to Nayar, it was the Indian side that finally withdrew this proposal. Concerning these two cases, although the proposals were raised in different ways, in that the Chinese side accepted the proposal while the India side turned down the proposal it was similar. It is more than possible that around the time of the Geneva conference of 1962 other similar proposals had been raised. It is not so important to identify which side had raised the proposal—in retrospect, any such proposal was with constructive meanings.
In the 1950s, the direct connection between the Tibet question and the Chinese-Indian dispute over the border issue was where the origins of the Chinese-Indian opposition could be identified. After the Chinese-Indian border clash of 1962, the Pakistan factor became increasingly more outstanding. The antagonism between China and India, while under the strong impact of the deterioration of relationship between China and the Soviet Union, was also clearly demonstrated in the Indian-Pakistani conflict. The Chinese-Indian border clash not only exposed India’s weaknesses in military power and capacity but also stimulated, to a certain extent, Pakistan’s intention to use military means to solve the Kashmir issue. Then, under the circumstance that the United States significantly increased its aid to India after 1962, Pakistan became closer and closer to China. In a sense, the second Indian-Pakistani war in 1964-1965 and the third Indian-Pakistani war of 1971 and 1972 were reflections of the status of Chinese-Indian relations. China supported Pakistan, and the Soviet Union supported India. (After the second Indian-Pakistani war, the United States and Britain stopped aiding India and maintained neutrality in the Indian-Pakistani confrontation.) In the mid-1960s, when the Chinese-Indian relations became cooled down and showed a tendency toward stabilization, Pakistan’s relationship with India deteriorated continuously. Consequently, on the basis of the second Indian-Pakistani war, the third war between the two countries broke out. The result of the war made it a widely recognized reality that it was impossible for Pakistan to defeat India, and Pakistan’s own national power was greatly reduced in the wake of the independence of eastern Pakistan (Bangladesh). India thus greatly reduced the security threat that it had been facing in the areas surrounding it. Entering the 1970s, the influence of the Pakistan factor was reduced greatly. As far as this is concerned, the situation in this region became more and more stabilized.
A direct consequence of the failure on the part of China and India to reach an agreement in 1960 was the relationship between the two became estranged for a long period, which had lasted until Rajiv Gandhi’s China visit of 1988, or even has lasted until today. It thus can be said that the “same bed, different dreams” experience of the two countries in 1954 and the failure of reaching an agreement on the western section of the border in1960 are with a very heavy price
In the wake of the Chinese-Indian border clash of 1962, China successfully achieved stabilizing its borders with India at relatively low costs. However, not only did China lose India as a friendly country—and India had since pursued a path of increasing its military power and, especially, developing nuclear weapons—but also was India made increasingly closer to the Soviet Union. In any case, the relative stabilization of Chinese-Indian relations was not just because of the Chinese “war of border self-defense” against India; this was caused by the complicated functioning of many other factors and the international structure. Within China, some scholars believe that probably the Chinese counter-offensive in 1962 went too far. However, the Indian side in 1962 was completely without the intention to resolve the dispute through negotiation. Against this background, China had no other choice but to conduct the “war of self-defense.”
内容提要
从20世纪60年代后半期到80年代初期，由于中苏论战、中美接近等事件的发生，冷战格局发生了很大的变化。但是，对于中印关系而言其影响是有限的。中印关系根本改善的转折点是1988年12月印度总理拉吉夫·甘地访华。也就是说，从20世纪60年代到80年代，中印关系没有明显改善的迹象。在此，有必要重新分析中印边界争议——这是对于武装冲突之后的中印关系演变给予评价的重要依据，以及能否进一步深入理解中印关系存在问题的根源。
1954年4月29日签订的《中华人民共和国和印度共和国关于中国西藏地方与印度之间的通商和交通协定》(此后简称“54年协定”)中，由于中印双方不愿意涉及边界问题，所以中印边界问题处于一种“暧昧的”状态。对于暧昧的意思，双方的理解完全相反。印度理解为“已经解决了”（边界已划定），中国认为先搁置（边界尚未划定）。当不能保持这种暧昧状态的时候，冲突就不可避免了。而不能保持这种暧昧状态的根本原因在于西部边界的焦点化。
1960年4月中印两国总理会谈时，中国对印度表示：对于东部边界做好了大幅度让步的准备。中国的提案事实上是东西交换论。但是印度拒绝了这个提案。由此可以推断既然中国表示在从不承认的麦克马洪线的东部边界可以做出某种妥协，那么使两国总理会谈破裂的应该是西部边界。
中国建设新藏公路，是涉及到实际控制的问题，就是西部边界成为中印争议的焦点。此后尼赫鲁放弃了对华友好的政策。
但是引起中印之间对立的是1954年协定，那时中印双方就开始同床异梦了。尽管采取措施进行修正但也没有达成妥协。可以说在1954年协定的交涉过程中，边界问题的暧昧化成为中印双方存在的问题。但是，其结果是印度最终将这种外交上的不利局势转向双边对峙。没有签订边界协定就认为边界已经划定，并将这一认识强加给对方，尼赫鲁政府的这一做法本身就存在问题。带有这种错误认识，并且没有意图解决这种对峙局面的尼赫鲁政府最终走进了死胡同。尼赫鲁政府进一步拘泥于边界“已经划定”，并强硬地坚持领土包括阿克塞钦的边界主张。而具有明显挑衅性的前进政策也是这一主张的延伸。从某种程度上讲，前进政策正是显现出印方狡辩的边界“已经划定”只不过是一个口头上的划定而已。最终, 印度这种无视军事挑衅性的前进政策引发了中国的反击。
但是1962年的时候还存在着妥协的可能性。最后想要介绍表示其可能性的小例子，印度驻联合国代表拉尔（A.Lall）明确表示，1962年7月，在讨论老挝中立宣言的日内瓦国际会议之际，中国的副总理兼外交部部长陈毅、外交部副部长章汉夫、外交部长助理乔冠华等中国代表团与印度的国防部长梅农（K.Menon）及拉尔之间曾三次相互交换意见。当时，陈毅曾提出把新藏公路留在中国一边的条件之下分割阿克赛钦地区的方案，向印方征求意见。拉尔向国内征求对这一方案态度，但是因为尼赫鲁当时没在新德里，没有按时给予答复，会谈也未能进一步的进展。印度媒体发现这次中印双方的接触，在国会中提出质询，尼赫鲁否认了中印接触的事实。拉尔认为尼赫鲁在国会的这一回答使中方感觉到印方拒绝了双边的边界交涉。如果中方的这个提案是事实的话，恰恰可以证明中方希望采取和平交涉的意图。但是目前还没有其他根据。还有，纳亚尔（K.Nayar）也曾听说过这样的消息，在印度国防部长梅农去日内瓦之前，印方提过相类似的方案，并且中方接受了此方案。按照纳亚尔所说，最后是印方自己撤回这一方案。关于这两个证言，虽说提案方不一致，但是中方接受提案，印方最终拒绝提案的情况是趋同的。可以推测，在日内瓦会议前后有可能存在着类似内容的试探方案。不管是哪一方主动提出这一提案，都是具有建设性意义的。
在20世纪50年代，西藏问题与围绕边界纠纷的中印间的直接关系是中印两国对立的问题所在。1962年中印边界冲突之后，巴基斯坦因素日益突出出来。中印两国的对立，在受到中苏关系恶化的强力影响的同时，在印巴对立中也显现出来。1962年中印边界冲突不但暴露了印度军事方面的弱点，也从某种程度上刺激了巴基斯坦采取军事行动的欲望。接着，美国在1962年之后大幅度增加了对印度的军事援助，使巴基斯坦进一步与中国接近。从某种程度上来说，1964年至1965年的第二次印巴战争和1971年至1972年的第三次印巴战争也是中印关系的反映。中国援助巴基斯坦，苏联支持印度（第二次印巴战争之后美英两国停止了对印度的援助，采取了中立的立场）。20世纪60年代，中印关系本身出现冷却并趋于稳定的同时印巴关系恶化。在第二次印巴战争的基础上爆发了第三次印巴战争，这场战争的结果，不但使巴基斯坦不可能战胜印度成为公认的事实，巴基斯坦本身也因为东巴基斯坦（孟加拉国）的独立而削弱了国家实力。印度因此成功地大幅度减少了周边的安全威胁。进入20世纪70年代后，巴基斯坦因素的影响逐步缩小，从这一点来看，该地区的局势逐步趋于稳定。
1960年未能达成的协议的直接后果就是在相当长的时间内疏远了两国关系，一直到1988年拉吉夫·甘地访华，也可以说到今天。应该说，1954年的同床异梦与1960年未能达成西部边界协议所付出的代价是沉重的。
1962年中印边界冲突的后果，一方面，中国以较低的成本成功地实现了边界的稳定，但另一方面，中国不但失去了作为友好国家的印度，使印度走上了增强军事实力，特别是发展核武器的道路，而且使印度进一步接近苏联。不管怎么说，中印关系的稳定，不仅仅是因为中印边境自卫反击战，也同时是多种因素与国际格局共同作用的结果。中国国内也有观点认为1962年的反击过于利害。但是，1962年的时候，印方完全没有通过谈判解决问题的想法，在这种情况下，可以说中国除了自卫反击战之外没有其他任何选择的余地。
The Indian-Pakistani War of 1965，Great Power Relations，and China’s Responses and Policies
1965年印巴战争、大国关系与中国的政策和反应
Dai Chaowu，戴超武
Summary
The Indian-Pakistani War of 1965 was not only the result of the contractions and interest conflict between the two counties over Kashmir, it was also caused by the development of great power politics in South Asia.
After the Chinese-Indian border clash of 1962, with the mediation of Britain and the United States, India and Pakistan conducted six rounds of negotiations for resolving the differences between the two sides over the Kashmir issue. However, no agreement was reached. During this period, India enhanced its political control over Kashmir while, at the same time, endeavoring to greatly strengthen its military forces. All of this led to a huge sense of crisis on the part of Pakistan over the possible overturning of balance of power in South Asia, as well as the difficulty involved in resolving the Kashmir issue in the future. After the Chinese-Indian border war of 1962, the relations between Pakistan and China developed rapidly. Inside Pakistan—and within the Foreign Ministry and the Defense Military in particular—the voice favoring using military force to resolve the Kashmir issue became louder and louder. It was increasingly apparent that Pakistan intended to use China’s power and influence to help resolve the Kashmir issue in ways that were in its favor. After the clash at Rann of Kutch, Pakistan was more determined to adopt a policyline for resolving the Kashmir issue by military means, and made plans accordingly.
After the outbreak of the Indian-Pakistani war of 1965, the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union all responded, and a common feature of the responses was that all these big power hoped to prevent China from intervening in the war. In appearance, the Soviet Union carried out a policy of neutrality, but in essence Moscow supported India. The United States and Britain announced that they would stop supplying weapons to India and Pakistan, but the policymakers of the two countries—and those in the US in particular—were more worried of possible military actions on the part of China as a way to support Pakistan. Policymakers and military planners in Washington thus carefully considered making plans to deal with China’s possible intervention in the war. From Washington’s perspective, the Indian-Pakistani war could produce complicated and profound impact upon the interests of the United States, which would not be restricted to the Kashmir issue, but, rather, could lead to the totally failure of Washington’s comprehensive effort to establish the balance of power vis-à-vis China in South Asia. Consequently, Washington favored stopping the hostile military conflict between India and Pakistan, and pursuing a settlement of all issues of difference—including those over the Kashmir issue—between India and Pakistan through negotiations. The United States also supported the Soviet Union’s mediation effort for the conflict between India and Pakistan.
How did China respond to the Indian-Pakistani War? What policies did China carry out toward the war? These are the questions that scholars have held different answers. Most foreign scholars believe that China was ready to send troops to support Pakistan during the war. Many Chinese scholars have echoed the viewpoints that Yang Gongsu expressed in his memoir. Conclusions about China’s policies and responses cannot be simply reached by reading China’s diplomatic notes to India or by observing China’s military deployment. It is important to examine China’s domestic and international “grand strategy” during this period, and to study and examine Mao Zedong’s ideas and strategic perceptions. There existed several important factors restricting China’s intention and capacity to carry out direct military intervention in the Indian-Pakistani war. First, in 1965 Mao Zedong had begun his intensive preparation for initiating the Cultural Revolution in China, therefore his primary concern was undoubtedly domestic political issues. Second, the restructuring of China’s economic reconstruction, especially the construction of the “Big and Small Third Fronts,” made it impossible for China to provide large-scale military aid to foreign countries, let alone to involve itself in a large-scale war in a foreign country. Third, the emphasis of China’s foreign aid during this period was Vietnam, and this already had consumed a very large portion of China’s limited resources allocated to foreign aid. Furthermore, the power struggle inside Pakistan formed another important factor hindering China’s military intervention. While it seemed that Ayub Khan was inclined to developing relations with the United States and favoring America’s intervention and mediation, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto wanted to get China’s direct military intervention. The differences between these two stands became even clearer after Pakistan was defeated in the armored vehicle confrontation in the Indian-Pakistani war.
The Indian-Pakistani war of 1965 resulted in the virtual weakening of China’s influences in South Asia, the retreat of US influences in the region, and the increase of Soviet influences, especially in India. The Soviet Union endeavored to carry out a balanced policy between India and Pakistan, but the basic tendency of its policy was pro-India. Indeed, the Soviet Union made great efforts to develop relations with India, both during and after the war. More importantly, the war caused deeper hostility between India and Pakistan, which would serve as an important reason leading up to the Indian-Pakistani war of 1971.
内容提要
1965年印巴战争不仅是印度和巴基斯坦在克什米尔问题上的矛盾和利益冲突的发展结果，也是大国关系在南亚地区发展的一个重要结果。
1965年中印边界冲突之后，印巴双方在英美的调停下，先后进行了六次谈判，试图解决双方在克什米尔问题上的分歧，但没有达成任何协议。印度在这一时期不仅在政治上加强对印控克什米尔地区的控制，而且大力发展军事力量，从而导致巴基斯坦对南亚地区力量对比失衡以及未来解决克什米尔问题难度的增加产生了强烈的危机感，加上1962年中印边界冲突之后巴基斯坦同中国关系的迅速发展，使得巴基斯坦政府内部特别是外交部和军方主张以武力解决克什米尔问题的呼声越来越高。巴基斯坦借助中国的力量和影响解决克什米尔问题的企图是明显的。库奇兰恩冲突之后，巴基斯坦更加坚定了以武力解决克什米尔问题的行动路线，并由此制定了相应的行动计划。
1965年战争爆发后，美国、英国和苏联做出了相应的反应。值得提出是，这些大国反应的一个共同点是，防止中国对战争的介入，对付中国对南亚地区潜在的威胁。苏联采取的政策表面上看来是中立的，但实际上是支持印度。美英虽然宣布停止对印巴两国的武器供应，但每英两国特别是美国决策者主要担心中国可能对印度采取军事行动以支持巴基斯坦。美国决策层考虑制定相应的计划应对中国可能的介入。因为在美国决策者看来，印巴战争对美国产生最为复杂和最为深远的影响的，不仅仅是克什米尔问题本身，而是可能会导致美国在南亚地区建立一个针对中国的平衡力的努力的失败。因此，美国主张使印巴停止敌对冲突，通过谈判来解决包括克什米尔问题在内的所有问题的分歧。美国由此同意由苏联进行调停印巴双方的冲突。
有关中国对印巴战争的反应和政策，是学术界存有相当分歧的问题。国外大多数学者认为中国在战争中是准备出兵支持巴基斯坦的，中国国内的研究也基本同意杨公素回忆录中的观点；有关中国的反应和政策不能简单地以中国对印度的照会或军事调动得出上述结论，重要的是要从这一时期中国的内政外交的“大战略”，主要是从毛泽东的思想和战略构想来考察。制约中国在965年印巴战争中采取直接军事行动的因素大致有以下几点：其一，毛泽东从1965年开始就酝酿发动“文化大革命”，此时国内政治应该是他考虑的头等大事；其二，中国国内建设重点的调整，即这一时期开始的大小三线的建设，使得中国不能在外援上特别是军援上采取支持大规模战争的外援。另外，中国的武器生产当时多是苏式，同巴基斯坦军队的美式武装存有差异；其三，但是中国的外援重点是越南，这一项援助占去了当时中国外援的绝大部分。同时，巴基斯坦内部的权力斗争，也是制约中国对待印巴战争以及战争结局的一个重要因素。就目前的资料看，阿尤布·汗主张发展同美国的关系，主张美国介入进行斡旋；而布托则主张请求中国出兵援助。这两种斗争的斗争，在印巴坦克大战巴方失利后更为明显。
1965年战争的后果主要体现在，中国对南亚地区的影响实际上在减弱，美国的影响在消退，苏联的影响在加强，苏联试图在印巴之间推行寻求平衡的政策，但其政策的倾向性是明显的，大力发展同印度的关系。更为重要的是，印巴敌对更加强烈，成为导致1971年印巴战争的一个重要起因。